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# UNIT HISTORY (U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION  
TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

## 1971

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## FOREWORD

The purpose of this document is to provide an annual review of the activities of the United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany. The scope of this unit history is limited to a summary of the more significant USMLM operations and liaison contacts with Soviet military officials. The brief presentations on Soviet and East German military developments should be viewed by the reader as conclusions reached by USMLM personnel through repetitive tours in East Germany rather than as facts based upon detailed analysis.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION  
UNIT HISTORY  
1971  
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PART I

GENERAL

A. (C) MISSION

Primary: To conduct liaison between the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (CINC USAREUR), and the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (CINC GSFG), in accordance with the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement (ANNEX A).

Secondary: To exploit United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) status and potential for the collection of intelligence information in East Germany.

B. (U) REFERENCES

1. TDA E1 W1AUAA 04, HQ USAREUR, 14 May 1970.
2. USEUCOM Directive 40-18 (Clas).
3. USAREUR Regulation 383-27 (Clas).

C. (U) HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT

The basis for the existence of USMLM is the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. The Agreement was signed in March 1947 by Lieutenant General C.R. Huebner, Deputy Commander in Chief, European Command, and Colonel-General Malinin, Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff, Group of Soviet Occupation Forces, Germany. The Agreement established a Soviet Military Liaison Mission (SMLM), presently accredited to CINC USAREUR and located in Frankfurt/Main; and the USMLM, presently accredited to CINC GSFG and located in Potsdam, East Germany. Terms of the Agreement authorize each Mission to have 14 accredited members without regard to service or grade, guarantee the right of free travel for accredited members throughout the zone without escort "except place of disposition of military units", permit the Missions to render aid and protect the interests of "people of their own country" in their respective zones, grants the right of extraterritoriality of the Mission buildings, and requires each signatory to provide the other with the necessary quarters, rations, P.O.L. supplies and household services. Similar agreements for establishment of military liaison missions were signed between the Soviets and the British and the Soviets and the French.

The 14 accreditations are normally held as follows:

Chief, USMLM (Army)

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Deputy Chief, USMLM (Air Force)	1
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Liaison Officers:

Army	4
Air Force	2
Navy	1
NCOIC, Potsdam (Army)	1

Drivers:

Army	3
Air Force	<u>1</u>

TOTAL	14
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D. (C) ORGANIZATION

USMLM is a USAREUR subordinate unit accredited to CINC, GSFG. The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA E1-W1AUAA-04) authorizes an Army element of 9 officers and 23 enlisted men. The Chief, USMLM, is appointed by CINC USAREUR. A Navy element of 1 officer and an Air Force element of 5 officers and 11 enlisted men are attached to the Mission. Chief, USMLM, exercises command authority over all elements of the Mission.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAREUR (DCSI, USAREUR), exercises primary staff supervision over USMLM, to include the provision of policy and operational guidance and the levying of intelligence collection requirements.

CINC USNAVEUR and CINC USAFE exercise normal staff supervision over the Navy and Air Force elements in matters involving administration, discipline and training. All liaison and intelligence collection requirements proposed for levy on USMLM are submitted to CINC USAREUR for approval.

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E. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Personnel: (ANNEX B)

Officer Personnel: Colonel Frederick C. Turner assumed duties as Chief of Mission, USMLM, in April 1971 upon the departure of Colonel Howard M. Richie. In addition, four Army officers and three Air Force officers departed during the year while three Army officers and two Air Force officers were newly assigned.

Enlisted Personnel: Twenty Army and one Air Force enlisted personnel departed during the year while twenty-three Army and one Air Force enlisted personnel were assigned.

Logistics:

U. S. Support: Support rendered by Berlin Brigade and Tempelhof Central Airport was outstanding.

Vehicles: The most essential piece of equipment in USMLM is the tour car. USMLM is allowed to accredit a total of 10 cars for use in East Germany. The vehicles using the accredited passes travelled over a quarter million miles on operational missions in East Germany during 1971.

During 1971 an agreement was worked out whereby a vehicle pass for a bus or truck could be exchanged informally for that of a sedan. This greatly facilitated transportation requirements for social functions in Potsdam and for upgrading the furnishings in the Potsdam Mission House.

1971 Model sedans were received during the autumn and placed into the fleet as the old models were phased out. Several new refinements were made in the modification of vehicles, with an attendant decrease in down time. By 31 December the tour fleet consisted of the following:

- 18 - 1971 Ford Custom Sedans
- 1 - 1970 Ford Station Wagon


Building/Grounds Improvement: In 1971 many improvements were made in the physical appearance of the USMLM Berlin Installation including an entire internal paint job, conversion of car shed into a permanent garage facility with individual bays with doors, resurfacing of driveway, a concrete pad and apron in the motor pool area, and the acquisition of new furniture.

1971 also saw an accelerated program of interior decoration of the Potsdam Mission House, which included new furniture, drapes and carpets furnished through Berlin Brigade E & I Division.

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Soviet Support: The support provided by the Soviets is concerned principally with providing building and ground maintenance, issuance of coupons for 2,500 liters of gas monthly, furnishing and paying of East German employees at the Potsdam House, and providing rations and a minimal amount of furniture and dinnerware. In 1971 the house was painted, inside and out, and received many badly-needed repairs.



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## PART II

### LIAISON ACTIVITIES

#### RELATIONS WITH SERB AND GSFG HEADQUARTERS

##### A. GENERAL

Only two meetings were held with SERB during the first quarter of 1971. The first meeting was requested by the Chief, USMLM in order to make arrangements with SERB for a change in guest passes for personnel attending a USMLM social function held at Potsdam on 6 March. The second meeting was requested by SERB to register low-level protests regarding two minor incidents involving USMLM tours on 22 and 23 March.

In the second quarter a new Chief arrived and the inevitable "sizing-up" process began. The new Chief, banking on the precedents of a previous tour with USMLM, pressed to open the Wartha-Herleshausen crossing point to USMLM travel and to expand the Soviet visitor pass policy, opening Potsdam once again to members of the Berlin garrison. Each of these efforts was at least conditionally successful after various confrontations with the Soviets. A May accident in which an EGA truck ran a USMLM vehicle off the road was followed in June by another accident in which a USMLM tour car struck an East German civilian motorcycle, with two civilians being hospitalized and the Soviets initially demanding compensation.

In July a USMLM tour was detained inside a permanent restricted area at a Soviet airfield and all the equipment was seized by the Soviets. The personnel involved were declared personae non grata, letters were exchanged by the two headquarters, and the subject was raised on the diplomatic/ambassadorial level. Relations were extremely tense until 3 September, when the first of the Berlin Accords was initiated and US-Soviet relations changed overnight. The new relations were enhanced on 12 October by the announcement of the forthcoming Presidential visit to the Soviet Union, and remained unusually good during the remainder of the year.

##### B. GUEST PASSES

Since the riot in 1965 at the USMLM Potsdam House which resulted in extensive damage, the Soviets followed a policy of prohibiting visits by members of the Berlin garrison and civilians. This was apparently done in retribution for the unfavorable world-wide publicity, including photographs, given this event. The policy was initially

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enunciated as allowing only military visitors from the USAREUR headquarters. This was later expanded to allow lower-ranking technicians from Berlin who could assist in the support of the Potsdam installation. The Soviets also required that the place of origin and the purpose of visit be stated.

The newly arrived Chief, looking to the precedents of a previous tour, and relying on the wording of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, refused to accept the newly imposed Soviet requirements. In May he requested guest passes for several colonels from USAREUR to visit the USMLM Potsdam House. SERB demanded to know the position held by the visiting officers, place of origin, and purpose of visit. The Chief, USMLM replied that (1) guest passes had been requested in accordance with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and (2) that all USAREUR headquarters required from the Chief of the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt were the names and identity card numbers of the guests. The Chief, USMLM further stated that the policy of his headquarters was that as the personal representative of the CINC, GSFG, the Chief of the Soviet Mission needed only to indicate that the presence of guests was needed or desired. The Chief, USMLM was unwilling to accept anything less than the treatment accorded the Chief of the Soviet Mission.

The final reply from the Soviets to the Chief, who went to pick up the passes, was that, "inasmuch as you have failed to tell us who the people are, where they come from, and the purpose of the visit, permission for the guest passes cannot be granted." In a subsequent meeting the Chief pointed out to the Soviets that the policy of his headquarters, as well as common courtesy, called for earlier notification of the refusal of guest passes. Subsequently, passes were refused to the civilian parents of a USMLM officer. From what time on (May - June), all requested passes were issued and they were generally available for pickup the day before the planned visit or earlier.

In July the Berlin Brigade Chief of Staff attended the Fourth of July picnic. This was the first time since 1965 that a colonel from Berlin had visited Potsdam. At other social events later in the year numerous lieutenant colonels and colonels from Berlin visited Potsdam. The Soviets did, however, send a letter stating that visitors could not visit places of interest in the Potsdam area. A policy of generally ignoring this Soviet edict was not challenged by the Soviets during the remainder of the year.

In 1970 approximately 52 guest passes were issued to US personnel to visit the USMLM Potsdam installation. During 1971 this number increased to over three hundred; the issue of guest passes appears to be settled.

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C. SOCIAL CONTACTS

Social contacts between USMLM and Soviet personnel from SERB and the GSFG headquarters increased significantly during the year. The February Washington's Birthday party included several Soviet guests, including generals from the headquarters at Zossen/Wuensdorf.

In March an American brigadier general from Headquarters USAREUR arrived at Potsdam for what was hoped would be a meeting with a Soviet general. However, the Soviet general did not appear. In May the CINC, GSFG invited the new US Chief of Mission to Wuensdorf for what turned out to be an hour's conversation.

At the 4 July Independence Day party, three US general officers were present and two Soviet generals attended. In September the departing Soviet CINC again invited the USMIM Chief to GSFG headquarters to bid farewell and introduce the new CINC.

At the October Columbus Day dinner-dance an American corps commander was present with two other general officers, and the Soviets reciprocated with two generals attending.

At Christmas the Chief, USMLM, went to the Headquarters, GSFG, at Wuensdorf, to present gifts on behalf of the CINC and Chief of Staff, USAREUR.



AMERICAN AND SOVIET GENERAL OFFICERS ATTENDED  
COLUMBUS DAY CELEBRATION AT THE POTSDAM MISSION HOUSE

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D. VISIT OF THE CINC, USAREUR

On 14 October, the CINC, USAREUR arrived in Berlin on the command diesel train. It was decided at that time that he would be available at 1300 hours to visit the USMLM Potsdam installation for about an hour. The Chief proceeded to SERB and informed them that the CINC, USAREUR would be at the Glienicke Bridge crossing point at 1300 hours. The Soviet reaction was immediate. They requested only the number of the USMLM car and who would be riding in the vehicle. This was at 1000 hours. By 1100 hours, the Soviet personnel at the Glienicke Bridge crossing point had been notified. At 1300 hours all the barriers were raised, and the CINC crossed in a USMLM tour car without stopping. He visited the USMLM Potsdam House and remained for approximately an hour, talking with tour officers, drivers, and the Chief, USMLM. Upon his return to Berlin the check point barriers were once again raised and there was no check of documents or other delay at the crossing.



