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UNIT HISTORY(U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

1983

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HQ USAREUR + 7th Army
ODCSINT, Attn: AEAGB-CI-5
Unit 29351
APO AE 09014


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USMLM continues in its 37th year to be perhaps the most dependable source of detailed and precise information on the Group of Soviet Forces Germany. Our liaison status allows relatively unimpeded access to East Germany and we hope to rationally exploit this window on GSFG to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective on the Soviet military. USMLM's mere presence and movement insure us a key role in the critical Indications of Hostilities (IOH) network. Beyond that, we routinely contribute meaningful intelligence in response to a wide range of national and theater requirements pertaining to Soviet equipment, organization, manning, tactics, and training. This reporting, although occasionally dramatic, as was the case with last year's T-64 interior exploitations, more often consists of individual and seemingly insignificant sightings which eventually form a mosaic from which emerges a better understanding of GSFG ground and air forces. We prefer collection techniques which allow the collection environment to remain relatively undisturbed. This requires knowledge, finesse, judgment, and no small amount of courage. For these qualities, we turn to a truly impressive group of Army, Marine and Air Force officers and NCO's who comprise our reconnaissance tour personnel. This "cutting edge" is buttressed and supported by an equally impressive Tri-Service effort composed of USMLM's military and civilian analysts, specialists and administrative personnel. Altogether a professional group which is continuing and building on a unique tradition.


ROLAND LAJOIE
Colonel, GS
Chief of Mission

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FOREWORD

USMLM's Unit History serves several important informative functions:

- It provides an annual chronology of the Mission's operational accomplishments in overt intelligence collection.

- It affords a record of developmental trends within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and East German Armed Forces.

- It is a repository of information pertaining to USMLM's role as a military liaison mission representing the Commander in Chief, US Army Europe to the Commander in Chief, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

- It contributes to the military history program of the Armed Services.

USMLM's 1983 Unit History joins those from previous years to comprise an important record of trends, precedent and policy. As such it becomes a most useful reference document in the conduct of the Mission's daily affairs.

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
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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1983

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PART I

GENERAL

A. (C) MISSION.

1. The primary mission of USMLM is to carry out responsibilities for liaison between CINCUSAREUR, on behalf of US Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR), and CINCSFG and to serve as a point of contact for other US departments and agencies with CINCSFG, in accordance with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

2. The secondary and confidential mission of USMLM is to exploit its liaison status and attendant access for collection of intelligence information in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

B. (C) REFERENCES

1. TDA E1W1AUAA
2. USEUCOM DIRECTIVE 40-18, 30 Mar 78
3. USAREUR REGULATION 383-27
3. USAFE Regulation 23-11, 05 Feb 79
4. 7113 Special Activity Squadron Regulation 23-5, 01 Aug 79
5. USMC Table of Organization 5503, 17 Dec 76

C. (C) ORGANIZATION. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement (Annex A), signed in April 1947, authorized the exchange of Military Liaison Missions between the Soviet and US Military Headquarters in Germany and laid down general guidelines for their activities and for the support to be rendered by the headquarters to which they were accredited. The agreement provided for 14 accredited personnel, with complete freedom to travel, except in areas of military dispositions. The 14 accredited personnel "will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations."

D. (C) STATISTICS.

1. (C) Intelligence Information Collection. In carrying out its second and classified mission, USMLM dispatched 513 reconnaissance tours into the GDR for a total of approximately 650,00 kilometers. The Mission produced in excess of 1000 Intelligence Information Reports resulting from information acquired during these tours.

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2. (U) Temporary Restricted Areas (TRA). In 1983 HQ GSFG levied 73 TRA. Section II, paragraph C contains details.

3. (U) Detentions and Incidents. USMLM tours were detained 12 times in 1983, as compared to eight in 1982.

4. (U) Liaison and Representation. CUSMLM or his representative met with SERE or HQ GSFG representatives a total of 13 times to discuss a variety of topics. See Section III, paragraph B.

E. (C) ORGANIZATION.

USMLM, with its support base in West Berlin, is able to employ all 14 accreditations (passes) for operational and liaison purposes in East Germany. Details of pass utilization and of the tri-service organization are provided in succeeding sub-paragraphs:

1. Pass Utilization: The 14 accreditations provided for by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement are normally held as follows:

CUSMLM (Army)	1
Deputy Chief of Mission (DCUSMLM) (USAF)	1
Naval Representative (USMC)	1
OIC, Potsdam House (Army)	1

Liaison Officers

Army	4
USAF	2

Liaison NCO's

Army	3
USAF	1

2. Army Element: The TDA in effect on 31 Dec 83 authorizes 11 officers, 26 enlisted personnel, and five civilians.

3. Air Element: The Air Element is composed of 5 officers and 11 enlisted personnel, organized as Detachment 16, 7113 Special Activities Squadron.

4. Naval Element: The USMLM naval element consists of one USMC officer.

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PART II. COLLECTION

A. (C) GROUND DIVISION COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (All elements of this section, to include photography, classified CONFIDENTIAL):

1. Introduction: From the perspective of USMLM Ground Division there were a number of significant changes, both structural and procedural, which occurred within the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). These changes included resubordination of a number of divisions, restructuring of several units within GSFG, of which the most significant was the conversion of a motorized rifle division into a tank division, upgrading of equipment, and apparent alterations in the pattern of training. These changes affected at least 11 divisions. The resubordination and restructuring which occurred in 1983 were consistent with GSFG's intent to field a more modern, flexible force. Given the scope of the effort, the resubordination and restructuring certainly had been well staffed over an extended period of time dating back to at least the arrival of General Zaytsev, CINC GSFG, in late 1980. It did not appear to USMLM that GSFG's readiness was perceptibly affected during the resubordination/restructuring.

In addition to this restructuring effort the most consistent observations relating to equipment upgrades involved artillery. Major upgrades took place as self-propelled pieces replaced towed in many units and other units received some of the retrograded equipment.

Concomitant with the massive reorganization effort was an alteration in the timetable of GSFG's previously established training pattern. This alteration became most evident before and during both semi-annual troop rotation phases in 1983.

GSFG participation in the annual Soviet harvest appeared to be normal, even as the restructuring, resubordination and change in the training pattern were being carried out.

2. GSFG Resubordination/Restructuring/Relocation Effort: GSFG carried out a major reorganization in early 1983. In brief, five divisions were resubordinated to different armies; one was reorganized from a motor rifle to a tank division; one moved from the Potsdam area west to a garrison in a PRA; and at least two training regiments were relocated from PRA to garrisons near Potsdam.

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USMLM was able to confirm the majority of this reshuffling through extensive side number and vehicle registration number (VRN) analysis after in-depth coverage by Tri-Mission tour officers and NCOs.

The first of these changes became evident in February when movement was noted by what was thought to be the 14th GMRD, which was garrisoned within the Jueterbog PRA. Tour officers reported a range of side numbers on tanks and other armored vehicles which was inconsistent with the number of vehicles assigned to a motor rifle division; since the VRN were clearly associated with the 14 GMRD it was concluded that a change had been made which converted that division from motor rifle to tank.

Between 20 and 26 March a major FTX occurred which included 20 GA units and the 25 Tank Division, a unit which had heretofore been subordinate to the 2 GIA. Since there were engineer and air support and headquarters elements from the 20 GA and since no other units from any other army were present it was concluded that the 25 TD had probably been resubordinated to the 20 GA.

In early May the 10 GTD/3 SA relocated some 100 kilometers closer to the Inter-German border from its previous garrison in the Potsdam area. At the same time the Tri-Missions reported the relocation of the 35 MRD into one of the garrisons vacated by the 10 GTD, and two training regiments took over another garrison where most of the 10 GTD had been housed. This move consolidated most of GSFG's training regiments within a 40 kilometer radius of Berlin and, at the same time, moved one of the 10 GTD's maneuver regiments west of the Elbe River.

A relocation by elements of the EGA was noted during the Spring 1983 training cycle. The 1 Chemical Defense Battalion and the 1 Tank Regiment from the 1 MRD/MD V moved from its old home in Burg to a location closer to Berlin, in Beelitz. This move could have been made to accommodate another Soviet shift or could have been related to an East German effort at centralization and consolidation.

An additional resubordination was discovered in July as numerous VRN/side number anomalies were noted in association with movement by the 27 GMRD and the 20 GMRD; apparently, the 27 GMRD and 20 GMRD switched armies, the 20 ending up in the 1 GIA and the 27 in the 8 GA. This switch makes sense geographically as each unit is now closer to its respective army headquarters.

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The impact of these changes is not yet totally apparent. Some of the changes appear to be simply administrative while others could be mission oriented. Following is a summary of the changes which occurred in 1983:

14 GMRD became 32 GTD/20 GA.

25 TD resubordinated from 2 GTA to 20 GA.

27 GMRD resubordinated from 1 GTA to 8 GA.

20 GMRD resubordinated from 8 GA to 1 GTA.

10 GTD moved from Krampnitz/Potsdam to Altengrabow PRA and Schoenebeck.

35 MRD moved some units from Caligow/Doeberitz to Potsdam/Krampnitz.

U/I Motor Rifle and Tank Training Regiments moved from PRAs to Krampnitz.

