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UNIT HISTORY(U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

1982

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FOREWORD

USMLM's Unit History serves important informative functions:

- It provides an annual chronology of the Mission's operational accomplishments in overt intelligence collection.

- It affords a record of developmental trends within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and East German Armed Forces.

- It is a repository of information pertaining to USMLM's role as a military mission in official liaison with Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces Germany, and representing the Commander in Chief, US Army Europe.


- It contributes to the military history program of the Armed Services.

USMLM's 1982 Unit History joins those from previous years to comprise an important record of trends, precedent and policy. As such it becomes a most useful reference document in the conduct of the Mission's daily affairs.

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As its predecessors, the 1982 History of the United States Liaison Mission is essentially a repository of the collection accomplishments and operational experiences of a very few accredited officers and non-commissioned officers to whom has been entrusted the rare opportunity and responsibility to conduct overt intelligence collection by personal observation throughout East Germany. As a preface to this volume, it is appropriate to provide a few descriptive remarks about these special individuals. Each is a masterful practitioner of the old Russian proverb that the "Hawk kisses the chicken to the last tail feather." His weapons are stealth and discretion. He knows that successful collection is a deliberate and persistent endeavor which reveals the correct picture about his opponent from an emerging mosaic of separate information, whose individual pieces are usually insignificant. He is enthusiastically committed to achieving the optimum utilization of both his accredited status and professional skills. He accepts this important commitment without reservation. Upon his individual judgment, initiative and courage, the success of USMLM is built.



RANDALL A. GREENWALT
Colonel, GS
Chief of Mission

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25 May 1982
Accused in SRB
23 June 82

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1982

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PART I

GENERAL

A. (U) INTRODUCTION. USMLM activities associated with carrying out its two missions are described in detail in succeeding portions of this History. A summary of these activities and results thereof follows.

1. (C) Intelligence Information Collection. In carrying out its second and classified mission, USMLM dispatched 586 reconnaissance tours into the GDR for a total of approximately 641,000 kilometers. The Mission produced in excess of 1180 Intelligence Information Reports reporting information acquired during these tours.

2. (U) Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA). In 1982, HQ GSFG levied two TRA. Section II, paragraph D contains details.

3. (U) Detentions and Incidents. USMLM tours were detained eight times in 1982, as compared to six in 1981.

4. (U) Liaison and Representation. USMLM or his representative met with SERB or HQ GSFG representatives a total of seven times to discuss a variety of topics. See Section III, paragraph B.

B. (C) REFERENCES

1. TCA E1W1AUAA

2. USEUCOM DIRECTIVE 40-18, 30 Mar 78

3. USAREUR REGULATION 363-27

3. USAFE Regulation 23-11, 05 Feb 79

4. 7113 Special Activity Squadron Regulation 23-5, 01 Aug 79

5. USMC Table of Organization 5503, 17 Dec 76

C. (C) ORGANIZATION. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement (Annex A), signed in April 1947, authorized the exchange of Military Liaison Missions between the Soviet and US Military Headquarters in Germany and laid down general guidelines for their activities and for the support to be rendered by the headquarters to which they were accredited. The agreement provided for 14 accredited personnel, with complete freedom to travel except in areas of military dispositions; the 14 accredited personnel "will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations."

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Because of Berlin's special status, USMLM is able to employ all 14 passes for operational and liaison purposes, with a support base in West Berlin. Details of pass utilization and of the tri-service organization are provided in succeeding sub-paragraphs:

1. Pass Utilization: The 14 accreditations provided for by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement are normally held as follows:

CUSMLM (Army)	1
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCUSMLM) (USAF)	1
Naval Representative (USMC)	1
OIC, Potsdam House (Army)	1

Liaison Officers

Army	4
USAF	2

Liaison NCO's

Army	3
USAF	1

2. Army Element: The TDA in effect on 31 Dec 82 authorizes 11 officers, 26 enlisted personnel, and five civilians.

3. Air Element: The Air Element is composed of 5 officers and 11 enlisted personnel, organized as Detachment 16, 7113 Special Activities Squadron.

4. Naval Element: The USMLM naval element consists of one USMC officer.

D. (C) MISSION.

1. The primary mission of USMLM is to carry out responsibilities for liaison between CINCUSAREUR, on behalf of US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR), and CINCSFG and to serve as a point of contact for other US departments and agencies with CINCSFG, in accordance with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

2. The secondary and confidential mission of USMLM is to exploit its liaison status and attendant potential for collection of intelligence information in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

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PART 11. COLLECTION

A. (C) GROUND DIVISION COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (All elements of this section, to include photography, classified CONFIDENTIAL):

1) Ground Collection - Characterizing the Environment, 1982

The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany defines the USMLM collection environment - that is, sets limits on what the Mission will be able to collect - in two ways. First, it establishes what is permissible or tolerable. Second, its activity or lack of activity determines what Mission reconnaissance tours are likely to see.

GSFG defines what is permissible or tolerable through a variety of control measures that can include any of the following: changes to PRA, imposition of IRA, surveillance (largely exercised through the East German Ministry for State Security, MfS), unfavorable response to Mission attempts to exchange holders of credentials (rotate pass-holders), aggressive warding off of tours from "sensitive" installations, more aggressive attempts to capture and detain tours, declaration of accredited personnel as persona non grata (PNG), and protests at a variety of military and governmental levels.

Ground Division experienced one serious detention (entry of vehicle, physical maltreatment of personnel, confiscation of reconnaissance equipment) and one serious incident (serious injury to a Soviet officer during an attempted entrapment detention), as a result of which three personnel were declared PNG. Despite these events, however, Ground touring personnel did not perceive a radical alteration of the "rules of engagement" as practiced by GSFG.

There were clearly some minor alterations, chiefly attempts to nail down certain actions as impermissible. A clear message was sent to the Local and transiting tours, for instance, to keep out of the Satzkorn rail sidings when military activity was in progress. It was underscored that repetitive or flagrant use of long range observation points into restricted areas was not to be tolerated, and would be met by active measures to keep tours away or capture them in the act of observing military activity. As a review of Mission detentions, incidents, and other reportable events will indicate, however, there was no overall grand tightening up on Ground Division by GSFG. PRA remained unchanged. Protests and counterprotests, though mentioning Ground personnel by name, did not appear to indicate a general restriction. Surveillance appeared to be at expected levels. Such hostile or threatening responses as were encountered were likely attributable to overzealous actions by individuals. The imposition of two IRA during the year did not significantly inhibit general order of battle or current intelligence collection.

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The pattern of GSFG activity also underwent only minor modification. The year continued to be defined by the so-called training cycle. There were, or continued to be, some slight adjustments to timing and tempo that might be associated with the arrival of the CINC GSFG, Army General ZAYTsEV.

In 1982 every GSFG division exercised at least partially at least once. Fifteen divisions were out of garrison under conditions that suggested FIX or CPX between January and April. Between June and October, 14 divisions similarly exercised or were tested. It may be that each division was out each half-year cycle. All "missing" divisions (those not observed by the missions in major out-of-garrison activity) may have conducted field training without transiting open (non-PRA) areas.

At the same time, many of these division activities were at obviously reduced strength. Even in major exercises, where elements of two divisions could be identified in what may have been opposed force play, far from total maneuver and support unit participation was confirmed.

Some of the increased number of exercise participants is attributable to the end of cycle burst of activity coincident with the start of the airlift phase of semiannual troop rotation in mid-April and mid-October. This flurry of demonstration exercises, tests, and quick-reaction FIX has become an established part of the training cycle. Widely scattered out-of-garrison activity, with much reduced troop participation, takes place within the context of a front CPX (based on deployment of the GSFG mobile command post and movement and deployment of front-level communications units); general staff presence for these exercises is suggested by at least one document obtained by USMLM.

While the amount of out-of-garrison activity may have increased with respect to the number of units, the timing of such activity appears to have stabilized. There have been some minor adjustments under ZAYTsEV, and 1982 may represent the stabilized schedule for GSFG, with one major exception - the Warsaw Pact exercise held in July. Several benchmarks can be established for the calendar year 1982:

by mid-Jan	large-scale driver training exercise (200+ vehicles) by 56 MT Bde and divisions
2d week, Jan	first division-level FIX
mid-Jan	departure of Potsdam SP How Boe for service practice
1st week, Feb	first 2 GTA large-scale exercise at northern Elbe crossing sites

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2d week, Feb	first major front CPX with army and division player participation; all armies in front-wide CPX play (8 GA staggered?)
mid-Feb	movement of regimental air defense batteries to Baltic ranges
mid-Mar	2d departure of Potsdam SP How Bde
1st week, Apr	major army FTX within front CPX (TRA 1-82)
mid-Apr	end-of-cycle testing within front CPX
15 Apr-1 May	airlift phase, semiannual troop rotation
4th week, Apr	final out-of-garrison movement, winter phase
2d week, May	establishment of harvest support camps
4th week, May	first front CPX/signal field training, summer phase
by mid-Jun	large-scale driver training
2d week, Jun	first division-level FTX, summer phase
3d week, Jun	1st departure of Potsdam SP How Bde, summer phase
26 Jun	first departure of harvest support units
2d week, Jul	first activity at northern Elbe crossing sites, summer phase
2d-3d week, Jul	Warsaw Pact exercise Main Thrust 82, including front, army and division participation
3d week, Jul	movement of regimental air defense batteries to Baltic ranges
mid-Aug	2d departure of Potsdam SP How Bde
mid-Aug	army FTX within front CPX (TRA 2-82)
4th week, Aug	LOC bridging at Domnitzsch
mid-Oct	end-of-cycle test within front CPX
15 Oct-1 Nov	airlift phase, semiannual troop rotation
3d week, Oct	final out-of-garrison movement, summer phase
7 Nov	first return of harvest support units
mid-Dec	first front CPX/signal field training, winter phase

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The Soviets probably consider that the training year begins in November (the start of the winter phase). Except for strictly annual events, however, the year divides neatly into two nearly symmetrical parts. It is likely that preparation for and conduct of Exercise Main Thrust 82 caused minor disruption to the summer 82 schedule. Nevertheless, 1982 still shows the half-year pattern, overlaid with annual cyclical activity (LOC bridge training, harvest support).