CINC, USAREUR VISITS THE POTSDAM HOUSE

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#### E. USE OF THE WARTHA-HERLESCHAUSEN BORDER CROSSING

##### Background

Prior to 1971 the last recorded request made by the Chief, USMLM for passage through the border checkpoint was on 17 May 1967. Up until that time, the crossing had been used by USMLM Chief after arrangements were made through SERB to ensure that Soviet personnel would be present at the checkpoint. This right and precedence of crossing had not, however, been exercised since.

Relations with the Soviets have repeatedly shown that they consider rights and precedents which are not exercised as being void. From the political point of view, the Soviets have continued to emphasize the alleged sovereignty of East Germany and have, therefore, been interested in maintaining only one point of Allied entry and exit (at Marienborn). However, they have been concerned for the crossing rights through Wartha-Herleshausen checkpoint of the Soviet Missions in Frankfurt and Baden-Baden. This was particularly true in conjunction with General Kulikov's visit to Baden-Baden during 1971. Thus the question of reciprocity was of concern to them.

The precedent for USMLM use of the Wartha-Herleshausen crossing point had been established several years ago. With the arrival of a new Chief who had served in USMLM during this period, an excellent opportunity presented itself to reassert the right to use the crossing.

Utilization of this crossing provides legal and legitimate reason for USMLM to cross through the Eisenach PRA. From the imminence of hostilities standpoint, this is significant since this is the area of the Fulda Gap, which has been a traditional invasion route.

##### Reassertion of USMLM Crossing Rights

April: On 16 April 1971 the new Chief submitted a written request to SERB for a crossing at Wartha-Herleshausen on 18 April. The Soviets did not reply and this crossing was not attempted. The failure of SERB to honor this request was discussed with the Acting Chief, SERB on 3 May 1971. Chief, USMLM referred to the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and its basic premise of reciprocity, particularly with respect to usage of the Wartha-Herleshausen crossing to facilitate movement between the American and Soviet Missions and their respective headquarters. In answer to SERB's protest that no Soviet personnel were available at the checkpoint, the Chief, USMLM pointed out that during his previous tour, personnel had traveled to the checkpoint from the Eisenach Kommandatura to process USMLM personnel, just as American

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military personnel from Bad Hersfeld always accomodated Soviet Military Mission personnel. It was further pointed out that alternate routes of travel such as the Helmstedt Autobahn or air travel were equally available to both missions.

However, the Chief, USMLM stated that it was in the best interests of both headquarters to facilitate by all possible means the movement of US and Soviet mission personnel to their respective headquarters. At the conclusion of the meeting, the SERB representative stated he would inquire into the question of USMLM usage of the crossing point and inquire when the Chief, USMLM would again want to travel to his headquarters.

May: On 10 May 1971 the Chief again submitted a written request to exit the Soviet Zone at Wartha on 13 May. Again, SERB gave no reply to this request. Nevertheless, the Chief and a driver proceeded to the Wartha crossing. At the initial checkpoint, the East German guard was asked in Russian if the local Soviet kommandant or his representative was present. The German replied by ordering a truck to block the road behind the USMLM vehicle and prevented forward travel by placing a car in front. As civilian traffic backed up in both directions, the Germans lifted the barrier and directed the USMLM vehicle into a driveway on the opposite side. After much telephoning, the guard returned and asked for the Chief's destination and for his identification. No identification was shown. Answering in Russian, the Chief mentioned Heidelberg, which the guard understood. One hour and five minutes later the guard motioned the Chief toward Wartha. The final three barriers were opened by East German Border Police without hesitation, and the USMLM vehicle proceeded through the baggage and vehicle inspection areas without stopping.

On 14 May the Chief attempted to cross back into the Soviet Zone via the Wartha checkpoint but was ultimately turned back after a ten-hour wait. No Soviets were present to process the USMLM vehicle, and the Germans insisted the only crossing point for USMLM personnel was at Marienborn. When confronted with the fact that the USMLM vehicle had crossed the previous day, the East Germans replied that that had no bearing on the present. Furthermore, they repeatedly stated that the Soviet Headquarters had given instructions that only Marienborn could be used to cross the East-West German border. The sovereignty of the so-called German Democratic Republic was stressed, and the East German officer was adamant that the USMLM vehicle could not proceed farther. At 0500 hours the following morning, the Chief returned to West Germany and proceeded to the Marienborn crossing.

The East German guard at Marienborn demanded a border crossing slip which the Chief refused to surrender. He informed the Soviet lieutenant

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on duty that the USMLM vehicle was accredited to the headquarters, GSFG, with a Soviet-issued license plate, and that he would not become involved with local authorities. Finally, the Soviet officer gave the barrier pass to the East German and the Chief proceeded to Potsdam.

On 20 May the Chief, USMLM met again with the Acting Chief, SERB. He related his experiences at the Wartha checkpoint and requested that the matter be resolved. The Soviets repeated the familiar assertion that arrangements to cross at Wartha would have to be made with local authorities. However, they said the USMLM request had been given to the Deputy Chief of Staff at GSFG Headquarters and was being studied. The Chief, USMLM was advised to proceed to his headquarters in the same manner as his predecessor (i.e., by air).

The Chief, SERB was present at a meeting on 24 May when Chief, USMLM raised the sensitive matter of the Soviets' failure to honor the request for a USMLM crossing at Wartha into West Germany. The Chief, SERB reiterated the arguments that no Soviet personnel are stationed at Wartha and emphasized the sovereignty of East Germany.

The Chief, USMLM again reminded the Soviets of the efforts made by the American Military Police to facilitate the crossing of Soviet Military Mission vehicles at Wartha. Despite references to reciprocity and the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, the Chief, SERB insisted the Soviets had no control over local nationals and the discussion closed on that note.

The discussion continued on 29 May when the Chief, USMLM gave authorization for a Soviet Mission crossing at Wartha-Herleshausen on 1 June. He explained to the Chief and Deputy Chief, SERB, that he would sign the authorization and, as he probably would be visiting his headquarters some time in June, he certainly expected reciprocal courtesy.

June: In June the issue was not pursued since a more propitious opportunity would present itself early in July when the newly arrived CINC, USAREUR would host a reception to which the Soviets would be invited.

July: On 7 July USMLM submitted an informal request for a crossing at Wartha on 9 July. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SMLM had been invited to the CINC's reception on the 10th and SERB realized that this was a request from the Chief, USMLM to travel to the CINC's reception. USMLM's leverage was further enhanced early on 8 July when a request was received from the Soviets for a crossing for the Soviet Mission in Baden-Baden. When no word regarding the USMLM request had been received on

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8 July, the Chief, USMLM proceeded to SERB with the unsigned Baden-Baden Soviet Mission travel documents and inquired about his own travel. The Soviet response was that no word had yet been received from their headquarters authorizing the crossing. Chief, USMLM commented that he was awaiting word from his headquarters and assumed that both his authorization and that for the Baden-Baden Soviet Mission would be ready at approximately the same time. About five minutes prior to SERB's closing time, word was received that a Soviet Kommandant would be present at Wartha to assist the USMLM vehicle through the checkpoint. The Chief, USMLM replied that necessary signed documents for the Soviet Mission's crossing were also ready. COMMENT: It appeared that the Soviets were under pressure not to alienate the newly arrived CINC and particularly not to prevent the Chief, USMLM from attending his own CINC's reception to which the Chief, SMLM also had been invited. After the previous incident, they probably assumed correctly that the Chief, USMLM would either go to the border and wait or charge that he was denied access to his own headquarters for the CINC's reception. This was further strengthened by the timely receipt of the request for the Baden-Baden Soviet Mission travel and the implied threat that their travel would not be approved if approval for the USMLM travel was not forthcoming. At this point the Soviets gave in. In typically Soviet style, the Soviet concession was never mentioned again.

August: In August another crossing was requested and granted; however, on this occasion some delay was experienced. The Soviet officer at the checkpoint took the Chief's documents and made a telephone call, upon the completion of which he informed the Chief that there would be a slight delay. After waiting 30 minutes, the Chief inquired as to the reason for the delay. He was informed by the Soviet officer that the German Border Guards had not received instructions from their headquarters. The delay was protested and it was pointed out that the arrangements for the crossing had been made through SERB and that the Germans did not enter into the picture. Thirty minutes later the phone rang and immediately thereafter the Soviet officer escorted the USMLM vehicle through the barriers and stated that he would be there for the return trip. At 1815 hours that same day, the Potsdam Duty Officer received a call from the Chief, SERB who stated that the delay was caused by a Soviet officer who did not follow instructions. He further stated that the officer would be punished and apologized for the delay. The return trip on 21 August experienced no problems.

September: In September arrangements for crossing were requested the usual two days in advance. The Soviets thus received the request on a Thursday for a crossing on the following Monday. The only difference this time was that the notification of crossing indicated Car # 23 instead of the usual Car # 28, the Chief's staff car. On Friday SERB called the Potsdam Duty Officer and asked to have the occupants

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identified in advance. The requests merely indicated the car number alone, since the object was to establish that any USMLM officer could travel in any vehicle. Unfortunately, the Chief was not present when SERB called and the duty officer identified the occupants. The precedent for the previous crossings at Wartha-Herleshausen (1961-1966) was that only the Chief of Mission had used this route. It was suspected that had not the Chief been identified as going, the Soviets might have refused this crossing.

Consequently, in view of these considerations it was decided that the occupants should be changed as well as the time of crossing, since the Soviets had been mistakenly told who was crossing. One of the occupants thus was to fly to Frankfurt instead of using the vehicle, and the crossing time was set back some two hours. By Monday morning, 13 September, the Soviets had not called to notify USMLM that the crossing had been arranged. A routine telephone call to SERB on other matters showed that no one with authority was present, and it was suspected that, had a query about the crossing arrangements been made, the Soviets would have tried to finesse out of a commitment by stating that no one was available to make the arrangement. Consequently, the Chief left the Potsdam installation late, and the Duty Officer there as per instructions called to advise the Soviets that the Chief would be delayed arriving at Wartha. Thus the Soviets had four hours in which to notify the Kommandant at Wartha of the delay and had no opportunity to finesse out of the crossing.

At Wartha the Kommandant requested the passes and the vehicle pass and permission to look under the hood to check the motor number. He was not allowed to check under the hood, but did not press the point. He inquired about the third person who had originally been reported to SERB as accompanying the Chief, but did not seem overly surprised to be informed that only two people were making the trip. After looking at the passes, he motioned the vehicle without delay through the barriers.

A third officer accompanied the Chief back through Wartha on 16 September. The Kommandant neither commented, nor did he express surprise upon seeing three people in the car, and this time he did not request to see the car pass. The precedents set on this trip included changing the crossing time upon departure from Potsdam House and more people in the car on the return trip than on the outgoing trip. The Soviets for the first time requested the names of the occupants of the vehicle and they received them erroneously prior to the trip. The Soviets also failed to notify USMLM if the crossing had been arranged. Finally this was the first crossing involving members of the three different services.