7 GTD resubordinated from 1 GIA to 3 SA.

207 MRD resubordinated from 3 SA to 2 GTA.

1 Cnem Def Bn and 1 Tank Regt/1 MRD/MD V moved from Burg to Beelitz.

3. Changes in GSFG Training: The major change perceived by USMLM this past year came about as a result of the phased, or multi-tracked, training program which was initiated approximately three years ago and apparently became fully realized during the 1983 training year. It appears that, under this program, fewer troops are rotated by air and more specialists arrive in East Germany from the Soviet Union over a more protracted period of time. From the evidence available to USMLM it seems that non-specialty troops are now rotated into only one company of a tank or motor rifle battalion and they probably then spend the entire two year period together. Thus instead of each of the three companies in a maneuver battalion being affected during each troop rotation, only one company would be affected at any given time; in fact, since there are four rotation cycles during a troop's two year stint in GSFG and only three sub-units within a particular Soviet unit, it is quite probable that some battalions, and possibly even regiments, are totally unaffected during a given rotation.

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This is significantly different from the previous Soviet practice and could be due, in addition to the reasons already mentioned, to the increased reliance on specialty troops who must be trained elsewhere before being sent to their units in GSFG. This entire operation has changed the timing of events such as drivers' training and other activity traditionally related to semi-annual troop rotation.

Seen within the context of a major restructuring and resubordination effort within GSFG the numerous isolated anomalies observed during 1983 begin to make sense. Unfortunately, the scope of the restructuring and reorganization is not yet fully known. USMLM continues to pay close attention to all indicators related to any additional schedule shifts or inexplicable activities which could portend further modifications or point to a shift in tactics or organization.

With the implementation of the above mentioned multi-tracked training program GSFG units are probably now in a higher state of readiness than they were in the past and are probably less affected by troop rotation; in addition, GSFG is better able to fully utilize the limited number of major training areas in East Germany.

USMLM identified exercise participation by a total of 12 GSFG and five NVA maneuver divisions this past year. Although there was nothing odd about the number of FTxs it did appear that there was a shift in their thrust. FTxs emphasized movement and involved fewer participants compared with the massive multi-divisional type exercise play witnessed by USMLM in the past. Observations from these exercises would suggest that there is a focus on battalion and regimental activity. This is supported by comments made by General Zaytsev concerning training in GSFG in the January 1984 edition of "Kommunist of the Armed Forces."


Major, army level exercises still do take place as evidenced by a mid-summer FTx that involved elements of three divisions and large rear service elements of the 8 Guards Army. In addition, the 20 Guards Army also participated in an exercise during March and it appeared that a Warsaw Pact exercise took place just before, or even during, the Spring troop rotation.

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4. Significant Observations (All elements of this section, to include photography, classified CONFIDENTIAL)

a. On 12 MAR first ground photography of the DOG EAR air defense radar system was obtained. Equipment was associated with the U/I SA-6 Regt/47 GTD/3 SA.




b. On 24 FEB further evidence was obtained that 3 MRR of 1 MRD/EGA was converting from D-30 to 122mm SP guns (2S1). The Tri-Missions noted 2S1 in four separate EGA units in 1983.

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c. On 05 APR USMLM obtained the first ground photography of the Soviet Medium Tank (SMT) M1983/1. Although the vehicle was heavily tarped, the observation provided excellent close-ups clearly showing the double pin end connectors and open center guides which are unique to the new tank.



d. On 28 APR MAZ-537 with lowboy trailers were sighted transporting tarped probable SMT M-1983/1. VRN analysis of the transporters provided confirmation of the presence of at least 10 MAZ-537 per army heavy lift unit. Combined with other sightings of this vehicle at division level, this sighting suggested a doubling of GSFG's heavy lift capability.

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e. On 10 JUN a USMLM tour acquired coverage of a probable Air Assault Bn subordinate to the 20 GA at Dailgow/Doeberitz.



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f. On 13 JUN first-time photography of a new Soviet engineer vehicle, the BAT M1983, was obtained at the Brandenburg rail yard.



g. On 22 JUN a USMLM tour observed T-62 with the U/I Ind Tank Regt/2 GTA for the first time. This was the last known GSFG unit to be equipped with T-55.

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h. On 25 JUN road moveout by vehicles involved in harvest support activities in the Soviet Union was first noted.




i. On 15 JUL a train importing new 2S5 self propelled artillery pieces was observed en route to the U/I Artillery Brigade (2S5) of the 34 Arty Division. These guns were probably replacements for the M-46, previously held by this unit.

j. On 30 JUL a USMLM tour photographed the 8 GA's Mobile CP as it returned from an FTX. The photography and column coverage provided an insight into the structure of a mobile CP.

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k. On 1 AUG photography of airborne training in progress at Leipzig 241 provided further evidence of an air assault unit at this installation.



l. On 18 AUG a USMLM tour noted T-64 tanks at HAGENOW Installation 261. This sighting confirmed the upgrade from T-55 to T-64 in one of the U/I Independent Tank Regt/2 GTA.

m. On 23 AUG USMLM as part of a special Tri-Mission effort obtained the first ground photography of the DR-3 Drone Resupply Vehicle.



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n. USMLM analysis of an FMLM 10 SEP sighting confirmed that the 43 Artillery Brigade/8 GA has a battalion, with at least 18 tubes, of 152mm field guns M-1976. This also provided the first evidence of the use of a wheeled prime mover for these nuclear capable artillery pieces.

o. On 21 SEP a USMLM ground sighting indicated that the 54 GAR/27 GMRD was equipped with two battalions of 2S3. This provided the first evidence of two 2S3 battalions within motor rifle divisions.

p. On 20 SEP a USMLM tour observed a train transporting two battalions of 2S3 from the 47 GID. This confirmed the upgrade within the 99 Arty Regt/47 GTD, making it the seventh tank division within GSFG to have completed the upgrade.

q. On 28 SEP the SMT M-1983/1 was photographed by a ground team as it was being transported under tarps to the 27 GMRD/8 GA in HALLE.




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r. On 19 OCT a USMLM tour provided further confirmation that NEDLITZ/GRIMME EGA STORAGE FACILITY 501 is receiving equipment for probable use by reserve units.

s. On 19 OCT two USMLM tours observed MAZ-537 with lowboy trailers on the southern part of the Berlin Autobahn. The VRN series noted on these vehicles provided evidence which indicated a probable increase of 40 vehicles within the U/I Heavy Lift Bn/56 Motor Transport Bde.

t. On 08 NOV a USMLM tour gained access to a T-64A tank and obtained excellent close up photography of the interior.



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u. On 08 DEC a USMLM tour obtained the first ground photography of the MCV M-1979.



v. On 23 DEC there was a first-time sighting of 2S3 with the East German 8 MRD/MD V. This meant that all MD V divisional artillery regiments are now equipped with 2S3.


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w. On 20 & 23 DEC USMLM tours obtained confirmatory evidence that both the 8 GA and the 1 GTA have DR-3 Drone squadrons.



x. On 31 DEC 83/1 JAN 84 another special operation was conducted against the Soviet Medium Tank resulting in excellent coverage of the interior and exterior of a T-64B.



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5. SANDDUNE: SANDDUNE reporting ranged from the reporting of items of individual Order of Battle interest, such as the identification and location of the previously unlocated outbattalion of the Wittenberg Signal Brigade, to the consolidated exploitation and reporting of large amounts of documentation from the 34 Artillery Division and a battalion of the Northern Air Warning Brigade. This reporting and information from other documentation allowed the identification of a large number of equipment nomenclatures, to include the BM-22 (for what is held by other sources as the BM-27), numerous radar industrial designators and nicknames, and the IVlx ACRV designators.

SANDDUNE reporting has continued to document the GSFG manning question, concentrating on the differences between wartime and peacetime authorization and peacetime assignment. This reporting (IR 3002 (1), 3026, 3075, 3107, 3115 83) has been utilized by theater and national level agencies in the all source examination of the ramifications of the peacetime undermanning and the obvious IOH implications of the steps required to bring certain GSFG units to wartime authorization. This reporting has, in a nutshell, noted two major aspects of the mobilization for wartime authorization manning: the integration of reservists (including women) residing in the unit's area and the augmentation by reservists/active duty personnel from the USSR.

SANDDUNE confirmed or identified 18 True Unit Designators (TUD). Going beyond the unit identification (TUD and VCh) process, SANDDUNE was also able to provide first line information on unit relocations. Thus, the relocation of the 7 GTD's reconnaissance battalion was noted before it was reported by collateral sources and, in an integration of documentation and USMLM sightings, two training regiments which occupied a local area garrison after the withdrawal of 10 GTD elements were indentified.

The SANDDUNE section was not manned from January to March when two of the former section members, Mark Handy and Linda Fuchs, returned from the US following a job conversion. They were joined in April by the third section member, Eda-Suzanne Semmett. A fourth member has been recruited and hopefully by mid-1984 SANDDUNE will have its full personnel complement.

SANDDUNE, which published just over 200 reports in 1983, continues to account for approximately forty percent of the OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE evaluations received by USMLM. Some of the more significant reports are outlined below (the numbers are the IIR numbers less the station designator and the year).