Virtually all major tactical movement - indicative of exercises or movement to ranges - took place in two distinct periods. The first lasted three months, from mid-January to mid-April, with a two-week lull in early March. The second exercise season was longer, from mid-June through mid-October with two distinct lulls in early July (possibly preparation for Main Thrust 82) and late September-early October. It is not clear why field exercises started sooner after spring rotation than after fall rotation, but that is clearly the case both for maneuver units and frontal signal units/CPX play. In contrast, movement of the Potsdam SP How Bde and regimental air defense batteries for service practice is at the same relative time in each cycle. To make the two half years more equal, winter field training would have to begin in December, or summer training in July with deletion of long pauses in the late summer. Another slight asymmetry is that the end-of-cycle tests and exercises are more widespread and involve more units in October; this is logical if such tests mark the end of the training year as a whole.

If there has been a change to the training cycle and if that is as a result of ZAYTsEV initiatives, such change has been modest. Training may be more decentralized, with divisions more frequently involved in out-of-garrison activity, but with fewer actual troops in the field on each occasion. Field training definitely begins slightly earlier than previously accepted by the Missions, and continues (in test/demonstration exercises) even while the bulk of GSFG troops involved in rotation are being airlifted in and out. The training year still has two nearly equal halves; both begin after pronounced lulls during November and May. A hectic test and evaluation period of about two weeks closes each half-year as airlift begins and activity out of garrison virtually ceases.

It is much more difficult to establish a cycle for the EGA, and this should be a future project. Major out-of-garrison activity by the EGA was during the same period as similar activity by GSFG, except that the Germans started later and finished sooner. There was no detectable burst of activity at the end of either half-year cycle. Like the Soviets, the EGA appeared to shuttle divisional components through major training areas, with some of these movements turning into genuine divisional exercises. Each Military District conducted at least one major army-level exercise (in alternate cycles). Troop

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rotation, for obvious reasons, provides a much less visible benchmark for EGA activity than for Soviet. The following activities, noted below, served as such markers in 1982. While the EGA has lulls that match the post-rotation lulls of GSFG, it appears that the EGA operates on a straight annual cycle rather than on two half-year phases:

mid-Jan	first winter FTX/CPX
mid-Jun	LUC bridging at Domnitzsch
12-17 Sep	EGA parade practice on West Ring Autobahn
Sep	mobilization exercise (callup of civilian trucks, drivers)

2) Ground Collection Operations and Significant Observations

Ground collection operations in 1982 may be characterized as five interrelated disciplines: current intelligence/indications and warning (I&W), intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), general order of battle, technical intelligence, and acquisition of documents and materiel.

Current Intelligence/Indications and Warning


Current intelligence/I&W collection is an integral part of every collection mission. All tours sample the environment to assess the readiness state of GSFG and East German forces, and the degree to which the GDR is being prepared as a theater of military operations. Merely gaining access to the GDR is itself collection of important I&W information. This and other negative I&W intelligence is significant, but only for a short time; the negative must be reconfirmed constantly. This partly accounts for the necessity to maintain Ground Division reconnaissance tours in the GDR at all times, if possible.

Tours may be targeted specifically to collect I&W information when other collection suggests that events of warning significance may be taking place. In contrast to 1981, USMLM mounted no specific collection operations to confirm or deny GSFG operations against Poland.

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USMLM continued to coordinate Tri-mission collection against two recurring events of current intelligence/I&W significance: semiannual troop rotation and harvest support. Coverage of semiannual troop rotation was able to confirm that prior service soldiers ("old troops") were leaving garrisons for rotation airfields as conscripts arrived. Perhaps more important, mission collection was able to ascertain that rotation was taking place within a context that did not suggest positive I&W significance. Unit and garrison activities fell to seasonal low levels, training areas were not in use, and potential troop concentration areas (PTCA) associated with field deployments were not occupied.



Out-rotation at Wustermark (Nitec Photography)

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The second major predictable event of the year, harvest support, also took place without any unusual circumstances, apart from numbering anomalies for the individual companies of the separate MI battalions. The establishment of camps was noted in the first half of May, the first departure of harvest vehicles for rail transport to the Soviet Union in late June, and the first returning vehicles in early November.



Rudolstadt Harvest Support Camp (IR 2 215 2161 82)

The Mission provided daily current intelligence information on activities of GSFG and the EGA through the USMLM SITREP. In 1982, 256 of these reports gave I&W staffs and current intelligence centers worldwide initial information on exercises, movements to and from garrison, and indications of reorganization/reequipping. Through this reporting, consumers are able to build a history of activity based on one source of information for comparison with other collection resources.

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Polish Troops in Main Thrust 82 (IR 2 215 2257 82)

One unusual current intelligence event was Warsaw Pact Exercise Main Thrust 82. USMIM Ground teams happened to be in the major area of exercise movement during the period of field play and return to garrison, and were able to collect detailed information on the arrival, movement between PRA, and departure of Soviet (primarily 7 GTD, 1 GTA), East German (primarily 7 TD, MD III), and Polish (primarily 20 TD) participants. Tri-mission coverage was able to document early movement of command and control and support forces, beginning at least 8 July. Polish troops arrived by 14 July. At the same time, deployment of GSFG communications and command elements indicated a major FTX/CPX. EGA and GSFG units moved into the Altengrabow PRA on 19-21 July and began return to garrison from the Letzlinger Heide PRA on 23-24 July. The last Polish train leaving the GDR was seen on 26 July.

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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

IPB involves collection and reporting of information that relates to the GDR as a potential theater of military operations in support of general defense planning. In its broadest sense, IPB includes everything of interest to US commanders in Europe, and thus everything that the Mission reports is of IPB significance. In normal usage, however, IPB is reconnaissance of routes, terrain, obstacles, and areas in response to specific questions levied by US field command staffs. The Mission uses its access to the GDR to obtain information directly from the wartime area of interest and area of influence of US units. Results of this reconnaissance are provided in limited distribution to the requestor. In 1982 USMLM ground teams published 15 IIR with 611 photographs under a program of IPB collection in support of corps, divisions, and armored cavalry regiments.



Typical IPB Reconnaissance Photography

In addition to IPB in support of specific requests from the theater, ground reconnaissance was targeted against the national data base holdings of Warsaw Pact potential troop concentration areas (PTCA). A formal program of PTCA evaluation was begun, whereby USMLM ground reconnaissance teams would visit all accessible PTCA listed in the national data base and evaluate them


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against a standard developed by the Mission. In addition, all PTCA - formerly known as bivouac/alert sites or deployment areas - discovered by the Tri-missions were also scheduled for evaluation using the same criteria. At the end of the program, in mid-1983, USMLM will publish a consolidated listing of PTCA outside PRA, indicating using unit or presumed function, the state of military development or improvement, and recommendations for inclusion in or removal from the national data base.

General Order of Battle

General order of battle collection is done when reconnaissance teams directly observe GSFG and EGA movement, activity, and associated installations (garrisons, logistics/support facilities, training areas). Such collection is usually routine; seldom of such significance as to warrant special mention; time-consuming; frequently hazardous; and dependent on long-term, accurate development of data bases by the Mission itself. Changes to organization, equipment, patterns of activity, and installations that were detected by the Mission in 1982 include:




122-mm SP How 2S1 with 17 GTR, 79 GTD (IR 2 215 2750 82)

Continued introduction of 2S1 into tank regiments. This was both a reorganization and a reequipping: tank regiments previously had no organic artillery, and reorganized regiments originally received towed D-30.


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D-20 Gun-how with 3 Arty Regt, MD III (IR 2 215 2177 82)

Upgrade of FGA non-divisional artillery in MD III by acquisition of at least one battalion of D-20.



Elements of U/I Engr Constr Bn Deploy (IR 2 215 2150 82)

Unusual rail deployment of elements of the only accessible engineer construction battalion, procoably dedicated to airfield

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construction/repair. Other such units, if in GSFG at all, are collocated with airfields and inaccessible to the Mission. Deployment of the unit is of interest in establishing its TOE, readiness, and activity baseline as an I&W factor.




New Radio Relay System with KGB/UPS Signal Unit (IR 2 215 2225 82)

Deployment of new communications systems with the newly isolated KGB/UPS Signal Unit. Also an item of technical intelligence interest, the new, three-vehicle set with lattice mast-mounted dish antenna may be a replacement for the R-400/404. Information on this equipment and this unit is an example of significant crossover among SANDDUNE, order of battle, and technical intelligence collection disciplines.

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Disruptively Pattern Painted T-62 in 7 GTD (IR 2 215 2209 82)

First detection of disruptive pattern painting on Soviet primary combat vehicles. Such painting was noted initially on EGA tanks and other armored vehicles, then seen on 7 GTD armor during Main Thrust 82. Until then, pattern painting had been widespread in GSFG but confined to communications and control vehicles, self-propelled artillery and SSM, and other equipment likely to be isolated and vulnerable to identification/engagement from the air.

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Officer with Airborne Insignia, Cottbus (IR 2 215 2452 82)

Conversion of insignia at the U/I Guards Air Assault Brigade, Cottbus. Why this unit wore motorized rifle insignia for two years is a mystery, unless there was a change in status; clearly elements of the unit were airborne qualified and equipped prior to the adoption of airborne insignia.

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Troops from 2 MRR, 1 MRD with AT-4 (IR 2 215 2005 82)

Field confirmation of the AT-4 SPIGOT with elements of the EGA. Prior to a USMLM sighting in the local area, the EGA military press had published articles showing units with the AT-4, but the SPIGOT had not been seen in EGA hands by western observers.



T-34 Tanks in Storage (IR 2 215 2245 82)

Confirmation of EGA war reserve stocks of T-34 series tanks at BURG. While the location of this reserve depot had been tipped off to the Mission, the precise identification of the heavily tarped tanks required close-in ground photography.