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October: Another trip was arranged for the 7th and the 10th of October. SERB called and asked for the names of the occupants and were told the Chief and a driver. Instead the Chief and his wife went without a driver; there was no delay and no car pass was asked for. The return trip was aborted, as the vehicle broke down in West Germany and the Chief flew back, the Potsdam Duty Officer notifying SERB about one-half hour before the scheduled crossing.

November: In November a crossing was arranged for the Chief to attend the celebration of Soviet Revolution Day at the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt. As on the previous two occasions, the Chief, SERB personally called the Potsdam Duty Officer and requested the identities of the travelers; he was told the Chief, his wife, and a driver. However, the Chief and his wife went alone and passed through in both directions without incident and without showing the car pass.

For the first time, two crossings were requested in November, the second for the 13th of November. Prior to this crossing, SERB called numerous times attempting to discover the identity of the persons traveling, and in a meeting on 11 November the Deputy Chief of SERB asked the Deputy, USMLM the identity of the travelers. The USMLM Deputy said he was not aware of the identity of the travelers and questioned the need for SERB to know, pointing out that the Soviets only provide notice of transit. Deputy Chief, SERB indicated that he was weary of calling each time to request the names of the travelers and indicated that it would be better to include them in the written request. Deputy, USMLM stated that he did not know the identities of the travelers, but would check on it. Subsequently, the Potsdam Duty Officer provided the names after checking with Berlin.

Prior to departing Potsdam House, the Potsdam Duty Officer called SERB and notified them of a delay in departure time. SERB only commented that they would pass the delay along to their headquarters. The crossing to West Germany was effected without delay, and, for the first time, no return crossing was requested, leaving the date open. When the Kommandant at Wartha asked about the return, the Chief told him towards the end of the same week, but remained very indefinite. On Friday morning the Deputy Chief, USMLM notified SERB of the time of the Chief's return crossing on Saturday afternoon of the 20th of November. The return crossing was also without incident.

This was the first time that two crossings had been effected in one month and also the first instance in which the date and time for return had not been given in the informal request. Also for the first time a crossing was arranged by telephone and less than two days notice given.

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However, the Soviets continued to insist on knowing the identity of the travelers in advance. When the Chief of SERB again requested in a 22 November meeting that the original written request contain the identities of the travelers, the date and time of crossing and the vehicle number, the Chief of USMLM said that this information was not provided by SMLM to the Allied Contact Section in Frankfurt and only a two hour lead time was given. Chief, SERB ended the conversation by saying that the Chief, SMLM (Colonel Spivak) had been instructed to give such information to Allied Contact Section. Chief, USMLM said that he would be glad to comply with the request, but that substitution due to unforeseen conditions might necessitate change, which Chief, SERB accepted, saying that as long as the original request contained all the information, telephone change could be made later.

December: On the 6th of December a written request was given to SERB asking for a crossing on the 7th and 11th of December by the Chief and two liaison officers. SERB was advised on the morning of the 7th that the Deputy Chief would take the Chief's place as per the agreement in the meeting of 22 November. The exit trip occurred without incident. The return trip involved only the Deputy Chief and a liaison officer, the third officer having flown back. Again this trip passed without incident, and for the first time there was a substitution for the Chief, USMLM.

Conclusion: The year 1971 has seen the reopening of the Wartha-Herleshausen checkpoint for the USMLM Chief and Deputy Chief accompanied by other accredited personnel. Plans have been made to continue the trips and to attempt to have the crossing open to any or all accredited personnel on short notice.

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### PART III

#### INCIDENTS AND DETENTIONS

Following are summaries of incidents and detentions which occurred during 1971:

On 11 January a tour was detained near Tucheim by a Soviet lieutenant colonel as it attempted to pass a convoy of Soviet vehicles. The tour was subsequently taken to the Brandenburg Kommandatura, where the officer was charged with photographing Soviet military equipment. After a total of seven hours, the tour was released.

On 22 March a tour was apprehended by a Soviet lieutenant colonel wielding a pistol. The tour had been attempting to pass a Soviet convoy. At the Brandenburg Kommandatura, the tour officer denied charges of pursuing, joining, and photographing the convoy. The tour was detained 12 hours and 40 minutes.

On 23 March a tour was stopped near Gera by a Soviet major who falsely accused tour of being in a permanent restricted area (PRA). The Soviet officer instructed the tour to wait, and he left to notify other Soviet authorities. The Soviet officer had not returned after a thirty minute period, so the tour departed the area and returned to Potsdam. As the tour officer attempted to cross the Soviet checkpoint at the Glienicke Bridge, he was detained and escorted to the Potsdam Kommandatura, where minor allegations were made. Evidence indicated that the tour car was forcefully entered while parked in the Kommandatura compound. The officer was allowed to return to Berlin after spending the night at the Kommandatura. The total time of the detention was 11 hours and 30 minutes.

On 3 May a tour was detained seven hours at Wittenberg after a Soviet major rammed the tour car with an UAZ-69. Charges of being in a restricted area were denied. Light damages were sustained by both vehicles.

On 20 May a tour with two officers and an enlisted driver was struck and forced off the road by an East German Army URAL-375 driven by a student driver. The truck's brakes locked, causing it to swerve into the path of the tour car. One tour officer suffered minor cuts and bruises; he was evacuated by an East German ambulance to a hospital in Pasewalk, where he was treated. After an eight hour recovery period, he was released to a USMIM recovery team. A second recovery team, which had been dispatched to return the damaged tour car to Potsdam,

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was directed to return to Potsdam without the wrecked USMLM vehicle. The following morning the recovery team returned to Prenzlau, where it was allowed to tow the damaged car back to Berlin. During subsequent meetings between the Chief, SERB and the Chief, USMLM, the Soviets adopted their usual stance, assigning all blame for the accident to the USMLM tour vehicle despite the fact that the East German driving instructor at the scene of the accident had acknowledged his student's responsibility for causing the collision.

On 28 May a tour was detained 11 hours and 30 minutes after being stopped by a well-organized fleet of Volkspolizei sedans who had set up a series of roadblocks on all primary and secondary roads in the vicinity of Sanitz, which is heavily signed with mission restriction signs (MRS). Custody of the apprehended mission tour was turned over to the Soviet officials who arrived on the scene. The tour was taken to the Kommandatura in Rostock, from which it was released after denying the usual charges.

On 4 June a tour was detained near the village of Tambach by East German Army personnel after a mild collision with a Volkspolizei car while attempting to elude VoPo and East German State Security surveillance vehicles. The Soviet officers who arrived from an unknown location to investigate released the tour after the vehicles involved were re-positioned and photographed to show the USMLM vehicle at fault. The total time of detention was two hours and 20 minutes.

During the afternoon of 24 June a tour consisting of two officers and a driver accidentally collided with a motorcycle, injuring its two East German civilian passengers. Attempts by East German police to interrogate the tour at the scene of the accident were resisted, and a Soviet officer was summoned. Approximately thirty minutes after the accident, an East German ambulance transported the injured civilians to a hospital in Grossenhain. Soviet officers from the Kommandatura in Riesa arrived exactly three hours after the accident. They charged the USMLM tour with total responsibility for the accident. The Soviet allegations were denied, and it was pointed out that the East German motorcycle was traveling on the wrong side of the road, thus causing the accident. Both tour officers were then taken to Riesa, while the driver remained with the immobilized tour car. The USMLM vehicle was subsequently towed to the Riesa Kommandatura by a Soviet truck. At the Kommandatura, both officers were accused by the Deputy Chief, SERB of traveling at excess speed on the wrong side of the road, causing the collision. The USMLM officers vigorously denied these accusations. The senior tour officer was informed that the bill covering damages and personal injury amounted to 25,680 East Marks and that the GSFG Chief of Staff would contact the USAREUR Chief of Staff to resolve the matter.

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The tour was then released to a recovery team and allowed to return to Potsdam. From the time of the accident until the tour was released approximately 30 hours elapsed.

On 27 July an officer and driver were operating in the permanent restricted area at the Soviet Airfield near Jueterbog. They were surprised in their observation point by approximately 12 Soviet soldiers who forcibly threw both tour members to the ground, tied their hands, confiscated all their equipment, and drove them, in the back of an ambulance, to the airbase and then to the Kommandatura in Jueterbog. Both the officer and the driver were interrogated for several hours, with the Soviets labeling the tour officer a "Second Francis Gary Powers". The officer denied knowing he was inside a permanent restricted area but acknowledged taking photographs of aircraft. The Chief, SERB personally visited the scene of the detention and returned to the Jueterbog Kommandatura to inform the tour officer that he was indeed guilty of a PRA violation. The tour was escorted back to Potsdam in the late evening hours. Upon their arrival in Potsdam, the Deputy Chief, SERB directed the tour to go to the USMLM Potsdam House and remain there until otherwise directed. The Soviets kept both passes until the following afternoon, when they were returned and the tour personnel were allowed to return to West Berlin. Approximately thirty hours elapsed from the time of the apprehension to the return of the Soviet documentation. On 11 August a meeting was held with the Soviets at which the Chief, USMLM was informed that the tour officer and the driver involved in the PRA violation could no longer have Soviet accreditation and were declared personae non grata. Some of the equipment which had been taken at the scene of the detention was returned, but the following items were retained by the Soviets:

- 2 Nikon F cameras with motor drives
- 2 PYE two-way radios
- Nikkor 200 mm lens f/2.8
- Nikkor 1000 mm lens
- Novoflex 400 mm lens f/5.6 with pistol grip
- Lunasix Lightmeter
- Pentax Spotmeter
- Hensoldt Binoculars
- Philips Cassette Tape Recorder with microphone
- Large camera bag
- Map Case
- Aircraft identification book
- Notebook
- Compass
- Huebner-Malinin Agreement
- 1/100,000 Maps with PRAs and MRS annotated (1 set)

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- 6 1/50,000 Target Maps annotated with PRAs, MRS, OPs and some installations
- 8 Rolls Tri-X film
- 3 Rolls Plus-X film
- 2 Rolls High Speed Ektachrome



EQUIPMENT CONFISCATED BY SOVIETS

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The final detention of the year occurred on 19 August, when a tour was stopped in Strassgraebchen by an East German Army lieutenant colonel after the tour vehicle had severely damaged its steering mechanism while negotiating a trail in the vicinity of Kamenz. The Soviet Kommandant from Koenigsbrueck arrived to investigate, and in collaboration with the East German officer, falsely accused the tour of violating mission restriction signs in the area. The tour officer was taken to the Dresden Kommandatura, where he was allowed to telephone the mission house in Potsdam to request a recovery team. After the tour officer was returned to the disabled USMLM vehicle, pleasantries were exchanged and the tour was released. The time of the detention was seven hours.

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## PART IV

### INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

#### A. (S) GENERAL

USMLM's intelligence collection is accomplished by overt ground reconnaissance conducted by the fourteen military personnel accredited to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Ten vehicles, which are modified to increase their cross-country mobility, are likewise accredited. These sedans bear Soviet-issued license plates which identify the car by number. The Potsdam Mission House serves as the operational base for all activities in East Germany; the Mission Headquarters and all support facilities are located in West Berlin. Intelligence collection activities are closely coordinated with representatives of the British and French Military Liaison Missions during a weekly tri-mission operations meeting.