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3002/3003	Deployment Schematic for regimental signal company
3002(1)	Army level critique of regimental CPX which included the call-up of reservists (including women) and the formation of a temporary tank battalion
3007	Translation of a Soviet manual on normative standards for a variety of artillery and artillery support equipment
3018	Organizational structure of frontal signal battalion
3025/3026	TOE register for battalion of U/I Guards Arty Bde (2S3)/34 Arty Div with specification of wartime and peacetime manning
3032/3045-3052	Extensive documentation from the maintenance workshop of the 34 Arty Division provided information on maintenance procedures and equipment nomenclatures
3039	Identification of testing of Article 219 (probable SMT M1983/1) in GSFG unit
3041	Identification of 13 T-64B (one tank company) in battalion of GSFG MRR
3068	Confirmation of Army Auto-Tractor Department as allocation authority for Vehicle Registration Numbers (VRN)
3084/3090	TOE of harvest support company which indicated company received Reserve augmentation

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3097/3098 Report on problems and deficiencies in 1 GTA which contributed to tuberculosis in the 1 GTA; a particularly high incidence of this disease was in the 27 GMRD in Halle

3100-3105 Analysis of documentation from a Soviet AW Bn of the Northern AW Bde. These reports provided room for the full scope of the SANDDUNE program: the association of radar designators and nicknames, vehicle usage, and the relationship through administrative documentation to other units

3111 Outline of 9 TD HQ with designation of each major building by unit and function

3113 Information suggesting the presence of a parachute company at division level

3126 TOE manning of a divisional PX, important for the resolution of the overhead manning level in GSFG

3308 Two SPOON REST D (IRL131) manuals

3512 Analysis of the echeloning and deployment of the rear service elements in a division-front CPX (Documents collected by BRIXMIS)

Significant unit (VCh) identifications were:

3005 Documentation that a number of army staff elements have separate FPN

3070 (Air) Assault Battalion/8 GA

3074 First identification of a divisional KGB osobyy otel

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B. AIR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES (All elements of this section, to include photography, classified CONFIDENTIAL):

SUMMARY

In 1983 the Tri-Mission Air Teams provided photographic evidence of qualitative upgrades in the GSFG Air Army and Radio-Electronic Combat Units and in the EGAF Electronic Warfare and Surface-to-Air Missile Units. The most significant of these include the FLOGGER J with the AS-14 Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile, the AS-12 Tactical Antiradiation Missile (TARM); the FITTER D with a new Missile Launch Rail (indicating the probable introduction of the AS-11 TARM); HIND E with a 23/30mm cannon and multiple AT-6/SPIRAL Antitank Guided Missiles; FOXBAT E, FLOGGER J, FITTER H, and FLOGGER D with Infrared Air-to-Air Missiles (primarily for self-defense in a close-in combat support role); completion of the upgrade of all Soviet SA-3 Surface-to-Air Missile Sites to the quad-rail SA-3C System; proliferation of the END CURVE and DOG TAIL Bistatic IFF Systems; modifications to the FLAT FACE and LONG TRACK Radar Systems; and the identification of a second SA-5 Surface-to-Air Missile Site with the EGAF.

SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS


a. On 27 January the construction of a large bunker was noted at Rovershagen Air Defense Filter Center. It will probably be used as the direct link for the new EG SA-5 site now under construction at Gubkow (Rostock). The bunker may be used either for additional equipment or operations support related to Gubkow.



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
b. On 3 March a HIND E from STENDAL Soviet Airfield with a twin-barreled 23/30mm cannon was photographed. This gun replaces the four-barreled 12.7mm gatling gun and will bolster firepower and stand-off capabilities. This system is more compatible with the AS-5 rocket and SPIRAL ATGM and will assume a greater strafing role against personnel and less heavily armored targets such as APCs. An air-to-air role is also feasible. Other modifications include an improved electro-optical fire system and probable heat dispersion devices for reduced IR signatures.



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
c. On 15 June first-time quality photography of the pedestal located under the FENCER C radome was obtained at Finsterwalde Soviet Airfield. The device may be associated with the laser designator system.



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

d. On 15 June detailed photography of an END CURVE variant was obtained at Finsterwalde Soviet SA-3 Site (VT030097). There were modifications to the END BOX and the metal plate on the sail.



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e. On 11 July multiple flights of the DR-3 reconnaissance drone were observed and photographed. The drone and photo-recce instrument package parachuted to earth. This data will aid in determining the craft's weight, dimensions, aerodynamics, and the nature of the recovery operations and tactics.



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f. On 11 July a single HIND E from Parchim Soviet Airfield was observed and photographed carrying four AT-6/SPIRAL Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) cannisters. This is the first known instance of four ATGM cannisters mounted on HIND E in GSFG. This helicopter was in an operational support role in the DR-3 recovery.



g. On 25 July a TALL KING C radar was observed at Steinheid Soviet Early Warning Radar Site. This discovery brings to six the total number of TALL KING C known to exist in the Forward Area. It represents a marked upgrade in GSFG early warning capabilities.

h. On 27 July the first deployment of BACKFIRE B outside the Soviet Union was observed and photographed and the aircraft's engine noise recorded upon departure from Templin Soviet Airfield. The sound recording provided for the first time a basis on which to evaluate future engine developments for the BACKFIRE series.




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i. On 3 August a HIND E MOD (with probable 23/30mm guns) was photographed carrying a new rail with an additional AT-6/SPIRAL ATGM mount. This confirmed the HIND E MOD's capability to mount at least 12 AT-6 as compared to the previous known total of four.



j. On 3 August technical-quality photography of the BAR BRICK MOD was obtained at Rohrberg EG Direction Finding Site.




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
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k. On 31 August USMLM's Annual Air Order of Battle for CSFG AA and EGAF was forwarded. This specialized report is often the sole source of information on units in East Germany and has been called the most reliable collateral AOB available to analysts.

l. On 12 September, technical-quality photography of the FAN SONG F was obtained at Beetz EG SA-2 Site. This is the first USMLM detected deployment of the FAN SONG F in the Forward Area. The system augments a FAN SONG E on site and has better ECCM capabilities against ARM attacks.




m. On 16 September a FOXBAT E from Finow Soviet Airfield was photographed equipped with dual APHID Missile Launch Rails. This confirms that FOXBAT E now has an enhanced low-level attack capability in addition to its high and medium altitude air superiority roles.



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n. On 21 September FENCER C at Gaddow-Rossow Soviet Range were photographed carrying probable 500kg bombs on the fuselage pylon.




o. On 26 September a FLOGGER J from Mirow Soviet Airfield was photographed carrying the AS-12 Tactical Anti-Radiation Missile (TARM). This will greatly enhance the threat to all fixed and mobile radar equipment of NATO forces.



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p. On 5 October the most comprehensive coverage to date was obtained of Neundorf Soviet Passive Detection Site. Close-up, technical-quality photography should greatly aid equipment analysis.




q. On 6 October two FLOGGER J at Finsterwalde Soviet Airfield were photographed carrying the AS-12 TARM and U/I Pod Variant I. Mirow and Finsterwalde FLOGGER J are the only aircraft known to be equipped with this TARM.

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

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r. On 14 October the complete EOB of Bienstedt EG Passive Detection Site and close-up, technical-quality photography of BOW TIE, PRAYER WHEEL, UI 213, 13 METER CIGAR, and CIGAR-like antennas were obtained.



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


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s. On 15 October identification of aircraft in the Allstedt Soviet Airfield Fire Support Squadron was confirmed by photography. Helicopter bort numbers and the nature of the airfield's construction were noted.


t. On 10 November a Finsterwalde FLOGGER J was photographed with an AA-8 WSEM and a dual APHID Missile Launch Rail. This is the first sighting of a double APHID Missile Launch Rail on this ground attack aircraft. The conceptual change in weapons mixes on aircraft previously considered as single-mission-oriented shows greater flexibility and survivability of Soviet front-line aircraft.



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u. On 1 December two DOG TAIL Bistatic IFF Radars were observed at Ribnitz Soviet GCI Site. There are only three other known sites with two DOG TAIL in GSFG. The DOG TAIL at Ribnitz is paired, however, with a BAR LOCK D instead of the usual SPOON REST D. This should shed further light on the function of DCG TAIL.



v. On 2 December Linde GACS Site was noted active with R-400/404 Dish Antennas. The site was completely dismantled in November 1982. Site is again considered operational.

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C. TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRA) (ALL PARAGRAPHS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL)

1. HQS GSFG imposed 73 TRA during 1983, after only two such restrictions in 1982. Although this demonstrates conclusively that the Soviets intend to continue to deny Iri-Mission access to designated areas as an exercise OPSEC measure, it should also be noted that some of the TRA did not appear to coincide with any unusual activity whatsoever. A description of each TRA is included for historical purposes; however, maps portraying the coverage have been omitted this year. These maps are on file at USMLM.

2. TRA Imposed During 1983:

a. TRA 001-83 and 002-83 were in effect during the period 7-13 Jan 83, and may have been designed to shield elements of 1 GTA conducting field training exercises (FTX)/river crossing exercises in the area.

1) TRA 001-83 effectively filled gaps between the Belgern, Grossenhain and Brandis Permanent Restricted Areas (PRA).

2) TRA 002-83 effectively blocked the Zerbst Gap and covered the Elbe River from Magdeburg to the Dessau PRA.

b. TRA 003-83 and 004-83 were in effect during the period 8-13 Jan 83 and consisted of the following:

1) TRA 003-83 increased the size of the Weimar PRA by at least one-third, encompassing the Schafstadt PRA, and could have served elements of the 1 GTA, the 8 GA, or MD III. Reportedly, elements of the 8 GA were conducting an FTX in the Gotha PRA area on 3-4 Jan 83, and a rail load-cut by elements of the 27 GMRD took place on 3 Jan 83.

2) TRA 004-83 tripled the size of the Koenigsstrueck PRA and could have served elements of the 1 GTA or MD III.