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Relocation of additional elements of 1 MRD to the new EGA installation in BEELITZ. Partial occupation of this large, modern kaserne by the 1 Recon Bn, 1 MRD was confirmed in 1981. Movement of the 1 Chem Def Co from BURG was suggested by vehicle sightings in the area, then confirmed by UVI photography. Movement of additional 1 MRD elements, perhaps including the 1 TR from BURG, is still expected.



Bunker at Alt Rehse (IR 2 215 2113 82)

Detailed ground photographic coverage of an extensive bunker and communications complex at Alt Rehse. Photography and detailed sketches of the area permitted identification of the facility as a major command and control facility for MD V.

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Storage Sheds at Anklam 501 (IR 2 215 2325 82)


Detailed photographic and descriptive coverage of an EGA probable mobilization base at ANKLAM. This is an example of the frustration and long-term commitment inherent in installation coverage. Despite numerous visits by all the Missions and excellent ground photographic and visual observation, no stored equipment has yet been identified at this facility and no association of responsible unit has been established.

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Technical Intelligence

Technical intelligence collection is normally exploitation of a target of opportunity - a chance moment of access to a new or high-interest piece of equipment. On rare occasions, such access has been deliberately planned and developed. Technical intelligence items of interest for the year included:




New and Modified REC Equipment, Diesdorf (IR 2 215 2319 82)

Detailed photography of new and modified radio electronic combat antennas, to include BRICK SHELL, deployed to surveil NATO REFORGER exercises.

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


Suspect OB"YeKT 447, Neustrelitz (IR 2 215 2721 82)

Photography of tanks identified from SANDDUNE materials as OB"YeKT 447. When the new number, signifying a tank sufficiently different from the standard I-64A as to require a new factory identifier, first appeared, USMLM researched Tri-Mission photography to find pictures of specific tanks that had been identified as "447s" by turret numbers in a specific division. Subsequent collection concentrated on trying to obtain current imagery of these and other tanks that might also be OB"YeKT 447.

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T-64A Interior (IR 2 215 2335 82)

In an unusual developed exploitation, interior photography of an unattended T-64A tank was acquired.

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


Soviet Medium SP Gun M1981 (Nitec Photograph)(IR 2 215 4005 83)

Photography of the Medium Self-Propelled Gun M1981 at Zeitz. This was the first ground view of this system in GSFG without full tarping.

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MDK-3 (IR 2 215 2075 82)

Detailed photographic coverage of the new tracked ditching system, MDK-3. Collection against a new piece of equipment being delivered to a GSFG engineer unit included obtaining the vehicle packing list to confirm the Soviet nomenclature (thereby eliminating the need for another M-number).



Box Body on Ural-4320 (IR 5 215 5017 82)

First photography of a Ural-4320 box body vehicle. The new diesel Ural is slowly being introduced into GSFG units, with first priority apparently to non-divisional artillery. Appearance of a BBV on the new truck heralds wider deployment.

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ZSU-23-4 with Modified GUN DISH (IR 2 215 2146 82)

First photography in GSFG of a ZSU-23-4 with modified GUN DISH radar. Existence of the modification, which may be related to an IFF system for the ZSU, was unknown in GSFG prior to acquisition of this photograph.

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P-304 NUP (IR 2 215 2254 82)

Detailed photography of a Soviet P-304 unattended repeater station (NUP). Collection included photography of the amplifier serial number and instructions on the inside of the cover plate.

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Acquisition of Documents and Material

The final collection discipline is simply that - collection of things. As the primary collector for Project SANDDUNE, Ground Division personnel acquired Soviet documents and material of intelligence interest that had been inadvertently lost, inadequately secured, incompletely destroyed, or improperly disposed of. The results of some of this collection are summarized below.

3) SANDDUNE

Project SANDDUNE continued to make unique contributions to national and theater intelligence by the translation, collation, and processing of documents and materiel collected by Mission personnel. The SANDDUNE effort ranged from pure technical translation of single documents; to processing of several unrelated documents; to integration and collation of many separate collected documents and fragments, Mission observations, and historical sightings files. A significant part of the SANDDUNE effort continued to be invested in the interpretation of fragmentary, cryptic references and notes.

The product included single brief reports of high interest, such as confirmation of the presence of the "METIS" ATGM system in the weapons inventory of a GSFG motorized rifle regiment; compilations of data, such as a list of Soviet military occupation specialty codes; consolidated lists of SANDDUNE-reported information, such as true unit designators, field post numbers, and factory/missile identifiers; and large efforts of collated SANDDUNE documents and Mission sightings, such as comprehensive reports on the organization, functions and equipment of the Wittenberg front-level signal unit and isolation of the KGB/UPS signal unit in the same garrison.

Much of the value of SANDDUNE comes from the fact that it is a sole-source product. All conclusions and associations in SANDDUNE reports are based only on internal evidence from the document itself or the data base of purely USMLM-acquired information. Any SANDDUNE report can thus be collated with other intelligence information without fear of false confirmation. In addition, the SANDDUNE product continues to be published at the CONFIDENTIAL level, making much information available at less restrictive classifications.

SANDDUNE published 188 IIR in 1982. By February 1983 USMLM had received 93 evaluations on 59 of these reports, including 36 evaluations of "Of Major Significance." Two evaluations were for a sub-category of 62 reports that transmitted over 300 documents of interest to the national cryptologic community.

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Full-time SANDDUNE staff dropped to two in March and to zero in October. The program whereby these personnel were hired and continued as "temporary" DM-funded positions was terminated in October and three positions converted to Career Intelligence (Excepted Service) GS-0132 positions. The last "SANDDUNERS", Mark Handy and Linda Fuchs, departed USMLM and Europe in October to return to the United States.

Some of the more noteworthy 1982 reports are summarized below (Numbers in parentheses are IIR numbers, less station designator and year):

- (3090) Current TOE of an upgraded BMP-equipped motorized rifle company.
- (3039) Outstation structure of the U/I SIGINT Bue, Torgau.
- (3002, 3044, 3086) Identification of separate chemical defense and Kommandant companies in two GSFG divisions.
- (3054, 3055) Structure of an SS-21 battalion and the SS-21 missile designator.
- (3107-14) TOE of an upgraded motorized rifle battalion, which provided new information on battalion-wide changes since 1979, documenting the evolution of company-level anti-tank assets and showing that the unit would require augmentation - including female personnel - to be brought up to wartime manning strength.
- (3101) Mortar battery upgrade from six to eight mortars in two GSFG divisions.
- (3115) Composition of the frontal CP that included previously undocumented elements.
- (3122) Identification of the R-414 as the probable follow-on to the ubiquitous R-400/404.
- (3126) Command and Staff Exercise critique that documented the use of a tank regiment as the forward element of an Operational Maneuver Group of an Army.
- (3048) On-hand weapons report which showed BMP and self-propelled howitzer upgrading for a motorized rifle regiment.

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- (3126) Identification of the probable GSFG Area Communications System (GACS) controlling unit.
- (3073, 3103) Technical specifications of the R-136 radio and the SDR-2MP BAR BRICK.
- (3106) Use of training tracks, by draft call-up, in a motorized rifle battalion.
- (3127) Identification of the 9K115 as the AT-7 "METIS", the latest Soviet portable anti-tank system.
- (3017) Tip-off of upcoming division FTX.
- (3054) Use of GSFG computer center to generate correlation of forces data for a field headquarters.

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8. AIR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS

1) In early January ATUSMLM disseminated a handbook detailing the armament and external stores of the Air Forces, GSFG and the East German Air Force. Evaluations received indicated that it is the most complete and concise assemblage available of such data and will prove invaluable as an identification guide for collectors throughout the intelligence community.

2) On 5 January the best photography to date was taken of the recently designated HIP G command and control helicopter. This photography should assist analysts in determining system functions and capabilities.




HIP G Command and Control Helicopter (IR 1 215 0003 82)

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3) The first observation of TALL KING C and CROSS SCREEN in East German hands was made at Gleina EG EW Site on 2 February. The addition of this equipment represents a major upgrade in the capability and range of their Early Warning Air Defense Net. The acquisition by the EGAF of a new radar system at the same time it is introduced into the GSFG inventory is unusual. The site was confirmed operational in June.



TALL KING C and CROSS SCREEN (IR 1 215 0014 82)

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4) On 19 February a FLOGGER J with U/I Pod Variant 4 was photographed at Mirow Soviet Airfield. The pod is cylindrical and has a pointed visor. This was the first observation of the pod in GSFG.




FLOGGER J With U/I Pod Variant 4 (IR 1 215 0029 82)

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5) On 20 February a FOXBAT C carrying a total of four wing pylons was photo-confirmed at Werneuchen Soviet Airfield. This is the first known instance of FOXBAT C mounting four pylons. On 14 July observations showed reassignment of the identical aircraft to Finow Soviet Airfield. Subsequent deployment of FOXBAT E to Finow indicates FOXBAT C was being used as a training platform in anticipation of the E model's introduction to GSFG.



FOXBAT C With Four Pylons (IR 1 215 0025 82)

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6) An in-depth Air Team study of Soviet range utilization was disseminated on 31 March. This report lists the various air-to-ground ranges, their frequency of use, and their specific hours of usage over a twelve month period by each of the six units of Air Forces, GSFG, with primary ground attack roles. This report should aid in determining unit proficiency and training cycles and provide insights into Soviet capacity for conducting range operations.

7) On 5 May a dummy missile was noted at Wittstock Soviet SA-3 Site. A live missile was mounted beside the dummy on the same launcher. This is the first time Soviets have been known to place anything other than live missiles on a launcher at an operational SA-3 site.




Dummy Missile on SA-3 Launcher, Wittstock (IR 1 215 0053 82)

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8) On 14 June END CURVE bistatic radar was noted in place at Merseburg and Allstedt Soviet SA-3 sites. This represented the first positive identification of this system in the GDR. A total of ten END CURVE have since been confirmed within the GDR.