#### B. (S) RESTRICTIONS

The Soviet headquarters has recognized the intelligence collection capability of the Allied Military Liaison Missions and imposed several restrictive measures intended to restrict the observation of Soviet and East German military forces.

Permanent Restricted Areas (PRAs) deny Allied Military Liaison Missions the right of travel in approximately 38% of East Germany. These PRAs are designed to embrace large garrison complexes, airfields, missile sites, major training areas, and all border areas. There were no changes in the configuration or amount of area covered by PRAs in 1971.

Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs) are normally imposed to screen significant training activity. Nineteen TRAs were effected during 1971 for a total of approximately 116 days. These TRAs were generally imposed in such a fashion as to link up with PRAs, effectively denying allied mission travel in not only the area of the TRA but in the total area of both restricted areas. This method of levying TRAs often limits access to a very large geographical area to travel on the autobahns.

The number of TRAs during 1971 was six less than imposed during 1970; it was, however, about normal of previous years. The average length of TRAs was 6.1 days as compared with 6.3 for previous years. No significant difference in the character and purpose of activity noted within the TRAs was discernible. The longest TRA was 10 days as compared with 23 days for the previous year.

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Mission Restriction Signs (MRS's) are positioned by both Soviet and East German forces to block access to most military installations located outside PRAs. Approximately 7,000 MRS's restrict access to major routes, highways, secondary roads, and trails which lead to intelligence collection targets. During the last four months of 1971, approximately 125 of these signs were removed by USMLM personnel. The emphasis during this sign removal campaign was on disposing of signs which blocked allied usage of major through routes. Due to the relatively small percentage of signs removed, it has not been possible to positively identify the action taken by the East German and Soviet forces to counter the removal of signs by allied missions. It appears, however, that the East Germans tend to replace torn-down signs more rapidly than do the Soviets. It has also been observed that when signs are replaced, two or more signs often reappear in the area where one had been torn down.



MISSION RESTRICTION SIGN

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C. (C) SURVEILLANCE (One Step Ahead?)

Extensive surveillance of USMLM and Allied Mission tours travelling throughout the Soviet Zone of Germany continued during 1971 at essentially the same increased level noted in the recent past. This was characterized by overt coverage by police organizations and other hostile elements plus essentially covert coverage by Ministry of State Security (MfS) elements.

Overt Surveillance: USMLM tours are forced to cope with hostile surveillance elements which are very efficiently organized, possess a full range of communications support, and are augmented by numerous individuals and organizations hostile to our presence. These include the East German national police apparatus, such as the Volkspolizei (People's Police), Grenzpolizei (Border Police), Bereitschaftspolizei (Alert Police), and Transportpolizei (Railway Police). This vast network is augmented by political officials, foresters, collective enterprise managers, and "do-gooder" citizens. The chances are excellent that any tour vehicle sighted by any of the category of personnel enumerated above will be reported to the central surveillance headquarters, MfS Department "R" in Potsdam. The GSFG also has a reporting system headed by the CI Organization at Zossen/Wunsdorf. Movement of a tour during daylight hours through and in the vicinity of large metropolitan areas or smaller towns and villages will result in the appearance of a Volkspolizei (VOPO) vehicle to escort the tour vehicle wherever it goes. Such escort activity is quite persistent and transgresses the geographical zones of VOPO responsibility, with the tour vehicle being "handed off" to the next zone.

Covert Surveillance: The MfS is charged with monitoring the movement and activities of the three Allied military liaison missions. Department "R" has a pool of manpower and a large fleet of vehicles assigned to accomplish this mission. The increase in the amount of civilian traffic present on this road arteries of East Germany has increased dramatically over the past 5 years, compounding the difficulties inherent in identifying these MfS agents, affectionately called "NARKS" by the Allied Missions. The MfS vehicles are somewhat distinctive in that they are often Wartburg or Volga sedans equipped with fog lights, two outside rear-view mirrors, tow hooks, and other special equipment. In addition, Western vehicles such as BMW, Mercedes, and even Chevrolet have been confirmed to be in use by MfS agents. Tour personnel also are often able to recognize the passengers as being MfS agents. This pool of regularly assigned personnel and vehicles is assisted by what are called "local NARKS", who appear to be individuals who utilize their own personal vehicle but who are "on call" to assist in tracking down a tour vehicle reported to be in the area. The locals not only increase the force deployed against the tour, but provide their own intimate knowledge of the local area roads and trails.

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NARK CAR

Surveillance Tactics: Overt surveillance elements tend to simply make their presence painfully obvious and annoying. However, more aggressive tactics, such as attempts at detention, have been noted. Covert elements are far more dangerous, since their main mission is to covertly locate a tour engaged in intelligence collection activities, photograph this activity, and set up means whereby the tour can be boxed in and detained. Their objective appears to be to embarrass the mission personnel involved through the use of documented evidence of their illegal intelligence activities so that the mission itself can be severely discredited and the individuals declared personae non grata. Fortunately, the MfS is rarely fully successful in these attempts. Partial success is, however, a common occurrence.

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Allied Countermeasures: A number of measures can be employed by the tour personnel to blunt or nullify the success of the hostile surveillance. Some of the main tactics used are movement only during the hours of darkness, route selection to avoid populated areas, and continually staying on the move. However, target types and locations often preclude the use of the latter two measures. For example, targets may be a Soviet installation in a major city or the observation and photographing of Soviet aircraft carrying out a flying program in the vicinity of their home base. Another thing seriously reducing the countermeasure options available to tour personnel is that the three Allied Missions have been operating in East Germany for almost 25 years and our areas of interest and methods of operation are quite well known.

Surveillance Effectiveness: Although hostile surveillance does not usually prevent Allied tours from operating, it greatly restricts their effectiveness. Tours often must keep on the move, precluding detailed coverage of a target. Trips to targets often must be aborted due to the presence of an accompanying VOPO. The threat of a traffic accident occurring during an attempt to shake off surveillance, the chance of being maneuvered into a "set-up", or the threat of an embarrassing detention are ever present and certainly detract from the intelligence collection effort. The Soviets have made excellent use of permanent restricted areas to not only deny us access to targets of interest, but to effectively channel our routes of travel, thus greatly aiding hostile surveillance elements in the accomplishment of their assigned mission.

Future Trends: It is logical to assume that the hostile surveillance will continue at the same level, if not in increased intensity, during the foreseeable future. The amount of surveillance in any area of the SZG will probably continue to be dictated by the command emphasis on surveillance in the area concerned and by the type and sensitivity of the targets. As the "state of the art" and surveillance equipment improve, so will the surveillance effort improve. Hostile surveillance is a fact of life recognized by each tour member who will, in turn, obviously continue to exert all possible efforts to negate its effectiveness.

#### D. (S) SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

January: Detailed ground photography of the Warsaw Pact aircraft shelters at Allstedt and Finsterwalde Soviet Airfields on 8 and 14 January helped confirm hangar construction techniques and was instrumental in ascertaining that the hangar doors are the most vulnerable part of the shelters. Observations made on these two occasions confirmed that the hangar doors at both airfields malfunction.

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On 18 January, a tour penetrated the East German SAM support facility at Freienhufen Lug, confirming the exact location of the launch site's support area and providing a site layout showing location of storage bunkers, administrative buildings, and billets.

February: A Mi-8 HIP C helicopter was photographed at close range on 9 February at Cochstedt Soviet Airfield. Many of the helicopter's maintenance panels were open, exposing the engine arrangement and exhaust ducting. This observation also provided the best coverage to date of the Doppler radar system fitted into the helicopter's tail boom.

A tour spent six hours on Belgern Gunnery/Bombing Range on 16 February, observing a total of 93 passes over the range impact area by FISHBED J aircraft operating from Kothlen Airfield. The tour made the first audio recordings of this aircraft firing its cannon. From these recordings analysts were able to determine that this armament is a revolver-type cannon which fires over 3,000 rounds per minute. Spent cartridges retrieved from the impact area were identified as electrically primed shells.

On 23 February, coverage was obtained of an East German Engineer depot at Kirchain. The installation, previously listed only as an engineer training area, housed numerous construction vehicles including scrapers, crane shovels, and heavy duty crawler type tractors in addition to cargo trucks and vans.


The existence of the East German SAM support facility at Bernsdorf/Strassgrachchen was confirmed when this installation was penetrated for the first time on 24 February. This observation and its photography provided conclusive proof that this facility also houses the regimental headquarters for the 14th EGAF SAM Regiment.

STYX missile containers on East German Navy KRAZ-214 trucks were sighted near Waren/Vielist on 27 February. This sighting suggests the presence of East German Navy missile units at locations other than on the Baltic Sea Coast.

On 28 February, two military trains loaded with T-62A tanks were observed halted in the Wustermark railroad siding. Photography obtained provided additional confirmation of the presence of an anti-aircraft machine gun on the T-62 as well as the characteristics of this gun. One of the trains with T-62A also contained ZSU 23-4, verifying this AAA weapon's association with armored units.

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
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HANGARETTE



MI-8 HIP C HELICOPTER



SAM SUPPORT FACILITY



STYX MISSILE CONTAINERS

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
March: Detailed photography of a temporary R-404 communications site was obtained at Wolfslake on 1 March. This observation revealed the manner in which telescoping mast is erected and how the transmitter-receiver vehicle is connected to it via the G-string feed.

On 8 March a new Soviet GAZ-66 R-125 van was photographed with its on-board generator running.

An SA-4 column complete except for transloader-erector-launchers (TEL) and tracked radar units was observed proceeding east on the Eisenach Autobahn on 11 March. This sighting provided analysts with a full inventory of SA-4 associated equipment.



R-404 ANTENNA



GAZ-66 R-125 VAN WITH GENERATOR


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
On 15 March, a tour successfully penetrated the East German SAM support facility at Parchim. The interior of an SA-2 GUIDELINE missile storage bunker was photographed, enabling analysts to determine the exact number of missile components which can be stored in such a bunker. This observation also provided conclusive proof that the East Germans have hardened their SAM installations to increase their survivability potential in the event of hostilities. Forty GUIDELINE warhead canisters were also photographed at extremely close range, providing shipping information stenciled on the end of the canister, including both gross and net weights.

On 24 March, detailed photography of a T-62 turret with its IR night vision devices was obtained as elements of the 7th Guards Tank Division were observed being loaded on flatcars to return to garrison after participating in TRA 6-71.

The Soviet Army places much emphasis on CBR training. In order to closely simulate combat conditions, troops are frequently seen wearing protective clothing while performing routine tasks such as laying wire or driving trucks. An example of Soviet CBR training was observed near Cottbus on 25 March as troops were seen fitting and clearing their gas masks.




PARCHIM SAM SUPPORT  
BUNKER



GUIDELINE SA-2  
WARHEAD CANISTERS

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T-62 TURRETS WITH IR DEVICES



CBR TRAINING AT COTTBUS

April: Soviet pipeline units were active during the early part of the month laying a large network of pipe in the southeast quadrant of East Germany. This pipeline is four to six inches in diameter and designed to carry POL products in support of field armies.

On 2 April, a new BRDM-2 without the usual turret was observed in the Potsdam-Wildpark railroad siding. It is believed that this vehicle has command or electronic functions.