4. TRA 005-83, 006-83 and 007-83 were in effect during the period 11-18 Jan 83.

a. TRA 005-83 blocked Allied Mission access to the northern Elbe River crossing sites and filled gaps between the Leitzlinger Heide, Rathenow and Perleberg PRA. This area is traditionally used during major FTXs by elements of MD V, the 2 GTA and the 3 SA.

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b. TRA 006-83 filled the Cottbus-Weisswasser pocket of the Border PRA, joined the Weisswasser East German Training Area 421 and may have served elements of the MD III.

c. TRA 007-83 increased the size of the Gotha PRA by at least two-thirds, extending the eastern boundary to Route 4. The geographic location suggests use by elements of the 4 MRD/MD III.

5. TRA 008-83 was in effect during the period 14-19 Jan 83. It denied Allied Mission access to the Wismar port area, the main route (Route 106) between Wismar and Schwerin, the Wismar garrison of the 288 GMRR, 199 Guards Artillery Regiment, and unidentified Anti-Tank Battalion/94 GMRD (Wismar 241), Wismar area Soviet and East German Logistics facilities, and East German paramilitary installations. This TRA may have been designed to mask FTX/CPX/driver training activity by elements of the 94 GMRD/2 GTA or movement of sensitive material from Wismar port south.

6. TRA 009-83 was in effect during the period 15-25 Jan 83. It was probably designed to screen movement and/or exercise activity of 8 GA elements. It linked the Saalfeld PRA, a major garrison area of the 79 GTD, with Ohrdruf PRA major training areas.

7. TRA 010-83 and 011-83 were in effect during the period 17-23 Jan 83:

a. TRA 010-83 joined the Jueterborg PRA with the Bad Dueben PRA. It denied Tri-Mission access to the southern Elbe River crossing sites at Domnitzsch-Prettin and Elster-Gallin, Annaburg Engineer Storage Facility 501 and Annaburg Army Barracks 211. This TRA may have been designed to shield East German or Soviet training at either of the crossing sites and/or activity by elements of the GSFG U/I Engineer Railroad Bridge Construction Regiment at Annaburg 211 and the unidentified Assault Crossing Battalion/35 Engineer Ponton Regiment/GSFG at Jessen 282.

b. TRA 011-83 extended the Coastal PRA southward, denying Tri-Mission access to Route 105/Autobahn E65 and observation points near Damgarten Soviet Airfield. While this TRA may have been designed to cover activity by the 773 Fighter Regiment (FISHBED) at this airfield, the size of the TRA suggests shielding of air defense or CPX activity.

8. TRA 012-83 was effective during the period 20-29 Jan 83. It denied Allied access to East German MD V installations housing elements of the 5 MT Battalion, the 5 Chemical Defense Battalion, the 5 Engineer Battalion and the 5 Air Defense Regiment. It also extended southward the portion of the Border PRA occupied by the 9 TD/MD V. A Soviet air defense exercise was reported to be taking place in the area during that time.

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9. iRA 013-83 was in effect during the period 20-27 Jan 83. It denied Allied access to observation points for Brand Soviet Airfield, the Spree River crossing sites, and roads/tactical trails habitually used by Soviet/East German elements exercising between the Border PRA and Jueterbog PRA.

10. TRA 014-83 was in effect during the period 30 Jan-08 Feb 83. It denied Allied access to the area between the Coastal PRA and the Schwann PRA, one logistics installation, one SAM site and the Bad Doberan and Neubuckow Rail Sidings.

11. TRA 015-83 and 016-83 were in effect during the period 30 Jan-08 Feb 83:

a. TRA 015-83 extended the Gotha PRA north to Route 80. It denied Allied access to possible communications/intercept locations and some logistics facilities in the 8 GA and MD III areas.

b. TRA 016-83 joined the Ohrdruf and Blankenhain PRA. This area had recently been included in TRA 009-83, which ended on 25 Jan 83. No evidence of military activity was noted in that area on 26 Jan 83.

12. TRA 017-83 and 018-83 were in effect during the period 30 Jan-10 Feb 83. They linked the Schafstadt-Weimar-Grimma-Zeltz-Hermsdorf PRA, allowing for possible 8 GA FIX-related movement.

13. TRA 019-83, 020-83, 021, 83 and 022-83 were in effect during the period 04-15 Feb 83, and consisted of the following:

a. TRA 019-83 blocked the Zerbst Gap and covered the Elbe River from Magdeburg to the Cessau PRA. No significant military activity was associated with this TRA.

b. TRA 020-83 blocked the Rheinsberg Gap between the Wittstock and Templin PRA, a traditional maneuver area for elements of the 25 TD/2 GTA.

c. TRA 021-83 extended the northern Wittstock PRA westward to the Rostock Autobahn, and covered an area not normally of great military significance, serving occasionally as a route for westward movement by elements of the 2 GTA from the Wittstock PRA toward the Parchim area.

d. TRA 022-83 covered the traditional northern Elbe River crossing sites and the area between the Perleberg and Letzlinger Heide PRA. This area is traditionally used during major FIXs by elements of MD V, the 2 GTA and the 3 SA.

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4. TRA 023-83 was in effect during the period 04-18 Feb 83. It joined the Altengrabow-Lehrnin-Dessau-Jueterbog PRA and blocked Tri-Mission access to a traditional maneuver area for the 20th GA and the 3 SA. This TRA also denied access to the southern half of the Potsdam Local Area, an Indications-of-Hostilities monitoring area rotated among the Tri-Missions on a daily basis.

15. TRA 024-83 was in effect during the period 06-19 Feb 83. It extended the Jueterbog PRA southeast to the Finsterwalde PRA, encompassing both the Babben and Welzow PRA. The effective time of this TRA overlapped that of TRA 019-83 through 023-83. During the period 06-15 Feb 83, a continuous restricted area was formed from Spremberg in the east to Magdeburg in the west.

16. TRA 025-83, 026-83, 027-83, 028-83 and 029-83 were in effect during the period 01-12 Feb 83 and consisted of the following:

a. TRA 025-83, 026-83 and 027-83 denied Tri-Mission access to garrisons of the 25 TD/2 GTA and blocked the Rheinsberg Gap, a traditional movement area between the Wittstock and Templin PRA often used by elements of the 2 GTA.

b. TRA 028-83 denied to the western portion of the Potsdam Local Area, an Indications-of-Hostilities monitoring area rotated daily among the Missions. This TRA blocked observation of 35 MRD/20th GA garrisons and local area bivouac sites/deployment areas.

c. TRA 029-83 covered the northern and eastern approaches to the Finsterwalde PRA and Airfield and may have been designed to deny observation of flying activity associated with that airfield.

17. TRA 030-83 and 031-83 were in effect during the period 01-15 Mar 83 and closed the gaps between the Zeitz, Hemsdorf and Weimar PRA. TRA 031-83 connected the Weimar, Kahla, Blankenhain, Saalfeld, Ohrdruf, Gotha and Border PRA and denied access to a significant portion of the 8 GA area. These two TRA combined with their contiguous PRA to form a continuous restricted area from Zeitz in the east to the inter-German border in the west.

18. TRA 032-83 was in effect during the period 01-18 Mar 83. It connected the Jueterbog, Dessau, Altengrabow and Lehrin PRA, as well as the area in TRA 029-83 (Paragraph 15c above). It denied Mission access to the southern portion of the local area, a traditional maneuver area between the PRA, suggesting possible FTX activity by elements of the 20th GA, including the 35 MRD.

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19. TRA 033-83 was in effect during the period 03-15 Mar 83. It connected the Eastern Border PRA with the Jueterbog PRA, encompassed the Briesen Brand PRA, and denied access to traditional exercise routes linking the river crossing sites on the Spree River. It also denied access to approaches to Brand Soviet Airfield. When combined with other PRA/TRA in effect during that time, it formed a continuous restricted area from the Polish border in the east to Magdeburg in the west.

20. TRA 034-83 was in effect during the period 04-15 Mar 83. It connected the Wittstock, Perleberg and Rathenow PRA and denied access to traditional exercise routes between these PRA, as well as to the northern Elbe River crossing sites. When combined with other PRA/TRA in effect during that time, it formed a continuous restricted area from Prenzlau in the northeast to the northern Elbe River crossing sites in the southwest, suggesting a 2 GTA FTX, including elements of the 25 TD and the 16th TD.

21. TRA 035-83 was in effect during the period 05-12 Mar 83. It filled the gap between the Grossenhain, Brandis and Grimma PRA and denied Allied Mission access to the 9 TD/1st GTA garrisons in Riesa and the 7th TD/MD III elements in Doebeln.

22. TRA 036-83 was in effect during the period 05-14 Mar 83. It extended the Neubrandenburg and Burg Stargard PRA north, south and east, and may be associated with Neubrandenburg-based MD V elements.

23. TRA 037-83 was in effect during the period 06-13 Mar 83. It filled the gap between the Schwerin, Parchim and Beckendorf PRA and encompassed the Demen PRA. The geographic location suggested possible use by elements of the 21st MRD and the 94 GMRD/2 GTA and/or then 8 MRD/MD V.

24. TRA 038-83 was in effect during the period 08-15 Mar 83. It connected the Demen, Beckendorf, Parchim and Retzow PRA with TRA 037-83 and the Guestrow area, and denied access to the MD V garrisons/training areas of the 5 Artillery Regiment, the 5 Anti-Tank Battalion and the 8 MRD/MD V garrisons and training areas, to include those of the 8 TR, the 8 Engineer Battalion, the 8 Medical Battalion and the 8 MT Battalion.