END CURVE, Allstedt (IR 1 215 0067 82)

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9) On 23 June the first technical quality photos of FENCER C/C MOD were obtained at Brand Soviet Airfield. FENCER'S deployment coincided with the phase-out of all FITTER A at Brand. FENCER's greater range and increased weapons load represent a major increase of Soviet air power in the forward area.



FENCER at Brand (IR 1 215 0074 82)

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
10) On 10 July the Air Team sighted unidentified RSBN air navigation aids at Bautzen EG Airfield. This equipment is unique to Bautzen. Its capabilities are as yet undetermined.



U/I RSBN System, Bautzen (IR 1 215 0081 82)

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U/I RSNB System, Bautzen

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11) On 19 July deliveries of FITTER K and FITTER G were confirmed at Neuruppin Soviet Airfield. The FITTER K has external modifications to the basic air frame and is another variant of the FITTER fighter-bomber. The phase-out of older FITTER C/E and the introduction of a regiment of FITTER K/G shows continued modernization of air forces in GSFG.



FITTER K, Neuruppin (IR 1 215 0089 82)

12) On 19 July FOXBAT E was photo-confirmed at Finow Soviet Airfield. On 23 July the first technical quality photography of this weapon system was obtained. Photos showed a new Infrared Search and Track System (IRSTS), minor modifications to the airframe, and probable avionic alterations.



FOXBAT E, Finow (IR 1 215 0089 82)

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13) On 3 August the first technical quality photos of U/I Pod Variant 3, a repeater/jammer pod on FITTER H, were obtained at Allstet Soviet Airfield. Photography will aid analysts in identifying system capabilities and in developing countermeasures.



FITTER H With U/I Pod Variant 3 (IR 1 215 0094 82)

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14) On 13 August the first video tape coverage of Soviet helicopter and fighter support of a river crossing near Sandau, GDR was recorded. HIND E, HIP, and FLOGGER aircraft were photographed flying fire support and protective cover missions. Video tapes hopefully will aid in analysis of tactics and improve training capabilities for NATO counter-air forces (IR 1 215 0124 82).

15) On 13 August HIND Es were photographed in conjunction with the river crossing exercise near Sandau, GDR. The HIND mounted an unidentified support or mechanism, possibly sling-loading equipment, a retractable dispensing chute, or a weapons mount, under the center portion of the fuselage.




HIND E With Belly-Mounted U/I Mechanism (IR 1 215 0124 82)

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16) On 17 September the construction of an East German SA-5 site was located, mapped, and photographed near Gubkow, GDR. This first deployment of SA-5 outside the Soviet Union in the forward area will be a major upgrade in air defense capability in the northern sector and represents a serious threat to NATO aircraft.



East German SA-5 Site, Gubkow (IR 1 215 0108 82)

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17) A newly constructed GCA site at Holzdorf EG Airfield was located in September. On 27 October a THIN SKIN B, SPOGN REST C/A, and functioning Inner Marking Beacon warning lights were observed in place. These sightings heralded the activation of Holzdorf in late November, when FISHBED D, F, and J were deployed from Cottbus EG Airfield. In conjunction with this deployment all ground attack helicopters at Brandenburg Briest EG Airfield were deployed to Cottbus. These changes represent a major upgrade in available EG facilities and repositioning of ECAF assets.



GCA Site, Holzdorf (IR 1 215 0125 83)

18) On 25 October the first comprehensive study on attack/assault helicopter identification was compiled and disseminated. The guide includes subordination of helicopter units by airfield and type. This guide will assist US forces along the East-West German border in recognizing opposing helicopter forces.

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19) On 1 November observations of FENCER aircraft at BRAND Soviet Airfield indicated that FENCER C MOD can be reconfigured as FENCER C. Air Team members noted that FENCER C 09 had initially been configured as a C MOD prior to 1 November. A greater flexibility in airframe utilization is implied.

20) On 16 December photography of the GCI site at MERSEBURG Soviet Airfield confirmed two DOG TAIL present. One is paired with a BAR LOCK C, and the other with a SPOON REST D. This bistatic system greatly enhances the capability of the Southern Zone Air Defense Filter Center collocated with the base.

21) On 30 December an in-depth study of Soviet air-to-ground gunnery range training tactics over a 24 month period was sent forward. The entire collection of reports of US, French, and British Military Liaison Missions during that period was examined and analyzed to obtain detailed information on the nature and quality of Soviet air-to-ground gunnery training as conducted in the GDR. The delineation of Soviet tactics and procedures was designed to assist consumers in assessing and countering Soviet capability.

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C. TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRA)

1. (U) HQS GSFG imposed two TRA during 1982, putting an end to speculation as to under what circumstances GSFG would return to their employment (No TRA were levied during 1981).

2. (U) TRA Imposed During 1982:

A. (U) TRA 001-82, effective dates 30 Mar - 05 Apr 82, consisted of four sub-areas, as follows:

1) (C) Sub-Area A joined together the Letzlinger Heide, Rathenow, and Perleberg PRA. It denied access to the northern Elbe crossing sites and shielded a 2 GTA FTX, including major movement by the Zi MRD.

2) (C) Sub-Area B extended Oranienburg PRA east to the Bad Duerben PRA and south to the south to the outskirts of Leipzig. No exercise activity associated with this sub-area was detected.

3) (C) Sub-Area C formed a pocket just south of the Jueterbog PRA and included Routes 87 and 96. No military activity associated with this sub-area was detected.

4) (C) Sub-Area D joined the Wittstock and Templin PRA. No military activity associated with this sub-area was detected.

B. (C) TRA 002-82, effective dates 17-21 Aug 82, connected the Eilenburg, Belgern and Brandis PRA and apparently shielded a 1 GTA FTX, which included participation by elements of 9 TD, 11 GTD, and 27 GMRD. Some EGA involvement was also noted.

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КАРТА

временного запретного района, объявленного ИВМС при ГК ГСВГ на период с 00.00 30 марта до 24.00 5 апреля 1982 года



КАРТА

временного запретного района, объявленного ИВМС при ГК ГСВГ на период с 00.00 30 марта до 24.00 5 апреля 1982 года



TRA 001-82, Sub-Areas A and B

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КАРТА

временного запретного района, объявленного ИВМС при ГК ГСВГ на период с 00.00 30 марта до 24.00 5 апреля 1982 года


КАРТА

временного запретного района, объявленного ИВМС при ГК ГСВГ на период с 00.00 30 марта до 24.00 5 апреля 1982 года



TRA 001-82, Sub-Areas C and D

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TRA 002-82

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D. (C) DETENTIONS, INCIDENTS, AND REPORTABLE EVENTS (All elements classified CONFIDENTIAL unless otherwise indicated)

1. General. In carrying out USMLM's two missions in the GDR, accredited personnel repeatedly come into contact with Soviet and East German military personnel and the civilian population. The nature of certain of these contacts is such that reporting to higher headquarters and mention in the Unit History is appropriate. These contacts are divided into three categories:

A. Detention. Tour's freedom of movement is physically restricted. Accreditation documents are surrendered with or without the preparation of an Akt. Circumstances surrounding a detention may be such that it is also reported as an incident.

B. Incident. A relatively grave occurrence whose resolution requires action at a higher level than Chief USMLM/Chief SERB. Action taken frequently includes an exchange of letters at Chief of Staff or higher level.

C. Other Reportable Events. Occurrence whose resolution can be accomplished at the Chief of Mission/Chief SERB level or which requires no additional action.

2. Detentions. Eight USMLM tours were detained in 1983:

A. Satzkorn (UU6217), 13 Mar 82. Soviet troops carried out a pre-planned ambush and detained a tour in the rail siding. Spike boards were placed at the front and rear of the tour vehicle. The tour was released at the Potsdam Kommandatura after a two hour and 42 minute detention.

B. Moellern (PB897C), 190920Z May 82. As a tour was preparing to depart an OP overlooking NAUMBURG TNGA 441, it was ambushed by a group of Soviet soldiers. Two soldiers forced their way into the vehicle through the sun roof and opened the car doors. All equipment was confiscated; tour personnel were forcefully restrained. Soviet troops tied the hands of both the tour officer and NCO. This occurrence was reported as a serious incident as well and was the subject of an exchange of protest letters at the Chief of Staff level.

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C. Ketzin (UU5316), 24 May 82. A Potsdam Local tour was the victim of heavy traffic, mud, and a zealous Kommandatura convoy controller. After observing a driver training column on Route 273, the tour was forced to retrace its route (back past the column) because of heavy traffic in Ketzin. Occupants of a Kommandatura control vehicle attempted to halt the tour vehicle. As a result of attempted evasive action, the tour vehicle became bogged down on the road shoulder. The detention was completed, credentials were surrendered, and the tour was released after six hours and 10 minutes.

D. Klein Ossnig (VT5028), 121140Z JUN 82. During a routine reconnaissance of COTTBUS TNGA 401, a tour vehicle became bogged down in deep mud. After repeated attempts at winching out, the vehicle electrical system failed. While the tour crew was attempting repairs, a Soviet officer and five enlisted men appeared and effected a detention. The local Kommandant, LTC Yakolev, was summoned. He conducted a cursory examination of the tour personnel's credentials, returned them promptly, and ordered the Soviet troops away from the tour vehicle, indicating that they had no business looking at or disturbing the vehicle. Throughout the detention, the Kommandant indicated that his only reason for being there and his prime concern were the welfare of the tour. He transported the tour officer to the Cottbus Kommandatura, where, after considerable effort, he contacted SERB in Potsdam, asking them to advise USMLM that the tour required a recovery vehicle. Once more at the scene of the detention, he mobilized his troops to assist in extricating the tour vehicle. An Akt was prepared but not offered for signature; LTC Yakolev indicated it was simply a formality. At his orders, a Soviet vehicle towed the tour vehicle to the Autobahn, where in due time the tour was collected by a USMLM recovery team.

E. Ludwigslust (PE6511), 241330Z Jun 82. A tour was detained for two hours after a minor accident; the tour was released at the scene.