YAK-28 BREWER E aircraft at Welzow Soviet Airfield were observed carrying Type C 16-shot rocket pods on 9 April. This is the first observation of this reconnaissance/ECM aircraft armed with what has always been considered an air-to-ground weapon. It is, however, now generally thought that these rocket pods are utilized on the BREWER aircraft to dispense chaff, thus intensifying the aircraft's ECM role.

On 15 April, East German FISHBED F export aircraft were observed in a ground-attack role firing air-to-ground rockets at the Bronkow/Luckaitz Bombing/Gunnery Range. Previous to this sighting, the East German Air Force had been assessed as having only an air defense mission with a very limited ground capability. This was also the initial

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observation of aircraft actually engaging in live fire activity at this range.

On 23 April, nine FISHBED D, six FISHBED F, seven FARMER B, three MONGOL, and four MIDGET aircraft were observed during a heavy flying program at Wittstock Soviet Airfield. The FISHBED and FARMER aircraft observed on this occasion were equipped to carry several types of ordnance including both ATOLL and ALKALAI air-to-air missiles, bombs, and both 16-shot and 8-shot rocket pods. This was the last observation by Allied missions of FARMER aircraft participating in a flying program at Wittstock Airfield.

On 28 April, ZSU 23-4 and ZSU 57-2 were observed together on a flatcar in the Priort railroad siding. This sighting was significant because the ZSU 23-4 was thought to be the replacement for the obsolescent ZSU 57-2; this was the initial observation of these two weapons together.



BRFWER E WITH ROCKET PODS



EAST GERMAN FISHBED F ON RANGE

May: Six different East German SA-2 launch sites were penetrated by a single USMLM tour on 1 May. In each case, the tour made its way to a position from which the FAN SCNG tracking and missile guidance radar could be observed. Two of the sites were utilizing FAN SONG B,


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
two FAN SONG E, and two contained the new FAN SONG F models. Each of these three radar guidance systems represents a different threat to USAF aircraft. This was also the first observation of FAN SONG F in East Germany.

A Czechoslovak-manufactured DOK front loader was observed in East German hands for the first time on 14 May. On this same date, an East German ZIL-130 special purpose vehicle, still unidentified as to role, was observed in the Potsdam area.

On 20 May, the East German auxiliary airfield at Alteno near Luckau was visited and details were obtained on the underground POI. facilities located there. This sighting indicates the East Germans have upgraded this sod field to give it refueling capability and supports the concept that the East German Air Force, like the Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army, places great stress on its capability to operate from secondary airfields and sod strips.



FAN SONG B



FAN SONG E



FAN SONG F



DOK FRONT LOADER

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June: The railway engineer river crossing site at Prettin on the Elbe River was reconnoitered on 14 June and found to be occupied by troops engaged in constructing elements of an NZhM-56 heavy railway floating bridge. The assembly of three distinct ponton types to form one major bridge section was observed and timed at approximately 50 minutes from the time the ponton transporters backed to the water until all three pontoons were locked in place. Additional information concerning the use of the KRAZ K-104 crane, power boats, and other bridging components was also gained from this sighting. Although this equipment was first sighted in 1965, this observation provided the first details concerning the methods used in the launching and assembly of the various bridge components.

On 15 and 16 June, a tour spent 31 hours at Schonhauser Damm Soviet auxiliary airfield observing the deployment of an entire ground-attack fighter regiment to this field from its home base at Neuruppin. Descriptions were provided of runway preparation, aircraft maintenance, and ground crew activities prior to the day's flying activity which the tour observed from start to finish.

On 16 and 17 June, reconnaissance of an unlisted naval supply depot near Waren indicated the depot is possibly used for storing either STYX or SAMLET missile components.


During TRA 8-71, the 56th Transportation Regiment laid tactical pipeline from Luebben to Jueterbog. A branch of the pipeline ran southward toward Rochau. Coverage of this exercise included photography of stacks of pipe sections which were stored at the Kleinbahren POL depot, which serves the 24th Tactical Air Army.




NEURUPPIN FRESCOS AT SCHOENHAUSER DAMM

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NZHM-56 RAILWAY FLOATING BRIDGE



NZHM-56 RAILWAY FLOATING BRIDGE

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July: The first sighting of the LONG TRACK radar in East German hands was made on 2 July. This equipment was observed near Schwerin and followed to the city of Teterow from where it was seen moving in the direction of Neu Brandenburg.

Photography of T-62 tanks at Wustermark on 5 July furnished conclusive proof that the turret hatch rotates.

On 8 July an AN-12 CUB with UAR markings was sighted at Dresden/Klotzsche Airfield. This was the first of several observations of CUB aircraft from Middle East countries at this airfield. These observations were followed by or joined with sightings of FISHBED aircraft painted with desert camouflage markings and bearing 4-digit numbers. It is suspected that Dresden/Klotzsche serves as a maintenance and delivery point for aircraft destined for Arab countries.

On 12 July, the FLAP WHEEL fire control used with S-60 AAA positions was observed and photographed in operational configuration at an East German deployment site in Potsdam/Neu Fahrland. Special attention was directed to the antenna system and its power source. This collection effort provided analysts with first technical quality photography of this Soviet-made equipment.

On 21 July, a new POL truck on a ZIL-131 chassis was observed on the Helmstedt Autobahn. This sighting reflects the Soviet trend observed in 1971 to update their equipment with particular emphasis directed towards replacing older trucks with new models.

During TRA 11-71, which began on 18 July, a column consisting of more than 700 vehicles was observed crossing the Helmstedt Autobahn at three locations going northwest. Portions of this column were observed later, exiting the East Ring Autobahn at Bernau, indicating that elements of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Guards Army, had participated in training during the TRA. A FROG-7 TEL and resupply vehicle were noted in the column. Observations made during this TRA also included the sighting of SA-4 equipment, including TELs, moving with Soviet armor and motorized rifle units. A complete battalion of T-55s was also observed being moved by a MAZ-537 equipped transportation unit from the vicinity of Burg to Dallgow-Doberitz.

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T-62 ROTATING TURRET  
HATCH



T-62 ROTATING TURRET  
HATCH

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
August: On 13 August, a FAN SONG F tracking and missile guidance radar was observed at Gross Dobbern SA-2 launch site. This was the third sighting of this FAN SONG model and coincided with the reappearance of a FAN SONG E at the Retschow launch site. This indicates there are only two actual FAN SONG F radars in East Germany which are being rotated among the East German SA-2 regiments for trial and evaluation. The three sites at which the FAN SONG F has been sighted are subordinate to three different regiments.

On 10 August, a FAN SONG dome was observed being erected at the SA-2 training school on Kamenz Airfield. This dome had previously been observed at the Ladeburg/Lanke SAM support facility and at the Klosterfelde SA-2 site. The purpose of this dome is not known; it is, however, assumed that it protects the FAN SONG radar.

The SA-4 associated LONG TRACK radar at Wittstock/Biesen Radar Site was photographed at close range on 24 August, satisfying all reasonable requirements for photography of this AC&W radar.



FAN SONG DOME



LONG TRACK SAIL

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FISHBED WITH CAMOUFLAGE PAINT



FLAP WHEEL



ZIL-131 POL



SA-4 RESUPPLY VEHICLE

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FROG 7 TEL



FROG 7 RESUPPLY VEHICLE


September: The YAK-28 FIREBAR aircraft at Zerbst Airfield were observed returning from missile firing activities near Peenemunde on 15 September. Several of the aircraft landed with missiles still on their pylons, indicating possible difficulty with firing procedures. Modifications on the FIREBAR airframe were completed during 1971, leaving most of the YAK-28 aircraft at Zerbst with an elongated nose; this variant was designated FIREBAR B.

On 23 September a tour observed the construction of a Soviet PMP bridge across the Elbe River at the Sandau river crossing site. This type 60 bridge can be constructed with amazing rapidity and is used to support river crossing exercises. The date of this sighting coincides with the imposition of TRA 19-71, the final TRA of 1971, during which river crossing operations were performed by elements of 9th Guards Tank Division, Second Guards Army and the 10th Guards Tank Division, Third Shock Army.


The Hungarian-manufactured armored personnel carrier designated FUG-70 was confirmed in the holdings of East German Border Command Units on 29 September. It has subsequently been observed in increasing numbers with border units in the Potsdam area.

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
**SECRET**



FIREBAR B WITH ANAB



PMP BEING LAUNCHED



PMP SECTION HITS THE WATER



PMP SECTION AFTER LAUNCHING

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

October: A search of a recently occupied bivouac area near Burghessler on 9 October resulted in the acquisition of a manual on construction and operation of blackout driving lights. The booklet describes the various types of blackout driving lights available and the types of vehicles adapted for their use.


On 15 October, FITTER aircraft from Gross Dolln Airfield were observed performing simulated nuclear weapons deliveries on the Gadow/Rossow Soviet Bombing/Gunnery Range. The entire sequence of the low altitude bomb system maneuver, including the aircraft with attached atomic bomb simulator, weapon release, burst, and resultant mushroom cloud was observed and photographed.

On 19 October, detailed photography was obtained of the rear of a FLAP WHEEL AAA fire control radar antenna deployed at the end of the West Ring Autobahn.

СВТОМАСКИРОВОЧНЫЕ  
УСТРОЙСТВА  
ГРУЗОВЫХ АВТОМОБИЛЕЙ  
ОПИСАНИЕ И ИНСТРУКЦИЯ ПО МОНТАЖУ



BLACKOUT DRIVING LIGHT BOOKLET




SIMULATED NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

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**SECRET**



FITTER WITH NUCLEAR  
WEAPON SIMULATOR



FLAP WHEEL  
ANTENNA

November: Eight East German ZSU 23-4 were observed among equipment being moved by rail on 1 November. This observation was significant since only four of this AA system were thought to be part of the anti-aircraft battery of a tank regiment.

The first firm indicator of SA-6 equipment in East Germany was provided on 9 November at the railroad siding in Halle/Schleittau. On this occasion, an unidentified unit was observed outloading. Among the equipment sighted were six ZIL-131, probable surface-to-air missile transloader/servicers. Analysis of the photography taken during this sighting indicated that these transloaders are part of the SA-6 missile system.

On 13 November, two RIGA class destroyer escorts of the East German Navy were observed near the Rostock city harbor undergoing repairs.

On 29 November, SA-4 equipment was observed for the first time in Saalfeld Installation 282. The sighting of T-62 and their turret numbers observed on this and previous occasions assisted analysts in determining that this installation also houses a tank division, rather than a motorized rifle division as previously believed.

The Soviet conscription announcement was made on 20 October, and by early November Pendel trains began to assemble in rail sidings. The first sighting of an actual Pendel movement was made on 16 November near Pasewalk, signaling that troop rotation had actually begun. There


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were relatively fewer sightings of Pendel trains during this troop rotation period than in previous years. This is probably due partly to the fact that the Soviet trend appears to be greater utilization of airlift for troop rotation. This rotation period, which lasted approximately six weeks, was highlighted by a minimum 40 flights by transport aircraft into Gross Dolln and Grossenhain Airfields.