25. TRA 039-83 was in effect during the period 10-15 Mar 83 and extended the southeast Border PRA to the outskirts of Dresden and Karl-Marx-Stadt. The geographic location suggested use by elements of MD III, including the 7 TD.

26. TRA 040-83 was in effect during the period 13-23 Mar 83. It extended the southern portion of the Jueterbog PRA westward.

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27. TRA 041-83 was in effect during the period 25 Mar - 02 Apr 83 and connected the Jueterbog, Dessau, Altengrabow and Lehnin PRA, denying access to the southern portion of the Potsdam local area. Its location suggested FTX activity by elements of the 20th GA.

28. TRA 042-83 was in effect during the period 08-18 Apr 83. This TRA, with its contiguous PRA, formed a continuous restricted area from the Polish border through the Letzlinger Heide Training Area, and denied access to traditional maneuver routes in that area. The placement and timing of this TRA suggested a probable single- or multi-Army FTX in that area.

29. TRA 043-83 and 044-83 were both in effect during the period 27 May-09 Jun 83, and both encompassed several PRA. It is not known what, if any, military significance should be attached to these TRA.

30. TRA 045-83 and 046-83 were in effect during the period 30 May-13 Jun 83 and consisted of the following:

a. TRA 045-83 connected the Wittstock, Ratherow, Ferleberg and Letzlinger Heide PRA, effectively blocking observation of northern Elbe River crossing sites and tactical approaches. This area is normally used by elements of the 2 GIA for Division- and Army-level FTXs involving movement from Wittstock to the crossing sites, assault river crossings and further movement into the Letzlinger Heide PRA.

b. TRA 046-83 connected the Lossa, Weimar, Altengrabow, Dessau, and Jueterbog PRA, along with several minor PRA, effectively blocking Allied Mission observation of movement between 8 GA garrisons in the south of East Germany and major training/maneuver areas in central East Germany. This area is frequently transited by Division- and Army-level FTXs originating either in the Letzlinger Heide or Jueterbog Training Areas.

31. TRA 047-83 was in effect during the period 04-12 Jun 83. It extended the Northern Coastal PRA southward, denying access to observation points for Dargarten Airfield and some elements of the 8 MRD/MD v.

32. TRA 048-83 was in effect during the period 05-15 Jun 83. It connected the Weimar, Blankenhain, Saalfeld, Ohrdruf, Gotha, Soemmerda and Lossa PRA and effectively connected with TRA 046-83 for the period 05-13 Jun 83. It further limited Tri-Mission observation of movement of 8 GA garrisons in southern East Germany and major training areas/maneuver areas in central East Germany and observation of movements between the Saalfeld and Ohrdruf PRA and between the Weimar and Gotha PRA.

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33. TRA 049-83 was in effect during the period 08-20 Jul 83, and connected the Dessau and Altengrabow PRA. It denied Tri-Mission access to infrequently used Elbe River crossing sites used primarily by the East German Army and limited observation of commonly used maneuver routes between garrisons in the Dessau PRA and training areas in the Altengrabow PRA.

34. TRA 050-83 and 051-83 were both in effect during an announced GSFG exercise. The geographic location suggests possible east-west exercise play. TRA 050-83 was in effect during the period 20-28 Jul 83, while TRA 051-83 was in effect during the period 21 Jul-05 Aug 83.

35. TRA 052-83 through 057-83 were imposed in conjunction with an announced GSFG exercise, and consisted of the following:

a. TRA 052-83 was in effect during the period 22 Jul-10 Aug 83 and connected the Altengrabow, Dessau and Jueterbog PRA.

b. TRA 053-83 through 055-83 connected the Templin, Wittstock and Letzlinger Heide PRA, encompassing traditional maneuver routes of the 2 GTA. TRA 055-83 covered the Elbe River crossing sites. These TRA were in effect during the following periods:

052-83	22 Jul-10 Aug 83
053-83	23 Jul-05 Aug 83
054-83	23 Jul-05 Aug 83
055-83	23 Jul-10 Aug 83

c. TRA 056-83 was in effect during the period 23 Jul-05 Aug 83 and connected the Rathenow, Letzlinger Heide, and Altengrabow PRA.

d. TRA 057-83 was in effect during the period 23-30 Jul 83 and expanded the restricted area between the Weimar and Dessau PRA. This area was probably used by the 27 CMRD.

36. TRA 058-83 was in effect during the period 27 Jul-12 Aug 83. It connected the Perleberg and Wittstock PRA and overlapped with TRA 053-83 (see Para 34b above). This TRA covered an area traditionally used by the 2 GTA for movement to the northern Elbe River crossing sites.

37. TRA 059-83 and 060-83 were in effect during the period 12-21 Aug 83, and consisted of the following:

a. TRA 059-83 covered an area associated with Soviet flight patterns. DR-3 drone activity was observed just prior to the announced time.

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b. TRA 060-83 connected the Dessau and Altengrabow PRA.

38. TRA 061-83 was in effect during the period 13-20 Aug 83, and denied access to the area between the Wittstock and Templin PRA. This area contains several Potential Troop Concentration Areas and transit routes used by 2 GTA elements.

39. TRA 062-83 was in effect during the period 13-21 Aug 83 and connected the Altengrabow, Lehnin and Dessau PRA.

40. TRA 063-83 was in effect during the period 14-20 Aug 83 and denied Mission access to the northern Elbe River crossing sites. This area was covered prior to that by TRA 055-83 during the period 23 Jul to 10 Aug 83 (see Para 34b above).

41. TRA 064-83 was in effect during the period 14-21 Aug 83 and connected the Jueterbog and Finsterwalde PRA. It denied access to transit routes in that area.

42. TRA 065-83, 066-83 and 067-83 joined together the Jueterbog, Lehnin, Altengrabow, Schafstadt, Weimar, Dessau, Cothstedt and Quedlinburg PRA and could have covered movement by elements of the 3 SA, the 8 GA and the 20th GA. The timing of these TRA coincided with the possible end of training cycle FTX, as USMLM had received notice of a river closure on the northern Elbe River in the vicinity of Kehnert on 04 September 1983. TRA 065-83, 066-83 and 067-83 were in effect during the following time periods:

a. TRA 065-83 was in effect during the period 03-10 Sep 83,

b. TRA 066-83 was in effect during the period 03-13 Sep 83,

c. TRA 067-83 was in effect during the period 05-12 Sep 83,

43. TRA 068-83 was in effect during the period 05-12 Nov 83. It covered an area associated with Soviet flight patterns from Neubrandenburg Airfield and connected the Eastern Border PRA with the Neubrandenburg PRA. The area did not include regularly used maneuver areas; however, elements of the 9 TD/MD V are located in the adjacent Border PRA.

44. TRA 069-83 was in effect during the period 06-13 Nov 83. It denied Mission access to Prenzlau installations/training areas associated with elements of the Soviet 25 TD and elements of the East German MD V and to an East German SAM Support Facility. It also included the rail-line from the Szczecin port (Poland) to the Angermunde-Border PRA.

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45. TRA 070-83 and C71-83 were in effect during the period 09-15 Nov 83, and consisted of the following:

a. TRA 070-83 denied access to Wittenberg installations associated with elements of the 7 GTD/3 SA. The boundaries of this TRA suggest an attempt to preclude visits to Wittenberg coincident with the visit of dignitaries to Martin Luther centenary celebrations in the city.

b. TRA 071-83 denied Allied access to Hassleben Airfield, Kranichborn Radar Site and Alperstaedt SA-4 Site, suggesting a possible air defense exercise.

46. TRA 072-83 and 073-83 were in effect during the period 16-20 Nov 83, and consisted of the following:

a. TRA 072-83 denied access to training areas used by elements of the 21st MRD north of Perleberg.

b. TRA 073-83 denied access to training areas and railroad sidings used by elements of the 29 GMRR/10th GTD near Schoenebeck.

47. SUMMARY:

a. There were 180 days when at least one TRA was in effect against Allied Missions in 1983.

b. TRA restrictions were in effect the entire month of March; October and December were the only two months in which no TRA were in effect. A recap of TRA days, by month, appears below:

January 1983	07 - 31
February 1983	01 - 19
March 1983	01 - 31
April 1983	01 - 02, 08-18
May 1983	27 - 31
June 1983	01 - 15
July 1983	08 - 31

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August 1983	01 - 21
September 1983	03 - 31
October 1983	NONE IMPOSED
November 1983	05 - 20
December 1983	NONE IMPOSED

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D. (C) DETENTIONS AND INCIDENTS (All elements classified CONFIDENTIAL unless otherwise indicated)

1. General. In carrying out USMLM's two missions in the GDR, accredited personnel repeatedly come into contact with Soviet and East German military personnel and the civilian population. The nature of certain of these contacts is such that reporting to higher headquarters and mention in the Unit History is appropriate. These contacts are divided into two categories:

A. Detention. Tour's freedom of movement is physically restricted. Accreditation documents are surrendered with or without the preparation by the Soviets of an official protocol (Akt). Circumstances surrounding a detention may be such that it is also reported as an incident.

B. Incident.

1) Serious Incident. A relatively grave occurrence whose resolution may require action at a higher level than Chief USMLM/Chief SERB. Action taken frequently includes an exchange of letters at Chief of Staff or higher level.

2. Minor Incident. Occurrence whose resolution can be accomplished at the Chief of Mission/Chief SERB level or which requires no additional action.