F. Nedlitz (UT1073), 232015Z Jul 82. A tour was detained for one hour and 15 minutes in connection with the investigation of a minor traffic accident. The tour was released at the detention site.

G. Elstal (UU6623), 011120Z Aug 82. Soviet troops attempted an ambush of the Potsdam Local tour at the Elstal Rail Siding. The tour escaped from the ambush; a Soviet officer was injured in the course of the detention attempt. The tour was subsequently detained at the Glienicke Bridge and held at the Potsdam Kommandatura for 23 hours, 35 minutes. This was also reported as a serious incident and was the occasion for an exchange of protest letters at the Chief of Staff level.

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H. Werder (006005), 150515Z Sep 82. A tour was detained by East German troops bivouaced along the West Ring Autobahn after a blowout immobilized the tour vehicle. The tour was released by a Potsdam Kommandatura representative after a three hour and 10 minute detention.

2. Incidents. See paragraphs B and G above and Section III, paragraph B, for details of detentions/incidents of 19 May and 1 August.

3. Other Reportable Events.

A. Potsdam, 180855Z Mar 82. The Potsdam Duty NCO, en route to the Potsdam House, was stopped and held by a group of Soviet soldiers. A SERB representative released the NCO on the spot. No Akt was prepared nor were credentials surrendered.

B. Jaennersdorf (UVO513), 061030Z Apr 82. A Soviet UAZ-469 ran into a tour vehicle within the confines of JAENNERSCORF REDLIN TANK RANGE. Only minor damage resulted; the tour was delayed for just under an hour at the Glienicke Bridge.

C. Potsdam, 260626Z Jul 82. An East German male entered the Potsdam House and requested assistance in defecting. After the Duty Officer explained that USMLM could provide no assistance, the East German left the compound. He was arrested at the front gate by East German police. Approximately five minutes after the would-be defector left the house, a SERB representative arrived. He departed immediately upon hearing that the East German was no longer on Mission territory.

D. Magdeburg (PC8080), 030600-1300Z AUG 82. USMLM was involved in determining condition of dependent son who had become ill on the Berlin duty train and been admitted to Magdeburg Hospital and in returning him to West Berlin. Cooperation and assistance of SERB and the Magdeburg Kommandatura were noted.

E. Potsdam, 061645Z Aug 82. Captain Vanderhoof, the Naval Representative and a member of the tour crew involved in the 1 Aug detention/incident, crossed the Glienicke Bridge as a member of the Potsdam Local tour. Shortly thereafter, a SERB representative called the Potsdam House and advised that "...the presence of Captain Vanderhoof in the GDR is not regarded as appropriate." Captain Vanderhoof returned to West Berlin.

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E. (C) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT (IIR) PRODUCTION

USMLM IIR production figures for 1982 are listed below; 1981 figures for the same category follow in parentheses:

AIR DIVISION (1 215)

USMLM Originated:	135 (188)
Based on Allied Reports:	111 (173)
SANDDUNE Reports:	9 (10)
Total:	255 (371)

GROUND DIVISION (2 215)

USMLM Tour Reports:	287 (327)
SANDDUNE Reports:	158 (139)
Based on Allied Reports:	303 (392)
Total:	748 (858)

NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS (5 215):

Tour Reports:	17 (36)
SANDDUNE Reports:	9 (4)
Total:	26 (40)

TOTAL ALL IIR:	1029 (1269)
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PART III

LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION

A. (C) OFFICIAL VISITORS: Visits by members of the intelligence community and others with a professional interest in USMLM's collection activity promote an informative dialogue which assists USMLM in its efforts to maintain an effective and active collection program.

The following is a selected list of key personnel briefed by USMLM in Berlin during 1982:

JANUARY Lieutenant General Paul S. Williams, Commander V Corps
Brigadier General Donald C. Hilbert, Asst Vice Dir Estimates, DIA
Brigadier General David L. Nichols, Dep CofS/Plans, USAFE
COL Joseph R. Tedeseki, Cdr FSTC

FEBRUARY General Frederick J. Kroesen, CINCUSAREUR
General W. Y. Smith, DCINCEUSEUCOM
Brigadier General Leonard H. Perroots, DCS1 USAFE
Colonel Craig R. Chamberlain, JFKCMA
Colonel Richard A. Jones, Dir Ops Plans, HQ USAFE/DOX
Mr (GS-17) William H. Jenkins, Chief NCEUR

MARCH Brigadier General (P) William E. Odom, ACSI DA
Brigadier General Alben G. Wheeler, Cdr AAFES Europe
Brigadier General William E. Overacker, Cdr, 322 ALD/CC
Colonel Gordon T. Bratz, National Defense College
Colonel Stephen H. Cowles, 10 TRW
Colonel Mark D. Gatanas, National Defense College
Colonel Dudley Gordon, Cdr, 66th MI Gp
Colonel Charles E. Heimack, National Defense College
Lieutenant Colonel Darrel W. Katz, Det A, Berlin
Colonel John G. Koliher, National Defense College
Colonel Douglas Roscoe, National Defense College
Colonel Robert Sigathy, National Defense College
Colonel John D. Sullivan, National Defense College
Colonel James M. Torge, Det 3 FTD
Colonel David S. Watrous, Cdr, Foreign Tech Div, AFSC
Mr (GS-16) David G. Miller, DOD

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APRIL General Bernard W. Rogers, CINCEUR
General (Ret) Wallace C. Megathan, DIO/BPF
Major General Lawrence D. Garrison, Air Deputy, AF North
Rear Admiral Roger E. Box, P&P/SHAPE
Brigadier General Jack O. Braashaw, ADC, 1st AD
Brigadier General Kenneth E. Lewis, CG, 3d Support Cmd
Brigadier General (P) Norman H. Schwarzkopf, ADC, 8th ID
Brigadier General O. R. Whiddon, ADC-G, 3d AD
Colonel H. F. Bronson III, USAFE
Colonel Jack Dickey, USAFE
Colonel Robert Drudek, CofS, 21 SUPCOM
Colonel F. L. Gatz, HQ USEUCOM
Colonel Ron Lord, Air Attache, Bonn
Colonel William T. Price, USAFE
Colonel C. S. Scanlon, Cdr, INSCOM
Colonel B. Skanskog, AF North
Colonel Luis Vale, Cdr Lindsey Air Station
Colonel Charlie Williams, DATT, Warsaw
Mr (GS-16) David Y. McNanic, NSA

MAY General Charles Gabrieli, CINCUSAFE
Major General Kenneth L. Peek, Jr, AFMPC/CC
Major General Davis C. Rohr, J5, USEUCCM
Major General John W. Woodmansee, Jr., Dep Cdr, V Corps
Colonel (P) Kenneth W. North, XO/DCINC Europe
Colonel James Zachary, 21 SUPCOM
Mr (GS-16) Frances B. Curley, NSA
Mr (GS-15) James A. Donnelly, NSA

JUNE Major General Thomas E. Healy, CG, 1 AD
Brigadier General L. H. Perroots, DCSI USAFE

JULY General Frederick J. Kroesen, CINCUSAREUR
Admiral George E. Kinnear II, USMILREP NATO
General Richard L. Lawson, CofS, SHAPE
Major General J. Boatner, USCOB
Brigadier General S. Bissell, Dep ACSI, USAF
Brigadier General Julius Parker, DCSI, USAREUR
Brigadier General C. G. Prather, ADC, 3d AD
Brigadier Anthony A. Smith, XO SACEUR
Colonel A. Aiello, Air Attache, Bonn
Colonel R. E. Holcomb, 66th MI Gp
Colonel George M. Jarvis, HQ USAFE
Colonel John Lasley, CDR, 7TH Wthr Sqdn, HQ USAREUR
Colonel J. M. Tonge, Det 3 FTD
Colonel J. Barrie Williams, 66th MI Gp

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AUGUST Major General Thomas D. Ayers, CofS USAREUR
Major General Charles W. Dyke, DCSOPS USAREUR
Major General Hugh Overholt, JAG USAREUR
Brigadier General Edward J. Heinz, J2 EUCOM
Brigadier General Robert E. Wagner, ADC 3d ID
Colonel Cloyd H. Pfister, Cor, USAFSB
Mr Walter Anoruszyn, AMEMB, Bonn
Mr Tim Ramish, Legal Advisor, AMEMB, Bonn
Mr Mike McQuade, Legal Advisor, AMEMB, Bonn

SEPTEMBER Mr Harry Walters, Asst Secy of the Army, Manpower
Reserve Affairs
Brigadier General E. R. Cromartie, PM USAREUR
Rear Admiral T. R. Kinnebrew, J3 EUCOM
Brigadier General Harry Walker, 59th Ord Bde
Brigadier General Wilson E. Cooney, Dep Cdr 5th ATAF
Colonel J. D. Caldwell, FTC
Colonel Nicholas B. Kemp, USAFE/DOX
Colonel Jack Mason, Jr., AIR SCOUTH NATO
Mr (GS-16) William Fromm, NSA

OCTOBER Major General Carl U. Cathey, Cdr, 3d AF
Major General W. R. Langenecker, HQ USAF
Colonel C. L. Bishop, 6912 ESG
Colonel S. Robinson, 7113 SAS/CC
Colonel J. A. Warner, HQ AFIS
Mr (GS-15) David L. Ritchey, FTD
Mr (GS-14) L. D. Smith, FTD

NOVEMBER Mr William J. Casey, DCI
Major General Edward Atkinson, CIA
Major General Thomas D. Ayers, CofS, USAREUR
Major General Charles W. Dyke, DCSOPS, USAREUR
Major General R. W. Todd, CofS 4th ATAF
Brigadier General Wilfred L. Goodson, DCSPLANS, USAFE
Colonel Larry R. Butterworth, OIG, HQ USAREUR
Colonel Joseph C. Cantergiani, USAFE/INA
Colonel Richard D. Whisner, USEUCOM
Senator (Utah) Warren Hatch
Dr. Pillsbury, Senate Staff
Mr Robert L. Butterworth, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
Mr (GS-16) William J. Graver, CIA
Mr (FSO-2) Edward O'Donnell, State Dept
Mr Gary J. Schmitt, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence

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DECEMBER Mr James R. Ambrose, Under Secty of the Army, Manpower
Major General T. Goodall, Cdr, 17th AF
Brigadier General Charles R. Hamm, DATT, Moscow
Colonel Paul E. Landers, 437th MAW

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B. (U) RELATIONS WITH GSFG/SERB (All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated):

Meetings with Soviet Authorities: In 1982, seven USMLM/SERB meetings took place. A total of 12 items of US-originated correspondence were passed to SERB. Four pieces of Soviet-originated non-routine correspondence were received by USMLM.