SA-6 TRANSLOADER



SAALFELD SA-4 SITE

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

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December: The Soviet strategic SIGINT collection site at Zella Mehliis was visited on 9 December. It was noted on this occasion that the Soviets were continuing their practice of utilizing different intercept equipment at different times, making the site equipment inventory rather fluid. During 1971, the site contained at various times the following equipment: BAR BRICK, SWING BOX, SQUAT EYE, BIG EAR, GRID SHIELD, FRONT PLATE, FOLD PLATE, SPRAG STAR, DISCONE, four large and seven small parabolae, and several unidentified antennae. At the end of the year, construction was still underway on two new buildings on the west side of the site.

Excellent photo coverage of the East German intercept site at Bienstaedt was obtained on 9 December. Nine different antennae were noted which are capable of operating in UHF, HF, and VHF frequency bands to intercept point-to-point communications. This new facility gives the East Germans increased ability to monitor allied traffic and poses a new security threat to allied forces operating in West Germany.

On 19 December, the Dallgow-Doebritz rail siding contained two military strakes with a minimum 88 ZIL-164 cargo trucks loaded in piggy back fashion. All appeared freshly painted and bore no markings. Those trucks already loaded on the strakes had what appeared to be shipping instructions on the left cab window. With the sighting of increased numbers of ZIL-130 trucks in GSFG, it is probable that these ZIL-164 vehicles were being returned for other use to the USSR.

On 21 December, the floating dock number 1 of the Neptunwerft in Rostock contained a ROBBE-class LST of the East German Navy. The ship had a TSR type radar mounted on the main mast instead of the usual KSA-5.



EAST GERMAN INTERCEPT ANTENNAE AT BIENSTAEDT

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E. (C) ECONOMIC

Consumer Goods: The past five years have seen a significant increase in the number of television sets, radios, washing machines, stoves, and small refrigerators displayed in department stores. They are usually rather expensive and probably not always available. The attractiveness of the displays has improved considerably. Advertising associated with these goods is frequently observed. It is obvious that a concerted effort has been made to make them look better to the consumer. During this same period, there has been a dramatic improvement in the goods exhibited at the LEIPZIG Fairs. However, most of these products appear to be for export and are not representative of the items the local populace can purchase.

Clothing: Attempts are being made to imitate Western styles; however, East German clothing is considerably more conservative and often discloses the influence of East European tailoring. On Sundays and holidays the people dress up with their outward appearance closely resembling that of West Germans. Over the last two years, many of the young people have adopted some of the "mod" styles, and it is not uncommon to see "hot pants". Most of this western-appearing clothing (particularly girls' styles) is either home-made or has been altered. Styles which exceed the party concept of good taste or which show excessive western influence aren't found in clothing stores.

Grocery Stores: A major effort has been made to improve the "Konsum" grocery store system. Small "Konsum" stores have been built and older stores renovated with more lights added, brighter colors used, and displays made more attractive. The stores are furnished with medium size shopping carts or baskets, but paper/plastic carry-out bags are non-existent. Practically every small village has a "Konsum"; those too small to support a permanent grocery store are serviced on a scheduled basis by a van type vehicle stocked with basic items. Staple foods appear to be readily available, but there are few prepared and canned foods. No real evidence of food shortages has been noted, but lines do form when certain meats or fresh fruits are available. Apparently, the careful planner and eager shopper is there before the shop is opened in order to get the best choice.

Agricultural: With a shortage of spring rains, considerable effort was devoted to the irrigation of crops and pasture land in the northern portion of East Germany. All types of crops, except potatoes, were irrigated to some degree. Four basic types of irrigation systems were noted:

a. Buried sprinkler system: Pipes are laid in an underground network with sprinkler heads extended approximately 1 meter above ground in a pattern to assure full coverage of the area under irrigation.

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b. Above ground sprinkler system: Irrigation pipes (10-15 meter sections) are laid above ground with sprinkler heads attached to the pipes at intervals. The pipe network is periodically moved to assure full coverage.

c. Hydraulic (water) powered irrigation system: This is a self-powered system mounted linearly on large metal wheels. Motive power appears to be derived from water pressure passing through the system, activating a vane drive system on the wheels. Placed in operation on one side of a field, the system slowly traverses the area, accomplishing irrigation by a sprinkler system.

d. Electric powered irrigation system: This is an electric powered, track laying system of unusual design. The system in the report photographs is approximately 400 meters in length. Each section of the system appears to consist of a single, track laying arrangement (track, drive and road wheels, electric motor, power source) and a large, triangular truss section containing the irrigation pipes. The two upper pipes of the truss both appear to be fitted with sprinkler heads. The lower pipe appears to be used as a support for the system and to provide rigidity. The system appears to be employed in the same manner as the hydraulic (water) powered system, but could be used in more adverse terrain. The source of electric power could not be determined. It may be either from batteries housed in the compartments above the tracks, from a generator on board the system, or from commercial sources via an extension.

Transportation: Public transportation is still limited primarily to trains and buses. Bus transportation seems to be the only public transportation available to the smaller villages away from the rail lines. Older buses are being replaced by modern Hungarian-manufactured models. Much of the long-distance travel between the major cities is performed on trains. Diesels are replacing the older steam engines. One fireman stated that by the end of 1972, all steam engines will have been replaced by diesels. This appears doubtful, because few new diesels have been seen in the past several months and many steam engines are still in service. A few new passenger cars have been added, but not a significant number. There has been an apparent 30-50 percent increase in automobiles in the last five years. The Trabant is still the most frequently observed automobile, but there are also large numbers of Volga, Wartburg, new Skoda, and quite recently (within the past 18 months), the Polish Fiat sedans. The East Germans prefer the Fiat over the Wartburg and Skoda and definitely over the Trabant. The old Trabant 600cc is still being produced; the waiting period remains 7 to 8 years, and the car must be completely paid off before it is delivered. The waiting period for the Wartburg, Skoda, and Trabant is about eight years. There has been no apparent increase in the number of service shops, repair centers, or garages, and this

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seems to be a real problem. People just cannot obtain replacement parts. The percentage of Volgas and Moskvichs appears to have decreased, although the number of automobiles has significantly increased. A new car has appeared in the last few months which the East Germans call the Soviet Fiat. Bicycles are still very much in use within East Germany but have decreased in number. Many mopeds and motorcycles are very much in evidence as inexpensive but reliable transportation.

F. (C) POLITICAL

The impression USMLM officers have gained is that the Party system operates below the visible surface. It is just not exposed to the outsider. USMLM Liaison Officers are transient, passing through villages and sometimes stopping briefly in the large cities such as LEIPZIG, DRESDEN, MAGDEBURG, HALLE and ROSTOCK. The result is that no significant impressions have been gained of the Party in action. Slogans, radio and television propaganda, etc. provide some insight, but it is limited. The general impression is that the East Germans are striving continuously for recognition by Western governments, or for that matter, any government. Much of this, of course, is not evident in our touring. One impression is that the Soviets have a problem in restraining the East Germans in their drive for autonomy. The Soviets, on the other hand, seem interested in retaining the East Germans in a dependency status.

G. (C) SOCIAL ATTITUDE OF POPULATION

The East German people have learned that a certain standard of living and way of life can be achieved independent of the Party. Many people seemingly take pride in being able to achieve this status without joining the Party, and in many cases, despite the Party's controls and restrictions. Farmers are continually being encouraged to join the larger collective farms and coercion is often used. The farmers can resist, but they suffer. The larger collectives in the last few years have received very modern equipment, such as tractors, plows, and combines. The buildings on the collective farms have also improved greatly, and it appears that the efficiency of the collective farm has also greatly improved.

There is little doubt that the East Germans have accepted as fact that the Soviets are not going to leave. The East Germans truly believe that the Soviets benefit from their presence in East Germany by taking out of the country what they want. As a result, the East Germans are resolved to make the best life possible for themselves under current conditions. They accept but do not like the fact that they cannot travel to the West. They are busy with day-to-day living and concentrate on short-term goals, such as a three-day holiday, or

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longer vacation period, or with getting their son into an engineering school. If circumstances dictate that a son leave the farm and live in the city, they are all for it and, in fact, encourage it. Their goal is to give their children a better life than they have. Even among the non-Party, and/or the anti-Party, people, it appears that adaptation to existing conditions includes a willingness to have a son join the Party if deemed necessary to achieve success. Many of the people take great pride in the achievements East Germany has made in the last several years. In many cases, they are proud of what they have accomplished and in what their fellow citizens have done to build up the country. They take offense at any degrading remarks that an outsider might make. Their pride is not necessarily the type of pride that the Party would like to promote; i.e., that they have forged ahead with the Party. Rather the pride resides in the individual who has done well despite the Party, despite the Soviet occupation, and despite the tightly controlled isolated economy. This is their pride. It may be that there has been a relaxation of control to promote, perhaps, this type of feeling; if not actively on the part of the Party, perhaps passively. No evidence has been found of any real massive dissatisfaction, even if voiced occasionally by individuals. The general impression is that many East Germans are looking ahead to continued improvement in their standard of living and are going to continue to work for this. People are demanding more and slowly getting more.

On the part of the East Germans there does not seem to be a real drive for any reunification with West Germany. Part of this, probably, is because they do have certain suspicions about the West German government and West German industrialists and business people. They appear to believe a good bit of the overall tone of the propaganda they hear.



LOCAL KONSUM STORE

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## A G R E E M E N T

ON MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES  
COMMANDERS IN CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", dated November 14, 1944, the United States and the Soviet Commanders in Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadripartite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.
2. Missions will be composed of air, navy and army representatives. There will be no political representative.
3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.
4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission".
5. The Chief of the mission will be accredited to the Commander in Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the mission will be accredited to Commander in Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the mission will be accredited to Commander in Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.
6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.
7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.
8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of Commander in Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of Soviet or United States Mission wants to visit United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24-72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and headquarters of their respective Commanders in Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communication through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they also will be given facilities such as mail, telephone, telegraph, through the existing means of communication when the members of the missions will be traveling within the zone. In case of a breakdown in the radio installation, the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communication.