2. Detentions. Twelve USMLM tours were detained in 1983:

A. Emleben (PB1939), 2C0732Z Jan 83. A USMLM tour, while checking tactical trails and the rail siding, encountered four BMP M-1981 which immediately gave chase. The tour officer elected to accept the detention rather than risk injury. While the Soviet tactical vehicles were completing the detention, one BMP ran into the tour vehicle, causing approximately \$1000 damage. Tour personnel were of the impression that the collision was the result of ineptitude rather than malice; road surfaces were icy and slippery. The Gntha Kommandant arrived on the scene at 0930Z, followed shortly thereafter by four probable MfS agents with cameras. The tour was released at the scene after the tour officer's refusal to sign an Akt alleging violation of a restricted area and photographing military equipment. Tour personnel were permitted to call Potsdam for a recovery vehicle. The atmosphere was cordial; the commander of the regiment to which the BMP belonged waited with the tour till the arrival of the recovery vehicle. He also had a hot meal brought to tour personnel. Duration of detention: 3 hours, 28 minutes.

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B. Werder (UU5807), 03 Jun 83. Tour blocked by Soviet troops while transiting past Installation 261. Duration: 2 hours 30 minutes.

C. Kraatz (LU7871), 051800Z Jul 83. A USMLM tour was detained by Soviet troops subsequent to a breakdown of the tour vehicle. A USMLM recovery tour arrived on the scene (The tour officer had phoned for a recovery prior to arrival of Soviet troops on the scene) and was preparing to tow the disabled vehicle away when a Soviet in civilian clothing, who subsequently identified himself as the Fuerstenburg Kommandant, directed detention of both tours. Credentials were requested and returned once particulars were entered to the Akt. The Akt was presented for signature; upon the tour officers' refusal to sign, the tours were released at 1959Z hours, after a detention of 1 hour and 50 minutes. The atmosphere during the detention was described as cordial.

D. Vicinity Zeissholz (VS2391), 050720Z Aug 83. A tour was detained by Soviet personnel as the result of a trap laid along a tactical trail on the northern fringe of the Koenigsbrueck Army Maneuver Area. The tour was released at the Dresden Kommandatura after a detention of 4 hours 45 minutes. Atmosphere was described as professional and correct.

E. Berlinchen (UV3900), 080920Z Sep 83. A tour was detained by Soviet personnel while observing an aircraft landing program at Wittstock Soviet Airfield. The tour officer was outside the vehicle when a group of Soviet soldiers rushed him before he was able to reenter the car. The detaining party confiscated a camera and film. A German forestry official indicated that he had advised the Soviets of the tour's presence in the area and guided the detaining party to the scene. After a five hour detention the tour was escorted to the Wittstock Autobahn and released there. This detention plus two others were the subject of a GSFG Chief of Staff protest letter.

F. Nedlitz (UT1073), 201237Z Sep 83. East German troops ambushed a tour which included CUSMLM on a secondary road vicinity Nedlitz, using a W-501A/A and a farm tractor and trailer to block the road. Approximately 10 East German soldiers, many of whom photographed the tour vehicle, were involved in the detention. Beginning at 1320Z hours, a number of Soviet officers, including the Altengrabow Kommandant, arrived at the scene of the detention. Relations with the Soviets were correct and cordial. The Soviet officers expressed their displeasure with the enthusiastic photographic activity of the East German military, but admitted their inability to do anything about it. After the tour officer refused to sign an Akt, the tour was released at 1555Z hours.

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G. Nedlitz (UT1073), 211143Z Sep 83. East German troops carried out a virtual repeat performance of the ambush and detention of 20 September reported in paragraph F above: Two East German military vehicles blocked the tour vehicle front and rear. The performance of the detaining troops was characterized as better than on the previous day. The Dessau Kommandant arrived on the scene, prepared an Akt, and was able, in response to tour protests, to bring to a halt the East Germans' picture taking. The tour was released after a two hour ten minute detention. Note: This tour had departed for the GDR prior to the return of the tour which had been detained on 20 September.

H. Frankenberg (US6341), 060655Z Oct 83. East German military detained a tour as it was passing the front gate of Frankenberg Installation 061. Two vehicles exited the gate and blocked the tour vehicle front and rear. Soviet Kommandatura personnel arrived at the scene at 1240Z hours. After the tour officer refused to sign the Akt, Soviet personnel escorted the tour to Autobahn E63 and released the tour at 1255Z hours. The Soviet Major who was in charge apologized for the length of the detention (six hours); he indicated that the East Germans had not notified the Kommandatura until 1030Z hours.

I. Reuden (UT1673), 161155Z Dec 83. A Ural-375 in a Soviet column swerved across the road and struck a USMLM tour vehicle proceeding in the opposite direction on Route 246. Both vehicles were disabled. Kommandants from Dessau and Altengrabow arrived on the scene at 1530Z hours; the Dessau Kommandant took charge of the detention, to include preparation of the Akt.

J. Allstedt (PB7697), 220955Z DEC 83. A USMLM tour became bogged down in muddy terrain enroute to an OP. While in process of winching out, tour was observed by two probable MfS agents. Tour attempted to leave area, encountered a Soviet vehicle blocking the hard surface road, and again became mired down while taking evasive action. Approximately 20 Soviet troops, accompanied by two GAZ-66, effected detention. A Soviet officer, rank unknown, demanded tour credentials; tour officer refused to surrender documents because the Soviet officer failed to show his credentials (Instructions for tour personnel are to surrender credentials only to Kommandatura personnel). Soviet troops covered tour vehicle windows with a coat and camouflage net to prevent observation of an ongoing flying program. At 1330Z hours the probable Halle Kommandant arrived, presented his credentials, and took the tour documents. An Akt was prepared accusing tour of being in restricted area, behind MRS, and observing military activity. After the tour officer declined to sign the Akt, Soviet personnel assisted in freeing the tour vehicle from the mud and escorted the tour to Lodersleben (PB7697), where release was effected at 1845Z hours.

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K. Wuestermärke (VT0341), 220900Z Dec 83. A USMLM tour positioned itself in Wuestermärke to observe Soviet movement between the Jueterbog and Lieberose PRAs. The lead vehicle of a Soviet column spotted the tour car and immediately gave chase. The tour officer opted to accept the detention rather than become involved in a high speed chase through a built-up area. After a delay of approximately seven hours, a representative of the Cottbus Kommandatura, an Airborne Captain, arrived on the scene, prepared an Akt, which the tour officer refused to sign, and released the tour on the spot at 1650Z hours. Note: While the tour was held for almost eight hours, release occurred within less than an hour after the arrival of the Kommandatura representative.

L. Potsdam (UU6907), 30 Dec 83. A Soviet Major and three Warrant Officers effected a detention of a USMLM tour enroute to the official Potsdam residence. The detention occurred in the vicinity of a roadside parking area adjacent to Potsdam Installation 289 regularly used as a GSFG vehicle checkpoint. The Potsdam Kommandant arrived and accused the tour of being in the middle of a Soviet column. The tour officer denied this and pointed out that the tour was proceeding to the official Mission residence along the most direct route from the Glienecke Bridge and that there had been no column activity. The tour was released at 1105Z hours and proceeded to the House. In the next two hours two USMLM vehicles transited the same area without incident, despite the presence of the same Soviet personnel.

2. Incidents. In addition to the ramming associated with the 20 Jan 83 detention at Emleben and the physical restraint of a tour office during the 08 Sep 83 Berlinchen detention, the following reportable events occurred:

A. 02 Feb 83, vicinity Belzig (UT3560). A USMLM tour was involved in a one-car, weather related accident. The tour vehicle was travelling north along Rte 246, struck a patch of ice, skidded off the road embankment and rolled. Soviet personnel called to the scene by East German police transported the tour officer to a phone to call for a recovery. Both VOPOs and Soviet personnel were helpful and friendly.

B. 141210Z Feb 83, Burgstaedt (US4643). A USMLM tour was struck by an East German vehicle as a result of slippery road conditions. Damage to the tour vehicle consisted of a dented left door. Damage to the civilian vehicle included a bent bumper, fender, and hood and broken left headlight. VOPOs and Kommandatura personnel conducted a routine traffic investigation. Passes were not taken and tour was invited to have coffee at the Karl-Marx-Stadt Kommandatura (declined with thanks). Atmosphere throughout was characterized as correct and cordial.

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C. 280800Z FEB 83, Borenson (PB2942). A Soviet officer fired approximately six aimed pistol shots at a tour observing a signal deployment. No rounds struck the vehicle; a speedy departure was made. Incident was protested to SERB.

D. 231148Z Mar 83, vicinity Belzig (UT3579). A USMLM tour returning from Belzig on Rte 102 was behind a Soviet KAMAZ-5511 when traffic came to a halt. The Soviet truck's backup lights came on, and the vehicle traveled at a high speed in reverse, striking the tour vehicle, causing damages as follows: bent hood, crushed electric winch and front grill, bent left front bumper and right front fender, punctured radiator, and damage to assorted electrical components. The KAMAZ then continued on its way. The tour had been behind the KAMAZ for approximately three minutes prior to the incident, but had avoided any show of interest. The tour was towed by a stand-by crew to Potsdam where an immediate report was made to SERB. Return to Potsdam was delayed for approximately 30 minutes while a SERB/Kommandatura team inspected the damage sustained by the tour vehicle.

E. 280915Z May 83, vicinity Rietz. A Soviet officer fired a single, unaimed round from an AK-47 after a tour's presence in the area had been noted. At the time the round was fired, the tour had withdrawn to a point approximately 500 meters from the site and was completely concealed from view. Incident was protested.