1. At the request of Chief SFRB, Chief USMLM met with him at 1100 hours, 16 April 1982 in Potsdam. The purpose of this meeting was to transmit a letter of protest from Chief of Staff, GSFG, to Chief of Staff, USAREUR. This letter contained allegations of three specific incidents of misconduct by USMLM personnel during the period February-April. Violation of a Permanently Restricted Area was alleged, as well as violation of local restriction signs and unsafe driving practices. Since Chief SERB indicated that his Chief of Staff did not necessarily expect a written reply to the letter, Chief USMLM reviewed it and made the following points to Chief SERB: it was neither the policy nor practice of USMLM officers to violate Permanently Restricted Areas; USMLM officers exercised mature and responsible judgment in the field to insure that this did not happen; Chief USMLM shared the concern of the Chief of Staff, GSFG, for safety; neither side should conduct itself in a manner that jeopardized anyone's physical wellbeing.

On 10 May, Chief USMLM delivered a reply to Chief of Staff, GSFG's letter from Chief of Staff, USAREUR, which acknowledged receipt of that correspondence and promised due consideration.

2. At the request of Chief SERB, Chief USMLM met with him in Potsdam on 4 May to receive correspondence from Chief of Staff, GSFG, addressed to Chief of Staff, USAREUR, alleging the involvement of US military personnel in an attempt to exfiltrate an East German national. On 9 June, USMLM delivered a letter from Chief of Staff, USAREUR, to Chief of Staff, GSFG, indicating that appropriate measures would be taken against the soldiers involved and that there was a continuing effort to prevent incidents of this type.

3. At this time, a second letter from Chief of Staff, USAREUR, to Chief of Staff, GSFG, was also forwarded, expressing grave concern and strongly protesting Soviet actions during the course of a detention involving Major Greathouse and Staff Sergeant Schatz on 19 May 1982.

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4. On 11 June, a letter from the Chief of Staff, GSFG, to Chief of Staff, USAREUR, was delivered to USMLM for forwarding. The letter repudiated the basis for the Chief of Staff's protest letter concerning the detention of Major Greathouse and Staff Sergeant Schatz, asserting that Chief of Staff, USAREUR, had been incorrectly informed concerning the circumstances of the detention and about which Chief USMLM had been informed in detail.

5. On 23 July, USMLM delivered a letter from Major General Lynn, Chief of Staff, to his Soviet counterpart which announced his departure.

6. On 2 August 1982, Chief USMLM delivered the following correspondence to Acting Chief SERB:

Dear Sir: Since approximately 1415, 1 August 1982, Major Greathouse, Captain Vanderhoof, and Sergeant Framcke, accredited members of the United States Military Liaison Mission, have been detained at the Potsdam Kommandatura. I request their immediate release. Their continued detention will only lead to complications beyond whatever situation may already exist.

7. On 6 August 1982, Chief USMLM sent the following to Acting Chief SERB:

Dear Lieutenant Colonel Polozov: During the course of the detention of 1-2 August, Major Greathouse was told that a Soviet officer sustained injuries in an attempted detention. Should this have been the case it is most regrettable and I want to express my personal concern for the welfare of the individual.

8. On 27 August 1982, USMLM forwarded two letters from Chief of Staff, USAREUR, to Chief of Staff, GSFG. The first letter, dated 13 August 1982, was a letter of introduction from Major General Ayers to Colonel General Sviridov, announcing General Ayers' appointment as Chief of Staff, USAREUR. The second letter, dated 25 August 1982, pertained to a violation of the airspace of the Federal Republic of Germany by a Soviet Army helicopter on 24 July 1982.

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9. On 27 August, Acting Chief USMLM forwarded a letter from General Kroesen, CINCUSAREUR, dated 27 August, to General Zaytsev through Acting Chief SERB. The letter protested the use of physical restraint and the circumstances of detention involving USMLM personnel on 19 May, a premeditated attempt to detain USMLM personnel which regrettably resulted in injuries to a Soviet officer on 1 August, and the deliberate ramming of a USMLM tour vehicle on 13 August. The letter also contained an expression of condolence to the injured Soviet officer and an expressed hope for his full recovery.

10. On 4 September, USMLM received for transmittal a letter reply from CINCSFG, which acknowledged receipt of CINCUSAREUR's letter of 27 August 1982. This letter denied any Soviet misconduct and suggested that CINCUSAREUR was inaccurately informed. CINCSFG requested that Chief USMLM be advised of the allegations of the actions of his subordinates and that strict observance of the rules be demanded by him of members of USMLM.

8. On 29 September, 0915 hours, Chief SERB made an "urgent" request for a meeting with Chief USMLM. At this meeting, Chief SERB spoke from a talking paper to make the following points:

a. SERB and USMLM were the appropriate vehicles through which all matters between the respective headquarters were resolved.

b. A train had been detained at the Marienborn Checkpoint since 2200 hours the previous night because of inadequate documentation.

c. The US was obliged to pay the Reichsbahn for delays incurred in the passage of this train.

d. The US was to acknowledge this was an unscheduled train and thus required special documentation.

e. The US was to make an immediate request for permission to pass the train or specify the intention to send the train back to the FRG.

f. As soon as a request, in proper form and in accordance with established procedures, was received by SERB, SERB would grant a pass to permit the train to continue.

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g. Chief SERB would remain at SERB, Potsdam, to await the US reply through USMLM.

Chief USMLM stated that his initial information was that this was a programmed train and that there was a misunderstanding on the train's status. However, USMLM would contact the proper authorities and inform SERB as soon as possible. Colonel Rubanov countered that GSFG had confirmed with the Reichsbahn that this train was indeed not planned.

At 1615 hours, 29 September 1982, Chief USMLM again met with Chief SERB. At this meeting, Chief USMLM informed Chief SERB that the train being held at Marienborn was in fact a regularly scheduled train. This was confirmed in a copy of a letter provided by the US Command Berlin, previously informing the Reichsbahn of the train in question. The procedure used was identical to that which had always been used in the past and clearly the fault for the delay of the train lay with the Soviets. Chief USMLM requested that the Soviets correct the misunderstanding and get the train moving. When provided a copy of the notification letter from US Command Berlin to the Deutsche Reichsbahn, Colonel Rubanov expressed a combination of surprise and relief, stated that it was clearly the East Germans who were in error, and promised that the train would be moving as soon as he could coordinate with the Reichsbahn.

At a reception at the Czech Military Mission, West Berlin, on 28 October, Colonel Rubanov made a further pertinent remark to the effect that he had appeared agitated at the time of the 29 September meeting concerning the delayed train at Marienborn because he was responding to his Chief of Staff, who was absolutely adamant that the train proceed as required and that the delay not be seen as an intentional act on the part of the Soviet military authorities.

11. On 21 October 1982, Chief USMLM sent the following correspondence to Chief SERB:

Dear Colonel Rubanov: I wish to thank you and your staff for the prompt and efficient actions on 20 October that permitted the timely return to West Berlin of a transiting US Army officer who had been hospitalized in Brandenburg.

Major General Boatner, US Commander Berlin, asked that I also extend his appreciation for your cooperation in this humanitarian act.

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12. On 11 November 1982, Chief USMLM sent the following correspondence to Chief SERB:

Dear Colonel Rubanov: The officers of the United States Military Liaison Mission join me in expressing our sincere condolences to you on the occasion of the death of your Chief-of-State, L. I. Brezhnev, which was announced this date.

On 12 November 1982, Chief USMLM sent the following correspondence through Chief SERB:

Army General Zaytsev
Commander in Chief
GSFG

Sir:

I have been asked to convey the following message from the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe:

Dear General Zaytsev: On behalf of the United States Army, Europe, I would like to express sincere condolences on the passing of President Leonid Brezhnev.

Respectfully,

FREDERICK J. KROESEN
General, USA
Commander in Chief

This was subsequently followed by a written letter of condolences from General Kroesen to CINCGSFG.

13. At 2200 hours, 14 December 1982, Chief USMLM was called by Lieutenant Trenin, SERB, who spoke on behalf of Chief SERB, asking that USMLM help in obtaining the return of a member of the Soviet military who was reportedly in West Berlin. When queried for amplifying information, Lieutenant Trenin would only add that his knowledge of a possible Soviet soldier in custody of US military authorities was based on a public information source which he subsequently identified as being the 14 December issue of the West German newspaper "Die Welt" in which there had appeared an article which stated a Soviet soldier had crossed the border into West Berlin and had turned himself over to US military authorities. After inquiry, Chief USMLM informed Lieutenant Trenin that appropriate military authorities within Berlin knew of no such incident and that with such sketchy information, he could be of no further assistance.

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14. On 20 December 1982, Chief USMLM delivered the following correspondence to Chief SERB:

Dear Colonel Rubanov: At 2100 hours, 17 December 1982, Captain Paul Nelson and SFC Hans-Joachim Tiffany, accredited members of the United States Military Liaison Mission, travelling in Vehicle No 29, were fired upon by an unidentified Soviet officer in the town of Zeitz, west of the Weisse Elster River.

Upon observing the USMLM vehicle, this officer drew his pistol and fired a minimum of four shots from a distance of approximately 50 meters. Such thoughtless and life-threatening actions at the appearance of accredited personnel are unwarranted in any circumstance.