12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies, and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition, the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in the currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full right of extra-territoriality.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders in Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the mission will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly, as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by Deputy Commanders of United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

*E. H. Huebner*  
*Lt Gen. Dep Comdr.*

Lieutenant-General HUEBNER  
Deputy Commander in Chief,  
European Command

*Malinin*  
*3. 4. 47*

Colonel-General MALININ  
Deputy Commander in Chief,  
Chief of Staff of the  
Group of Soviet Occupation  
Forces in Germany

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## PERSONNEL ROSTER

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE DEPARTED</u>
COL	TURNER, FREDERICK C.	4 Jan 71	
COL	RICHE, HOWARD M.		5 Apr 71
LTC	COLGAN, DAVID J. (USAF)		
LTC	BROWNLEE, ROBERT W.		12 Jul 71
LTC	EVANS, ROBERT B.	6 Oct 71	
LTC	HOSKINS, LEE		23 Jul 71
LTC	SHIMEK, JOE E. II	12 Jun 71	
LTC	STOVALL, DON O.		1 Jul 71
LTC	VON DACH, ROBERT F.		
MAJ	BALL, WILLIAM R. (USMC)		19 Feb 71
MAJ	DePRIE, MICHAEL C.		
MAJ	FIELDER, WILLIAM H.		27 Jun 71
MAJ	HALL, DAVID B. (USAF)		2 Sep 71
MAJ	HANSEN, LYNN M. (USAF)	8 Jul 71	
MAJ	MANZO, FRED V.		
MAJ	MECKEL, PETER S.		
MAJ	NARGELE, DOMINIK G. (USMC)	30 Jan 71	
MAJ	NIKULLA, PAUL E. (USAF)		5 Jun 71
MAJ	VON HOENE JOHN P.		
MAJ	WALKER, FREDERICK A.	28 Jun 71	
MAJ	ZALMANIS, ANDRIS (USAF)		24 Mar 71
CPT	BURHANS, WILLIAM A. (USAF)	4 Aug 71	
CPT	GILBERT, GERALD H. (USAF)		
SGM	KOCHANIEC, LOUIS J		
CMS	WALTNER, MAVIS L. (USAF)		
SFC	ELLIS, JAMES R.		15 Aug 71
SFC	HAMILTON, JAMES E.		24 Feb 71
MSG	HASENYAGER, CLIFFORD E. (USAF)		
MSG	JOHNSON, ARLEY L. (USAF)		4 Aug 71
MSG	RATZ, MELVIN E. (USAF)		
SFC	RIDLEY, LAWRENCE D.		
SFC	TOLDSEPP, VALDEK	6 Oct 71	
MSG	VanWAGONER, CHARLES W. Jr (USAF)	20 Sep 71	
SSG	BEARD, ROGER D.		24 Feb 71
SSG	BERRY, JAMES R.	7 Jul 71	
SSG	BLAIS, ROLAND A.	11 Jan 71	
SSG	FLORIN, PAUL R.		
SSG	HUFF, CARL E.		3 Jul 71
TSG	NETTER, NIKOLAUS G. (USAF)		
SSG	NORTON, DANIEL T.	3 Aug 71	
TSG	O'DONNELL, JAMES (USAF)		
TSG	ROCHELEAU, KENNETH D. (USAF)		
SSG	SALAS, FRANCISCO A.		12 Jul 71
SSG	SCHNIEDERMEIER, JOHANN J.	3 Aug 71	
SSG	STAGGS, KENNETH R.	23 Nov 71	

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATE ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE DEPARTED</u>
SP5	ANCTIL, ROLAND R		
SSG	BONE, ERNIE A (USAF)		
SP5	CHU, HENRY R.S.P.	3 Mar 71	
SGT	COATES, ROBERT E. Jr.	15 Dec 71	
SP5	COLEY, JAMES E.		29 Sep 71
SP5	CURRAN, MICHAEL J.		
SSG	GRUNCH, ROBERT W. (USAF)		
SP5	GUEST, GERALD L.		10 Sep 71
SP5	HEDRICK, DANNY F.		
SP5	JEFFERIES, LOUIS E.		
SP5	JONES, THOMAS R.		13 Jan 71
SSG	KELLER, JOSEF (USAF)		
SP5	KELLEY, ROBERT L.		
SP5	McCULLEY, LLOYD G.		12 Jun 71
SP5	MILLER, RONALD M.		31 May 71
SP5	MINGES, MICHAEL V.		22 Dec 71
SGT	NAPOLSKI, CRAIG A.		
SP5	PRUITT, JOSEF D.	7 Aug 71	
SSG	SENNE, HELMUT (USAF)		
SP5	SHINKLE, GERALD K.	27 May 71	
SP5	TAYLOR, LARRY G.		14 Jul 71
SP5	YOUNG, CLYN L.		5 Apr 71
SGT	ZAMORA, EARL	12 Jan 71	
SP4	FONTENOT, MICHAEL T.		10 Jul 71
SP4	GILBERT, MICHAEL G.	27 May 71	
SP4	LEAR, WILLIAM E. Jr.	5 Nov 71	
SP4	PARSONS, DAVID L.	14 Feb 71	
SP4	PEAY, KENNETH B.	9 Jun 71	
SP4	PERKINS, JOHN W.		15 Nov 71
SP4	PHILLIPS, LYNDON D.	29 Jul 71	10 Aug 71
SP4	RAIT, STEPHEN R.	10 Agt 71	17 Aug 71
SP4	REMUS, ROGER S.	22 Jul 71	
SP4	TERRIAULT, JAMES	13 Mar 71	10 Jun 71
SP4	THOMAS, WILLIAM C.	8 Jun 71	12 Jul 71
SP4	VOIGT, JACK B.	14 Feb 71	11 Aug 71
SP4	WEBB, RODNEY M.	20 Dec 71	
PFC	ALFANO, CHRISTOPHER A.	10 Aug 71	

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ANNEX C

LIAISON MEETINGS

- 28 Jan Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request to protest U.S. detention of SMLM-F vehicle in Frankfurt on 27 Jan in which COL Spivak was a passenger. SERB also raised the subject of an accident involving LTC Stovall which took place in late December 1970. CINCSFG wanted an explanation as to why the SMLM vehicle was stopped in an open area.
- 5 Mar Deputy Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at USMLM request to discuss social function at Potsdam House on 6 March 1971 and to request guest passes.
- 24 Mar Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request to discuss two incidents involving two USMLM tours in the vicinity of Gera and Marzahn.
- 5 Apr Deputy Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at USMLM request to discuss routine matters of subsistence, repair and maintenance at the Potsdam Mission House. The general atmosphere of the meeting was quite cordial and businesslike.
- 8 Apr Chief USMLM met with Acting Chief SERB at USMLM request to get acquainted with personnel at SERB Headquarters building in Potsdam.
- 9 Apr Chief USMLM met with Acting Chief SERB at SERB request at the Potsdam Mission House to discuss furnishings and subsistence problems of the Potsdam Mission House.
- 16 Apr Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request at GSFG Headquarters for the purpose of an introductory visit with CINCSFG (Army-General Viktor G. Kulikov). A brief meeting with the Chief of Staff, GSFG, took place prior to the visit with the CINCSFG. Conversation was very animated and affable without political overtones. Personalities were discussed and the conversation was primarily in Russian between the CINCSFG and Chief USMLM.
- 3 May Chief USMLM met with Acting Chief SERB at USMLM request to discuss repairs at the Potsdam Mission House. The atmosphere of the meeting was very congenial. Chief USMLM thanked the Acting Chief SERB for arranging his visit to Headquarters, GSFG. Chief USMLM brought up the Huebner-Malinin Agreement and reiterated to SERB that this agreement was the basis for the existence of the USMLM and SMLM and the basic principle is reciprocity. This subject was broached as a result of the Soviets denial of the Chief USMLM's request to use the Wartha-Herleshausen crossing point. It was brought out by the Chief USMLM that this

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crossing point was along the shortest route between the missions (USMLM and SMLM) and their respective headquarters.

- 20 May Chief USMLM met with Acting Chief SERB at USMLM request to discuss repairs, domestic help, and subsistence at the Potsdam Mission House. The Soviet's denial of the Chief USMLM's use of the Wartha-Herleshausen crossing point on 18 April was brought up by the Chief USMLM. The subject of guest passes to Potsdam was also brought up by the Chief USMLM. The Acting Chief SERB suggested a meeting the following week between the Chief USMLM and the new Chief SERB (who was on leave) to get acquainted. The tone of the meeting was friendly and cooperative.
- 25 Jun Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at USMLM request to discuss an accident involving Car #25 in which two GDR civilians riding on a motorcycle were injured on 24 June near Riesa (US8185). Chief SERB was very hostile throughout the meeting and was obviously ill and suffering from a severe cold.
- 7 Jul Deputy Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at USMLM request to discuss incident which occurred on 5 July when USMLM car #25 was stopped by a BTR 60 approximately 3 km SE of Ganzlin (UV1819). Meeting was conducted in a cordial manner.
- 12 Jul Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request for the purpose of presenting the results of the Soviet's investigation of the accident on 24 June involving USMLM Car #25 and two GDR cyclists. Chief SERB made allegations of USMLM guilt in the matter.
- 11 Aug Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request for the purpose of announcing that Major Hall and TSgt Ratz were declared 'Personae non grata' and that the accreditation of Car #25 was cancelled.
- 14 Aug Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at USMLM request to protest the Soviet's failure to return equipment and personal effects taken from USMLM personnel during PRA violation and to protest the Soviet delay in pass exchange for new personnel to take the passes of those declared 'Personae non grata'.
- 20 Aug Deputy Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at SERB request for the purpose of protesting an alleged violation of Mission Restriction Sign (MRS) by USMLM personnel on 19 August, and to present a letter from Chief of Staff, GSFG for Chief of Staff, USAREUR protesting the detention of recent months involving USMLM personnel.
- 3 Sep Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request for the purpose of returning a portion of the equipment taken from USMLM tour during PRA violation. Chief USMLM informed SERB of the

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forthcoming Columbus Day party. Protest was also made of the time needed for Soviet processing of pass exchanges. Chief USMLM extended invitations for the Tempelhof Open House on 18 September.

- 16 Sep Deputy Chief USMLM met with Acting Deputy Chief SERB at SERB request at Potsdam Mission House for the purpose of inspecting the status and progress of repairs on the house.
- 17 Sep Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at USMLM request for the purpose of extending Soviet invitations to the USMLM Columbus Day Party and to protest the insufficient number of support personnel for the Potsdam Mission House. Chief SERB extended his regrets that he was unable to attend Tempelhof Open House on 18 September.
- 25 Sep Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request at Headquarters, GSFG Wunsdorf for the purpose of introducing Colonel-General Kurkotkin as new CINCGSFG who was replacing General Kulikov. Chief USMLM inquired as to the possibility of U.S. entry into Plauen PRA to contact parents of U.S. serviceman killed in Vietnam.
- 29 Sep Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at USMLM request for the purpose of expressing regret at refusal of U.S. entry into Plauen PRA. Chief SERB verified Soviet attendance list for 12 October party. Chief USMLM extended his appreciation for the farewell visit with the departing CINCGSFG on 25 September.
- 22 Oct Deputy Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at USMLM request for the purpose of protesting the lack of support personnel for maintaining heat at the Potsdam Mission House and the mediocre painting of the interior of the Potsdam Mission House.
- 30 Oct Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at USMLM request for the purpose of eliciting a photograph of the new CINCGSFG and to inquire as to the whereabouts of U.S. defector SP4 Fields who had entered Soviet Zone with a military vehicle. Request for a photograph was denied. Chief USMLM expressed regret by Soviets to allow U.S. entry to Plauen PRA for purpose of notifying parents of deceased U.S. soldier as requested in meeting of 25 September.
- 11 Nov Deputy Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at USMLM request to protest shortage of support personnel at Potsdam Mission House and to elaborate the repairs needed at this house.
- 22 Nov Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request for the purpose of presenting letter from Chief of Staff, GSFG to Chief of Staff, USAREUR concerning lack of U.S. support for SMLM-F. Also discussed were the whereabouts of U.S. defector SP4 Fields, the procedures to be taken for using the Wartha-Herleshausen checkpoint, and

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and the continued lack of support the Soviets were rendering for the Potsdam Mission House.