F. 03 Jun 83, near Doebeln (US6865). In the course of an attempted detention by East German military, the tour vehicle made contact with an EGA UAZ-469. The tour vehicle was not damaged; the EGA vehicle sustained scratched paint. The tour evaded detention and crossed the Glienicke Bridge checkpoint without incident.

G. 22345Z Oct 83, vicinity Staudnitz (US3484). A USMLM tour was involved in an accident on the Dresden-Leipzig Autobahn. An East German TRABANT towing a trailer left the left lane without signaling, cut off the tour vehicle in the right lane, and immediately hit his brakes. The tour NCO braked immediately, but was unable to stop before hitting the trailer. Subsequently, the driver of the TRABANT told police that he did not see the tour vehicle and, becoming startled when he saw its lights, hit his brakes. Except for a nosebleed by a passenger in the TRABANT, no injuries were sustained. The tour vehicle sustained the following damage: broken radiator, bent front bumper, damaged hood. Personnel from the Grimma Kommandatura arrived on the scene, sent his interpreter to phone for a USMLM recovery team, offered assistance in any other way and departed. The tour was towed back to Berlin by a recovery team.

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E. (C) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT (IIR) PRODUCTION

USMLM IIR production figures for 1983 are listed below; 1982 figures for the same category follow in parentheses:

AIR DIVISION (1 215)

USMLM Originated:	102 (135)
Based on Allied Reports:	129 (111)
SANDDUNE Reports:	4 (9)
Total:	235 (255)

GROUND DIVISION (2 215)

USMLM Tour Reports:	365 (287)
SANDDUNE Reports:	201 (158)
Based on Allied Reports:	303 (392)
Total:	759 (748)

NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS (5 215):

Tour Reports:	21 (17)
SANDDUNE Reports:	5 (9)
Total:	26 (26)

TOTAL ALL IIR:	1022 (1029)
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PART III

LIAISON AND REPRESENTATION

A. (C) OFFICIAL VISITORS: Visits by members of the intelligence community and others with a professional interest in USMLM's collection activity promote an informative dialogue which assists USMLM in its efforts to maintain an effective and active collection program.

The following is a selected list of key personnel briefed by USMLM in Berlin during 1983:

Senator (NV) Hecht	Scty of Army
Senator (RI) Chaffey	European Scty & Disarm-
Senator (UT) Hatch	ament Conference
Congressman (VA) Wolf	Ambassador to the GDR
Mr Marsh	Undersecretary of the Air
Ambassador Kampelmann	Force
Ambassador Ridgway	Principal Dep Asst SecDef
Mr Aldrich	for International Scty
Mr Hoehn	Asst SecDef (MRAL)
Dr Korb	Asst SecDef for Inter-
Mr Perle	national Affairs
Dr Pillsbury	National Scty Advisor
General Hartinger	Cdr, AF Space Command
General Johnson	Ramstein AB
General Keith	DARCOM
General Kroesen	CINCUSAREUR
General Meyer	CofS USA
General Otis	CINCUSAREUR
General Wickham	VCofS Army
Lieutenant General Faur	Dir NSA
Lieutenant General Galvin	Cdr VII Corps
Lieutenant General Forrest	DCINCUSAREUR
Major General Anderson	Cdr 3 AD
Major General Breckner	CoS, USAFE
Major General Bruton	TJAC USAF
Major General Crowell	Cdr 3 ID
Major General Hunceker	DCSLOG USAREUR
Major General Nichols	USAFE/CS
Major General Renick	Cdr SETAF
Brigadier General Cook	Dep Dir Opns/EUCOM
Brigadier General Curtis	USAFE/LG
Brigadier General DeMoss	Cdr 21st Spt Cmd

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Brigadier General Forgan	Asst CofS, AFCEM
Brigadier General Goodson	USAFE/XP
Brigadier General Hamm	DATT Moscow
Brigadier General Hansen	USAFE
Brigadier General Hyde	USAFE/DCOM
Brigadier General Johnson	USAF/PRP
Brigadier General Lustig	USAFE/DENG
Brigadier General Lutz	Ft Bragg
Brigadier General Martin	Dep ACSI/USAF
Brigadier General McLean	Cdr 200th TAMMC
Brigadier General Perroots	USAFE/IN
Brigadier General Powell	Asst DCSOPS, USAF
Brigadier General Shufelt	OACSI, DA
Brigadier General Soyster	OACSI, DA
Brigadier General Stephenson	3 SRT
Brigadier General Urschler	ESC/EUR
Rear Admiral Elfelt	DirOps/USEUCOM
Rear Admiral Schmitt	Con Nav Rep
Dr Roach	Senate Armed Svcs Committee
Mr Brenitzer	DIA, DC-4A
Mr Place	General Consul, USAF HQ
Mr Cahar	Senate Armed Svcs Committee
Mr Hanna	FSB
Mr Hoegler	FTD
Mr Brown	NSA Liaison Berlin
Mr Wilkinson	DCM, AMEMB East Berlin
Mr Ponick	Senate Armed Svcs Committee

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B. (U) RELATIONS WITH GSFG/SERB (All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated):

Meetings with Soviet Authorities: In 1983, 13 USMLM/SERB meetings took place. A total of eight items of US-originated non-routine correspondence were passed to SERB. Three pieces of Soviet-originated non-routine correspondence were received by USMLM.

1. On 161330Z FEB 83, Chief USMLM met with CSERB at the latter's office in Potsdam to relay an invitation from General Kroesen to General Zaytsev. Text of the letter containing the invitation follows:

Dear Colonel Rubanov,

General Kroesen, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe, invites General Zaytsev, Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, to meet with him for lunch at USMLM Potsdam, Monday 21 February 1983, from 1230 to 1430 hours.

General Kroesen sees this as an opportunity to express his professional and personal respect to your Commander-in-Chief. General Kroesen would be accompanied by his personal aide and one other member of his staff. Additionally, I and my deputy would attend, together with one USMLM officer-interpreter.

I am inviting you and your deputy, as well as an interpreter, to participate, should General Zaytsev accept this invitation.

If General Zaytsev is unable to participate, General Kroesen may still ask to visit USMLM Potsdam on that date. In that event, I would appreciate the assistance of your staff in facilitating a request for guest passes on short notice.

Sincerely,

RANDALL A. GREENWALT
Colonel, GS
Chief of Mission

2. On 11 MAR 83, from 1200 to 1400 hours, Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB at the former's request. The meeting, at the USMLM Potsdam House, was a working luncheon whose primary reason was to introduce Colonel Lajoie, the Chief of Mission Designate. Discussions addressed the following:

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a. The shooting incident of 28 February. Colonel Rubanov indicated that, while the USMLM tour had not been in a prohibited area, it had approached a "most sensitive" field deployment, secured by armed guards. He asserted that a guard, rather than a Soviet officer, had fired his weapon and that, contrary to the assertion of the tour, no rounds had been fired in the direction of the tour; the guard had fired in the air. When Chief USMLM disputed this claim, Rubanov responded to the effect that, had the guard intended to fire at the tour, there would have been bullet holes in the tour vehicle. He added that, although the word had been passed that it would be better to "capture a tour like a fish in a net", tours approaching a similar sensitive deployment could expect a similar reception. When pressed to furnish specifics as to what constituted a sensitive area, he responded: "That's not important; you'll know when you're in one!"

b. CSERB raised the question of the 14 Feb accident involving a USMLM tour and an East German civilian. He indicated that damage to the East German vehicle approximated 5000 DME and that the USMLM tour had been at fault. Chief USMLM disputed both the amount and the question of fault.

c. Chief USMLM casually inquired as to the reason for GSFG's resumption of TRA Imposition after a two year moratorium. Rubanov replied to the effect that it was the direct result of the Allies' continued employment of TRAs with no attempt at reciprocity. He denied that the GSFG moratorium had in any way been related to the Polish situation and indicated, in response to a question as to the effect that a reduction/elimination of Allied TRA would have, that GSFG reviewed such matters annually and that action to be taken in the future was dependent on Soviet perception of the situation at a given time.

3. On 250700Z APR 83, a SERB representative delivered a letter from General Zaytsev to General Kroesen in response to General Kroesen's letter announcing his imminent departure. Text follows:

Dear General Kroesen,

I have received your letter of 11 April in which you informed me that you will be leaving the position of CINC, US Ground Forces in Europe and 7th Army.

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I agree with you that correspondence and personal contacts promoted business-like cooperation. Furthermore, I share in your certainty that relations of cooperation and mutual understanding between our commands will continue to develop in the future.

Please accept, General Krzesen, my sincere wishes of good health and the best of everything for you and your family.

M. ZAYTSEV
General Army
CINC, GSFG

4. During the afternoon of 06 MAY 83, Captain Trenin, a SERB staff officer, called the USMLM West Berlin HQS to relay HQ GSFG's concern about possible disturbance of a Soviet wreath laying ceremony at the Tiergarten War Memorial resulting from aircraft overflights in connection with the Tempelhof Open House. Soviet concerns were relayed to the appropriate authorities and arrangements were made to ensure that the ceremony was not disturbed.

5. On 21 MAY 83, Chief USMLM delivered General Otis' letter, addressed to General Zaytsev, announcing his appointment as CINCUSAREUR.

6. On 02 JUN 83, Chief USMLM met with Chief SERB to deliver a letter from him concerning cancellation of visas for visits to the Soviet Union by two USMLM members. The letter included an inquiry as to whether this reflected a new Soviet policy toward travel to the Soviet Union by members of USMLM and a request for SERB's assistance in preventing a recurrence. Colonel Rubanov assured the Chief of Mission that SERB was unaware of the refusal and would investigate and report back in the near future.