I am bringing this matter to your attention with the expectation that the necessary steps will be taken to ensure that an appropriate level of discipline is maintained by Soviet military personnel in such encounters.

At the annual gift exchange at USMLM Potsdam House on 28 December, Chief USMLM inquired of Chief SERB whether he was in receipt of the letter addressed to him and dated 20 December. Chief USMLM anticipated a fairly standard rebuttal from Chief SERB, with likely accusations of misconduct on the part of the USMLM tour in question. In fact, Colonel Rubanov was disarming in his candor. He readily admitted that the Soviet officer on the scene had acted with serious impropriety. He further elaborated that, unlike some instances of physical encounter where there may be physical injury from which an individual will recover, a shooting can have fatal consequences, with no chance of recovery.

According to Colonel Rubanov, the Lieutenant who fired the shots had been disciplined. He then went on to criticize the unit at the scene because it had failed to take the necessary legitimate steps to ward off the tour and prevent observation. These "legitimate steps" were identified as follows:

Placement of mission restriction signs in the vicinity of the military activity;

Establishing pickets to secure the area;

Enlisting the assistance of the local Kommandatura in controlling the activities of the tour.

Chief USMLM expressed satisfaction that such a positive Soviet response was realizable at the Chief USMLM - Chief SERB level.

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C. (U) SOCIAL EVENTS (All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated):

1. General

A. USMLM's program of representational and liaison social activities serves the following objectives:

(1) Enhancement of the spirit of Tri-Mission operational cooperation through the development of binding social associations among members of the US, British, and French Military Liaison Missions, to include counterpart personnel of all ranks.

(2) Establishment of an atmosphere of professional respect and social amenity between USMLM liaison personnel and their Soviet counterparts in order to facilitate conditions that serve USMLM's operational and liaison interests.

(3) (C) Provision of an opportunity for senior US and Soviet military officers to meet cordially in a social atmosphere to permit the former to gain a deeper perception of the personal and professional traits of the Soviet military establishment.

(4) (C) Exercise of official rights of access to the official USMLM residence in Potsdam in accordance with established patterns that demonstrate US intentions to make advantageous use of opportunities afforded by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

B. Throughout 1982, US representational contact with senior Soviet military personnel remained at a reduced level in consonance with US diplomatic initiatives in response to continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan. This policy was evidenced by a reduced senior officer presence at USMLM's Torgau commemoration and by restricted USMLM participation at Soviet-sponsored social events, specifically the Soviet Army/Navy Day Reception at Potsdam.

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2. US-Sponsored Social Events

A. USMLM/Torgau Anniversary Commemoration; The annual Torgau Reception, commemorating the first meeting of US and Soviet troops at the Elbe River during the closing days of World War II, was hosted by USMLM at the Potsdam House on 24 April 1982. Senior US representative was BG Suddath, Cdr Berlin Brigade. General Vorob'yov, Headquarters, GSFG was the senior Soviet officer in attendance. Other senior guests included Brigadier Davis, Chief BRIXMIS, and Colonel Czernij, Chief FM.M. Soviet participation consisted of a contingent of 15 officers, including Colonel Rubanov, Chief SERB. In all some 50 US, Allied, and Soviet officers were present to once again acknowledge this historic event in a low-keyed, non-contentious atmosphere, which focused on soldierly rapport, rather than political issues.



Torgau Commemoration, 1982

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B. Lunch with Chief SERB: On 4 June, Chief USMLM hosted a lunch at Potsdam House for Colonel Rubanov, Chief BR1XMIS, and Chief FMLM, on the occasion of a return visit to Potsdam by Colonel Stovall, previous Chief USMLM.

C. Independence Day Celebration: On 3 July USMLM hosted the annual Independence Day picnic at Potsdam House. The largest USMLM-sponsored representational event for 1982, this activity once again brought several hundred US, British, French, and Soviet guests together to enjoy a traditional American Fourth of July celebration. This year the senior US representative present was BG Julius Parker; DCSI USAREUR. Soviet Major General Vorob'yov, Headquarters, GSFG, was the senior Soviet officer in attendance. This event marked General Vorob'yov's last appearance at a USMLM function. After five years in GSFG, he was returning to Moscow.



Independence Day Celebration, 1982

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D. Thanksgiving Dinner: On 27 November, USMLM hosted its annual Thanksgiving Day Celebration at Potsdam. Senior US guests included MG and Mrs Ayers, Chief of Staff USAREUR, MG and Mrs Dyke, Headquarters, USAREUR, BG and Mrs Goodsen, Headquarters, USAFE. Senior Soviet officers present were Major General Serov, who represented Chief of Staff, GSFG, and Maj General Pyal'tsev, Chief SMLM-F. Additionally, Colonel and Mrs Rubanov, Chief SERB, and the usual contingent of SERB officers and wives were present. Other Allied and foreign guests included Brigadier and Mrs Learmont, Chief BRIXMIS, Colonel Czernij, Chief FMLM, and Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs Blasko, Chief Czech Military Mission, Berlin.

E. Christmas Party for the Potsdam House East German Employees: This traditional event took place on 22 December and afforded USMLM the opportunity to, once again, express its appreciation to the staff at Potsdam House for its contribution through the year. Gifts and a buffet were provided to USMLM East German employees to mark the season.

F. US-Soviet Gift Exchange: On 28 December, Colonel Rubanov and six other SERB officers, with wives accompanying, visited USMLM Potsdam house to accept seasonal gifts to GSFG and SERB officers on behalf of CINCUSAREUR. Accredited USMLM officers and their wives were also present. Children of both US and Soviet participants enlivened this event with their presence.

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3. Soviet-Sponsored Social Events:

A. Soviet Army/Navy Day Celebration: On 19 February 1982, Soviet External Relations Branch hosted a reception in Potsdam to commemorate Soviet Army/Navy Day. The three Allied Military Liaison Missions were each represented by their respective Chiefs and one additional officer. Senior Soviet officer present was Colonel General Sviridov, Chief of Staff, GSFG. He was accompanied by a large contingent of approximately 10 to 12 Soviet General Officers. Approximately 30 other Soviet officers were present, including officers from SERB and the local Potsdam Kommandatura. Colonel General Sviridov's prepared remarks cited the accomplishments of the Soviet Army since its inception in the Revolution, through its victory over Fascist Germany in concert with its Western Allies. He disavowed "aggressive wars" and the strategy of "first strike." As in the previous year, USMLM attendance at this function was restricted, in consonance with US political directives.

B. Soviet/Allied Military Mission Gift Exchange: Colonel Rubanov invited the three Allied Chiefs of Mission, each accompanied by three accredited Liaison Officers, to a Soviet Seasonal Gift Exchange at SERB, Potsdam, on 30 December. A traditional Russian buffet contributed to making this a most congenial event.

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PART IV LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (NOTE: All paragraphs and subparagraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated)

A. GENERAL

1. The interior of the USMLM Berlin facility was completely renovated in 1982. The project, begun in July 1982 and finished in January 1983, included installation of new water pipes and radiators, removal of antiquated boilers and installation of a new heating plant with automatic electric boilers, replastering and repainting of the entire interior, construction of a new dayroom, new flooring and carpeting throughout the building, and renovation and complete outfitting of the in-house maintenance facility.

2. (C) The new Berlin facility annex became fully operational and now houses the Ground Operations Division and the new photo lab. Construction of this facility not only allowed for physical expansion of each section, but finally enabled all USMLM facilities to be placed under one roof.

3. The Soviets have the responsibility to provide the majority of USMLM logistic support at the Potsdam facility and did so as follows:

a. Coal for heating the main building's 37 rooms amounted to seven tons per month during the heating season. Electricity is provided for lighting and appliances. Natural gas is provided for stoves and hot water heaters.

b. Gas coupons for US liaison personnel travelling in East Germany were issued in the amount of 2500 liters of VK 94 each month.

c. Rations were delivered twice each week and covered basic items; the quantity of rations is estimated to be 1100 meals per month.

d. There is weekly trash pick-up.

e. There is an East German and West German telephone installed, with extensions on all four floors of the house (The East Germans provide service to both lines.).

f. There is one East German guard at the main entrance to the compound (24-hour post). There is a staff of ten East Germans who provide cooking, janitorial, and maid services.

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4. DEH, from US Army Berlin, and volunteers also provided extensive support with equipment and services not available from the Soviets:

- a. Furniture was repaired and replaced.
- b. Paint, floor tiles, and electrical supplies were supplied as needed.
- c. A new warming oven and an ice machine were installed in the kitchen.
- d. New carpeting was provided for high traffic areas.
- e. A complete rewiring program was initiated with supplies furnished by DEH and volunteer workers from FFSA (Heidelberg). This includes renovation of all wiring and lights of the residence itself and installation of an automatically controlled external lighting system throughout the compound.

B. (C) VEHICLES

1. Vehicle Status

a. As of 31 DEC 82:

1) Fleet Composition

Two 1978 Opel Senators
One 1978 Mercedes 350 SE Sedan
Four 1979 Mercedes 350 SE Sedans
Two 1980 Mercedes 350 SE Sedans
One 1980 Ford Carryall
One 1980 Ford Transit Van
Four 1980 Mercedes 280 GE Station Wagons
(4-wheel drive)
Eight 1981 Mercedes 280 GE Station Wagons
(4-wheel drive)
One 1982 Mercedes 280E Sedan

Total number of vehicles: 24

b. Three new 1983 Mercedes 280 GE station wagons and one Volkswagen Kombi L were placed on order in late 1982 for delivery in mid-1983.

2. Accreditations: USMLM currently is assigned ten accreditations, of which five are allocated to sedans and five to 280 GE vehicles.

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C. (C) PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY PRODUCTION STATISTICS (NOTE: All elements of this section classified CONFIDENTIAL):

<u>ROLLS OF FILM PROCESSED (35mm)</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1981</u>
Black and White (Original)	3357	3206
Color (Original and Dupe)	897	906
Duplicate Black and White	198	315
<u>PRINT PRODUCTION</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1981</u>
Proofs	100,087	119,531
Intelligence Report Prints	158,390	259,964
Total Prints	258,477	379,495

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ANNEX A

HUEBNER - MALININ AGREEMENT

A G R E E M E N T

MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadri-partite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."