- 29 Nov Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at SERB request for the purpose of inquiring as to response of Chief of Staff, GSFG letter concerning support for SMLM-F. Chief USMLM protested lack of support for USMLM Potsdam Mission House. Also discussed were impending pass renewals and return of U.S. defector SP4 Fields.
- 2 Dec Chief USMLM met with SERB representative Maj Shepilov at SERB request to inspect work done by East German contractors. Maj Shepilov was in charge of support for work being accomplished at Potsdam Mission House. He expressed distrust of East German workers.
- 24 Dec Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at USMLM request for the purpose of extending holiday greeting from USMLM to SERB. Also discussed were the delays experienced in the reissue or renewal of expired of lost passes (children's passes).
- 27 Dec Chief USMLM met with First Deputy Chief of Staff, GSFG (Major-General Yakovlev) at HQ GSFG at USMLM request for the purpose of delivering holiday greetings and gifts from Chief of Staff and CINCUSAREUR to Chief of Staff and CINCGSFG. Chief SERB was present.
- 30 Dec Chief USMLM met with Deputy Chief SERB at USMLM request to protest the delay in reissue of Sergeant Voigt's pass which disappeared sometime between 7 and 11 December. Protests involving the recent complications experienced in the exchange of personnel and vehicular passes were also discussed.

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ANNEX D

TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRA'S)

TRA 1-71 (242301Z-312300Z January 1971). This TRA screened FTX activity by elements of the Eighth Guards Army in the southwestern portion of East Germany. Fishbed aircraft of the 24th Tactical Air Army were observed performing ground attack runs over the Ordruf PRA on 27 January.

TRA 2-71 (242301Z January - 022300Z February 1971). Elements of the First Guards Tank Army and Second Guards Army participated in FTX activity. River crossing operations were conducted by units of the 94th GMRD, Second Guards Army in the Havelberg-Wittenberg area. Elements of the First Guards Tank Army conducted training in the Letzlinger Heide highlighted by river crossing operations in the Elbe North training area. Air defense activity involving surface to air missiles (SA-4) and AAA batteries was conducted in the Wittstock training area.

TRA 3-71 (262301Z-312300Z January 1971). This TRA was an extension of the maneuvers which took place in TRA 1 71.

TRA 4 71 (262301Z January - 052300Z February 1971). A Third Shock Army FTX was screened by this TRA. Activity was highlighted by river crossing operations by probable elements of the 207th MRD, Third Shock Army. The 34th Artillery Division (subordinate directly to Hq GSFG) also deployed to field locations in the TRA; however, the extent of its involvement is not known. Logistic support activity was performed by the 56th Transport Regiment.

TRA 5-71 (182301Z-252300Z March 1971). Units of the Third Shock Army especially the 10th Guards Tank Division and all of its major subordinate units were active during this TRA. Probable elements of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, Twentieth Guards Army also participated in FTX maneuvers in the area screened by the TRA.

TRA 6-71 (182301Z-262300Z March 1971). This TRA screened activity in southcentral East Germany with elements of the First Guards Tank Army conducting limited out-of-garrison training. Major elements of the 39th GMRD, 57th GMRD, and 20th GTD, Eighth Guards Army conducted FTX's in the restricted area.

TRA 7-71 (192301Z-262300Z March 1971). Divisional elements of the Eight Guards Army including the 39th GMRD, 57th GMRD, and the 20th GTD exercised in the area screened by this TRA.

TRA 8-71 (272301Z June - 012300Z July 1971). Elements of the First Guards Tank Army and the Third Shock Army conducted FTX activity and river crossing operations. The 56th Transportation Regiment

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conducted logistic support including laying tactical pipeline from Luebben to Jueterbog.

TRA 9-71 (072301Z-142300Z July 1971). This TRA screened FTX play by elements of at least the 20th GMRD, Eighth Guards Army. Probable elements of the First Guards Tank Army also trained in the restricted area.

TRA 10-71 (082301Z-152300Z July 1971). Field Training by major elements of the 32d MRD, Second Guards Army and limited exercise by the East German Army were screened by this TRA. Also, there were indications of logistical movement which probably related to a later press announcement of a Warsaw Pact logistics exercise.

TRA 11-71 (182301Z-252300Z July 1971). Significant divisional maneuvers in the restricted area involved the 6th GMRD and 71st Guards Artillery Brigade, Twentieth Guards Army. The TRA screened deployment into holding areas south of Berlin from which elements moved into the Letzinger Heide Training Area where the exercise activity terminated.

TRA 12-71 (252301Z July - 012300Z August 1971). Regimental elements of the First Guards Tank Army participated in FTX activity within the restricted area.

TRA 13-71 (092301Z-132300Z August 1971) and TRA 14-71 (092301Z-152300Z August 1971). Specialized AAA Artillery SSM, Engineer and CBR training was evident in this time period. The two TRA's screened this activity as well as exercise operations by regimental-level tactical maneuver units. Battalion strength units of the 6th and 7th GTD, First Guards Tank Army were active, and there was evidence that elements of the East German 7th Tank Division, Military District III deployed into the southern part of the TRA.

TRA 15-71 (092301Z-132300Z August 1971). This TRA screened FTX activities by battalion sized elements of the 39th GMRD, Eighth Guards Army.

TRA 16-71 (181100Z-222300Z August 1971). The Third Shock Army units conducted operations in the restricted area. Deployment of regimental size elements of the 10th GTD into the TRA and column movement near Route #5 indicated regimental level FTX activity during this period.

TRA 17-71 (232301Z-292300Z August 1971). This TRA screened a combined FTX by major elements of at least the 19th MRD, Twentieth Guards Army and the East German 8th MRD, Military District V. Artillery support was provided by 71st Guards Brigade, Twentieth Guards Army. Maneuver activity took place in the Jueterbog Training

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Area moving westward into the Altengrabow, Elbe North, and Letzlinger Heide Training Areas, during which major river crossing operations were conducted.

TRA 18-71 (292301Z August - 042300Z September 1971). This TRA was imposed at the conclusion of TRA 17-71 with its boundaries suggesting operations from the Letzlinger Heide Training Area toward the Polish border near Settin. It was primarily used by East German Military District V units including the 2nd Artillery (Scud) Brigade.

TRA 19-71 (232301Z-272300Z September 1971). Elements of the 9th Guards Tank Division, Second Guards Army and probable elements of the 10th GTD, 3rd Shock Army performed river crossing operations on the Elbe.

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MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
1-71 (24230LZ-3L23007 JANUARY)


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
MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
4-71 (262301Z FEBRUARY-052300Z MARCH)

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
6-71 (182301Z-262300Z MARCH)

D-9

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
7-71 (192301Z-262300Z MARCH)

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
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MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
8-71 (272301Z JUNE-012300Z JULY)

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
9-71 (0773017-1423007 JULY)

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
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MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
10-71 (082301Z-152300Z JULY)

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
11-71 (182301Z-252300Z JULY)

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
12-71 (252301Z JULY-012300Z AUGUST)

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MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
13-71 (092301Z-132300Z AUGUST)

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
14-71 (092301Z-152300Z AUGUST)

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
15-71 (092301Z-132300Z AUGUST)

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MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
16-71 (181100Z-222300Z AUGUST)

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
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MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
17-71 (232301Z-292300Z AUGUST)

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


MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
18-71 (292301Z AUG-042300Z SEP)

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MAP OF TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREA (TRA)  
19-71 (232201Z-27300Z SEPTEMBER)

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
ANNEX E

1971 TOURING STATISTICS

MONTH	TOURS	ONE DAY TOURS	TWO DAY TOURS	THREE DAY TOURS	TOTAL TOUR- DAYS
JAN	39	18	21	0	60
FEB	40	20	20	0	60
MAR	46	26	19	1	67
APR	35	15	19	1	56
MAY	46	24	20	2	48
JUN	40	19	20	1	62
JUL	39	15	24	0	63
AUG	36	15	21	0	57
SEP	33	19	13	1	48
OCT	34	14	20	0	54
NOV	33	7	26	0	59
DEC	29	16	12	1	43
TOTAL	450	208	235	7	699

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USMILM

PASS BEARING PERSONNEL \*

- 1 - CHIEF OF MISSION
- 1 - DEP CHIEF OF MISSION
- 7 - LIAISON OFFICERS
- 5 - DRIVERS

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PERSONNEL-1971



COL FREDERICK C. TURNER  
CHIEF OF MISSION



LTC COLGAN  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION



MAJ NARGELE  
NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE



SGM KOCHANIEC  
SERGEANT MAJOR



MRS. ALANIZ  
SECRETARY

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ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION



MAJ WALKER  
EXECUTIVE OFFICER



CMSGT WALTNER  
AIR FORCE NCOIC



SSG SENNE  
AIR FORCE ADMIN NCO



SSG BLAIS  
ARMY ADMIN NCO



SP5 SHINKLE  
PERS SP



SP5 CHU  
ADMIN SP



SP4 GILBERT  
PERS SP

F-4

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ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SECTION



SP4 NAPOLSKI  
CHIEF, COMM CTR



SP4 PERKINS  
CRYPTO SP



SP5 JEFFRIES  
CRYPTO SP



SSG NORTON  
MTR SGT



SGT ZAMORA  
SUPPLY SGT



SP4 REMUS  
SUPPLY CLK

F-5

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OPERATIONS DIVISION



LTC VON DACH  
OPS OFF



MAJ HANSEN  
ASST OPS OFF-AIR



MAJ FIELDER  
ASST OPS OFF-GROUND



MAJ MECKEL  
ASST OPS OFF-GROUND



SFC RIDLEY  
GROUND OPS SGT



MSG HASENYAGER  
AIR OPS SGT

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PHOTO SUPPORT SECTION



MSG VAN WAGONER  
CHIEF, PHOTO LAB



SSG BONE  
PHOTO SYSTEM TECH



TSG ROCHELLEAU  
LAB TECH



SSG GRUNCH  
LAB SP



SSG KELLER  
PHOTO SP



SP5 MINGLES  
PHOTO SP



SP4 ANCTIL  
PHOTO SP

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POTSDAM INSTALLATION



SSG SCHNIEDERMEIER  
NCOIC - LINGUIST



MSG RATZ  
DRIVER - LINGUIST



TSG NEITER  
DRIVER - LINGUIST



SP5 KELLEY  
DRIVER - LINGUIST



SP5 CURRAN  
DRIVER - LINGUIST



SP4 LEAR  
DRIVER - LINGUIST

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COLLECTION/PRODUCTION SECTION



TSG O'DONNELL  
INTELL TECH



SSG BERRY  
INTELL SGT



SP4 PEAY  
INTELL ANAL



SP5 HILDRICK  
INTELL ANAL



SSG FLORIN  
SEC CHIEF



SP5 PRUITT  
INTELL ANAL

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ACCREDITED LIAISON/RECONNAISSANCE OFFICERS



LTC EVANS  
SR LNO



MAJ DE PRIE  
LNO



MAJ MANZO  
LNO



LTC SHIMEK  
LNO



MAJ VON HOENE  
LNO

F-10

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ACCREDITED LIAISON/RECONNAISSANCE OFFICERS



CPT BURHANS  
LNO



CPT GILBERT  
LNO

F-11

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