5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

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7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of the Soviet or United States Mission wants to visit the United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24 - 72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and the headquarters of their respective Commander-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communications through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they will also be given facilities such as mail, telephone, and telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of breakdown in the radio installation the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communications.

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12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies, and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition, the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full rights of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the missions will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in the Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by the Deputy Commanders of the United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

/s/ C. R. Huebner
/t/ Lieutenant General HUEBNER

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
European Command

/s/ Malinin
/t/ Colonel-General MALININ

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
Chief of Staff of the Group
of Soviet Occupational
Forces in Germany

ANNEX B

TOURING STATISTICS

A. (C) TOURS AND TOUR DAYS, 1982:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOURS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOUR DAYS</u>
January	47	90
February	43	82
March	45	87
April	57	85
May	51	82
June	45	86
July	45	71
August	60	93
September	52	89
October	47	83
November	42	75
December	52	86
TOTALS	586	1009

B. DISTANCE TOTAL, 1982: 640,952 km

C. COMPARISON, 1981 AND 1982:

	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>PERCENT CHANGE</u>
TOURS	530	586	+10.6
TOUR DAYS	1022	1009	-01.2
DISTANCE	707,777 KM	640,952 KM	-09.4

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM Personnel Roster, 1982

PRESENT FOR DUTY 31 DEC 82

COL	GREENWALT, RANDALL A.	USA
LTC	GOVAN, GREGORY G.	USA
LTCOL	WURZBURGER, NILS L.	USAF
MAJ	BETO, MARK D.	USA
MAJ	BOLES, JOHN K. III	USA
MAJ	CONNOLLY, MICHAEL P.	USA
MAJ	ESCHRICH, JOHN E.	USA
MAJ	EVANS, CLYDE L.	USA
MAJ	GREATHOUSE, JOHN M.	USA
MAJ	NELSON, PAUL H.	USA
MAJ	TIHOMIROV, MICHAEL L.	USAF
CAPT	CROXALL, GARY L.	USAF
CAPT	GENAILLE, RICHARD A.	USAF
CPT	WYCKOFF, THOMAS G.	USA
SMS	FISHER, DAVID M.	USAF
MSG	GOTZMANN, GUNTER R.	USAF
SFC	MINTZ, ROBERT J.	USA
MSGT	PATTERSON, RONALD P.	USAF
SFC	TIFFANY, HANS-JOACHIM H.	USA
SFC	YELL, CHARLES E. JR.	USA
TSGT	BENICKEN, JOHN A.	USAF
SSG	BLAKE, RONALD H.	USA
SSG	CARREATHERS, GEORGIA E.	USA
SSG	COLEMAN, JERRY R.	USA
TSGT	DEWEY, BRUCE L.	USAF
SSG	FRAMCKE, HERBERT JR.	USA
TSGT	MANNING, LANCE E.	USAF
SSG	McMULLEN, W L	USA
TSGT	MULLEN, TIMOTHY C.	USAF
SSG	OBERLE, LINDA M.	USA
SP5	CRUZ LOPEZ, LUIS F.	USA
SGT	DAVIS, EBYLEE	USA
SGT	EAIRHEART, STEVE J.	USA
SGT	LAMBERT, GREGORY I.	USA
SGT	MCDOWELL, JAMES H.	USA
SP5	MONTANYE, LEISA S.	USA

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SGT	POINDEXTER, MICHAEL D.	USA
SGT	REDD, JOHN F.	USA
SP5	SANDOMIR, ALAN N.	USA
SP5	SMITH, GERALD JR.	USA
SP5	THOMPSON, ROBERT A.	USA
SSGT	TIFFANY, THOMAS J.	USAF
SSGT	TIFFANY, VIKKI M.	USAF
SP4	BEASLEY, BRYAN D.	USA
SP4	CASSIDY, PATRICK S.	USA
SP4	DIAL, LARRY D.	USA
SP4	JOHNSON, CHARLES D.	USA
SP4	KNIGHT, WILLIAM	USA
SP4	MCNEILL, JOHN L.	USA
SGT	MULLEN, JERI L.	USAF
SP4	PRENDERGAST, RICHARD M.	USA
SP4	TYSON, DAVID K.	USA
MR	BAILEY, JOHN M.	CIV
MS	CHAFFIN, LISBETH	CIV
MR	CORBETT, WILLIAM R.	CIV
MR	CREEKMORE, MICHAEL C.	CIV
MS	HADDAD, MARY D.	CIV
MRS	NAGY, HELENE	CIV

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(ANNEX C, CONTINUED)

DEPARTURES 1982

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTURE DATE</u>
LTC	GABEL, KOLMAN A.	29 Jun 82
LTCOL	HUML, GERALD F.	14 Jul 82
LTC	STEWART, PHILLIP R.	25 May 82
LTC	WEST, LOWRY A.	3 Jun 82
MAJ	GAGNON, ROBERT L.	21 May 82
CAPT	HARRISON, HERBERT A.	14 Jul 82
CAPT	VANDERHOOF, THOMAS	15 Oct 82
1LT	PRITCHARD, JOSEPH M.	21 Nov 82
SFC	KRUSE, MICHAEL	28 Oct 82
MSGT	VILLERY, ROBERT L.	20 Dec 82
SSG	CRUZ, JUAN M.	02 Apr 82
SSG	GAZDZIK, JOSEPH C.	22 May 82
SSG	GUZMAN, LUIS R.	28 Feb 82
TSGT	HARRISON, ALFRED JR.	15 Jun 82
TSGT	MILLARD, GAILEN E.	1 Jul 82
SSG	SATORO, GREGORY C.	12 Feb 82
SSG	SCHATZ, JESSIE G.	19 Dec 82
TSGT	ZELINSKI, THOMAS A.	1 Sep 82
SGT	ECKHARDT, ALTON J. III	19 Aug 82
SGT	EVERETT, RANDY B.	28 Oct 82
SP5	HARRIS, HERBERT L.	31 Jan 82
SP5	PEGGS, RICHARD L.	12 Apr 82
SP4	BRYANT, ALTON L.	18 Mar 82

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTURE DATE</u>
SP4	KENNEDY, CLEMMIE L.	27 Aug 82
SP4	METTERT, LISA D.	21 Apr 82
SP4	BLAINE, LINDA A.	1 Nov 82
MS	FUCHS, LINDA	31 Oct 82
MR	GILES, GEOFFREY N.	29 Jan 82
MR	HANDY, MARK A.	8 Oct 82
MRS	NORRIS-HANDY, JUDY	28 Oct 82
MRS	OLIVER, MARGARET E.	29 Jan 82
MS	PERSON, JULIA	13 May 82
MR	STUBBS, EDWARD E.	31 Aug 82
MRS	WEAST, ROSE M.	3 May 82

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ANNEX D

DEALINGS WITH SERB, STATISTICS

(C) A Unit History is often of use to the originating unit as an internal record of background information and precedent affecting current operations. This Annex has as its purpose the provision of just such an internal record of USMLM-SERB transactions for the period 1978-1981. Included are: total annual guest pass requests; and total annual requests for accreditation changes for personnel and for vehicles.

A. GUEST PASS REQUESTS:

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
JANUARY	27	83	3	23	48
FEBRUARY	54	25	41	42	39
MARCH	8	60	53	58	82
APRIL	112	157	118	85	104
MAY	74	98	33	42	43
JUNE	373	519	500	106	314
JULY	23	50	56	362	50
AUGUST	13	35	68	72	40
SEPTEMBER	46	44	60	22	25
OCTOBER	82	56	29	39	37
NOVEMBER	107	88	126	72	93
DECEMBER	83	47	69	16	61
TOTAL	1002	1266	1056	900	926

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B. PASS EXCHANGES

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
JANUARY	11	14	14	14	12
FEBRUARY	7	11	20	15	19
MARCH	12	13	16	11	13
APRIL	8	13	16	11	10
MAY	14	16	20	14	10
JUNE	10	10	8	16	12
JULY	12	13	16	20	13
AUGUST	12	14	17	17	20
SEPTEMBER	8	12	8	13	13
OCTOBER	9	13	11	10	14
NOVEMBER	9	15	12	15	17
DECEMBER	10	14	12	13	18
TOTAL	122	158	165	179	171

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C. VEHICLE EXCHANGES

	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
JANUARY	1			1	
FEBRUARY		1		2	2
MARCH	1				
APRIL		1			
MAY					
JUNE	1	1	1		
JULY			2		1
AUGUST		1			
SEPTEMBER	1		1		
OCTOBER		1	1	2	
NOVEMBER				2	1
DECEMBER	1	2	1	1	
TOTAL	5	7	6	6	4

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1-HQ USAF, ATTN: INY, WASHINGTON, DC 20330
1-CMDT MARINE CORPS, CODE: INT, HQMC, WASHINGTON, DC 20380
1-CMC (CODE PO), HQ USMC, WASHINGTON, DC 20380
1-PRESIDENT NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV, FT LESLEY J. MCNAIR, DC 20318
1-AFIS, ATTN: INH, BLDG 520, BOLLING AFB, DC 20332
1-AFIS/RE, BOLLING AFB, DC 20332
1-CMDT USA WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE, PA 17013
1-PRESIDENT NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RI 02840
1-AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112
1-CMDT C&GS COL, FT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027
1-SUPERINTENDENT, USMA, WEST POINT, NY 10996
1-FTD, WPAFB, OH 04533
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1-CDR USAFSS, APO 09107
1-ODCSI V CORPS, APO 09107
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1-DATT, AMEMB MOSCOW AFRCOS THRU 09757
1-DATT, AMEMB WARSAW AFRCOS THRU 09757
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1-TAREX BLN
2-BRIXMIS
2-FMLM

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