7. On 11 JUL 83 Chief USMLM made his introductory call on SERB. A friendly chat followed the presentation of the letter of appointment.

8. On 18 JUL 83, Chief USMLM delivered a non-paper protesting Soviet violations of FRG airspace.

9. On 22 JUL 83, Colonel Lajoie, the new Chief of Mission, made his initial office call on General Zaytsev. The meeting was characterized as quite formal but friendly. General Zaytsev's opening remarks stressed the senselessness of war - a conclusion which was most apparent to those senior commanders who had seen it through the vision blocks of a tank rather than from a safe spot in

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the rear. Zaytsev expressed his desire that CINCUSAREUR be advised of his belief that it was their shared duty to prevent the outbreak of war. In the course of a 55 minute conversation he discussed a variety of military subjects, demonstrating a professional soldier's knowledge of and interest in US military subjects and making comparisons of certain US and Russian equipment. He became visibly upset at the prospect of stationing of nuclear weapons on West German territory, "the territory of the former Nazi Germany, that country that unleashed the Second World War."

10. On 26 JUL 83, during an official BRIXMIS luncheon, Colonel Rubanov called Chief USMLM aside for a "small bit of official business." He reported that HQS GSFG had conducted an investigation of the alleged border overflights and had determined that they were completely without foundation. Off the record, he indicated that the individual who had claimed to the US headquarters that overflights had taken place clearly intended to complicate US-Soviet relationships.

11. On 08 AUG 83, CUSMLM met with CSERB in Potsdam at the latter's request. The agenda included:

A. A request to pass to USAREUR HQS a three-page summary of alleged violations committed by travellers to and from Berlin. No formal response was requested; the paper was to make US authorities aware of the magnitude of the problem.

B. Colonel Rubanov touched upon the detention of a USMLM tour on 05 August. He mentioned that Vehicle #21 had been seen too often over the previous three days in the vicinity of a training area and that the detention constituted the action necessary to bring this activity to a halt.

C. He asked whether SERB could receive requests for travel of the Command Diesel as a minimum at the same time as the responsible East German authorities.

12. On 12 SEP 83, CUSMLM and CSERB met at the SERB offices in Potsdam. Colonel Rubanov delivered a Chief of Staff to Chief of Staff protest letter concerning the detention on 08 SEP of a USMLM tour in which a camera with exposed film "containing data of an intelligence nature" was confiscated. During a post-delivery conversation, Rubanov complimented both the tour personnel and the troops who effected the detention for avoiding actions which could have resulted in a serious incident. When CUSMLM expressed his

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concern about efforts of detaining personnel to break into the tour vehicle, Rubanov stated that he had categorically prohibited Soviet troops from entering locked mission vehicles. In response to CUSMLM's query about the possible return of the camera, Rubanov grinned and asked in return: "When in the history of espionage, has an apprehended spy ever had his tools returned?"

13. On 13 OCT 83, CUSMLM delivered to COL Rubanov a non-letter protesting a 23 SEP 83 airspace violation by a Soviet helicopter. Rubanov accepted the letter with bored indifference, denied the charge, and promised to report the matter to GSFG.

14. On 16 DEC 83, CUSMLM passed a letter to Colonel Rubanov expressing CINCUSAREUR's interest in paying a call on CINCSFG early in 1984. Rubanov was noncommittal, commented that it was "a nice letter", and indicated that he would carry it back to Wuensdorf that afternoon. Rubanov then advised CUSMLM that an accidental collision occurred between a US and Soviet vehicle when a USMLM tour attempted to avoid detention. Subsequently CUSMLM learned that this was a deliberate ramming in the course of an attempted detention (On 06 JAN 84, USMLM received a reply to its 16 DEC letter indicating that although Zaytsev attached extreme importance to such contacts, his busy schedule prevented him from a meeting at this time).

15. On 20 DEC 83, CUSMLM delivered a letter of protest concerning the ramming which had been mentioned during the 16 December meeting. He supplied as well photos of the damaged tour vehicle. Rubanov was described as subdued; his reply lacked arrogance and was to the effect that such incidents are regrettable. He stated that, while Soviet units might have contingency plans for detaining mission tours, he was sure that deliberate rammings were not a part of such plans. Rubanov indicated that, although the letter was addressed to him personally, he would, because of the seriousness of the incident, pass it to the CINC.

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C. (U) SOCIAL EVENTS (All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated):

1. General

A. USMLM's program of representational and liaison social activities serves the following objectives:

(1) Enhancement of the spirit of Tri-Mission operational cooperation through the development of binding social associations among members of the US, British, and French Military Liaison Missions, to include counterpart personnel of all ranks.

(2) Establishment of an atmosphere of professional respect and social amenity between USMLM liaison personnel and their Soviet counterparts in order to facilitate conditions that serve USMLM's operational and liaison interests.

(3) (C) Provides an opportunity for senior US and Soviet military officers to meet with Soviet officers in a social atmosphere, permitting them to gain a deeper perception of the personal and professional traits of the Soviet military establishment.

(4) (C) Exercise of official rights of access to the official USMLM residence in Potsdam in accordance with established patterns that demonstrate US intentions to make advantageous use of opportunities afforded by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

B. Throughout 1983, US representational contact with senior Soviet military personnel remained at a reduced level in consonance with US policy regarding continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan. This policy was evidenced by a reduced senior officer presence at USMLM's Torgau commemoration and by drastically curtailed USMLM participation at Soviet-sponsored social events, specifically the Soviet Army/Navy Day Reception at Potsdam.

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2. US-Sponsored Social Events

A. On 21 FEB 83, CINCUSAREUR, General Kroesen, as a part of his farewell visit to Berlin, met with General Zaytsev, CINCGSFG, at the USMLM Potsdam House, for a business luncheon. General Kroesen bade farewell to his Soviet counterpart and expressed the hope that cooperation and mutual understanding would characterize relations of their headquarters with the Military Liaison Missions. Zaytsev in turn expressed gratitude for the support furnished SMLM-F, underscored the importance of honoring the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, and indicated interest in meeting the new CINCUSAREUR in the near future. Other guests included Major General Piyal'zev, Chief of SMLM-F, and Colonel Rubanov, Chief SERB.

B. USMLM/Torgau Anniversary Commemoration; The annual Torgau Reception, commemorating the first meeting of US and Soviet troops at the Elbe River in April 1945, was hosted by USMLM at the Potsdam House on 23 April 1983. Senior US representative was Brigadier General David R. Palmer, Assistant Division Commander, 8th Infantry Division. Major General Serov, Headquarters, GSFG, was the senior Soviet officer in attendance. Other senior guests included Brigadier Learmont, Chief BRIXMIS, and Colonel Czernij, Chief FMLM. Soviet participation consisted of a contingent of 15 officers, including Colonel Rubanov, Chief SERB. In all 53 US, Allied, and Soviet officers were present to once again acknowledge this historic event in a low-keyed, non-contentious atmosphere, which focused on soldierly rapport and on Allied military achievements during World War II.



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C. Lunch with Chief SERB: On 26 April, BG Greenwalt, Chief USMLM hosted a lunch at the Wannsee Residence for Colonel Rubanov, Chief BRIXMIS, and Chief FMLM; this luncheon served as a final opportunity to host his "closest professional associates" prior to his departure to take up new duties.

D. Independence Day Celebration: On 2 July USMLM hosted the annual Independence Day picnic at Potsdam House. The largest USMLM-sponsored representational event for 1983, this activity once again brought several hundred US, British, French, and Soviet guests together to enjoy a traditional American Fourth of July celebration. This year the senior US representative present was BG Leroy Suddath, Cdr Berlin Brigade. Brigadier Learmont and Colonel Huet, Chiefs BRIXMIS and FMLM respectively, led representatives of their organizations. Soviet Major General Serov, DCSI, GSFG, was the senior Soviet officer in attendance. Soviet attendance was down somewhat from previous years; Colonel Rubanov assured USMLM representatives that this was not a political signal, but was due to conflicting leave schedules.



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E. Thanksgiving Dinner: On 19 November between 1400 and 1730 hours, USMLM hosted its annual Thanksgiving Day Celebration at Potsdam. Senior US guests included Major General and Mrs Ayers, Chief of Staff USAREUR, Major General and Mrs Hatch, USAREUR Engineer, and Brigadier General and Mrs Perroots, DCS/INT, USAFE. Senior Soviet officer present was COL Rubanov, Chief SERB, who headed an exclusively SERB contingent of eight officer and three wives. Other Allied and foreign guests included Brigadier and Mrs Learmont, Chief BRIXMIS, Colonel Czernij, Chief FMLM, and Colonel and Mrs Blasko, Chief Czech Military Mission, Berlin. The Chief of Staff GSFG and two other Soviet general officers had been invited, but had declined without reason; when queried as to their non-appearance, Rubanov avoided providing an answer. Behavior of the Soviet group was described as friendly and upbeat.

F. Christmas Party for the Potsdam House East German Employees: This traditional event took place on 16 December and afforded USMLM the opportunity to once again express its appreciation to the staff at Potsdam House for its contribution throughout the year. Gifts and a buffet prepared by USMLM members were provided to East German employees to mark the season.

G. US-Soviet Gift Exchange: On 28 December, Colonel Rubanov and nine other SERB officers, with wives accompanying, visited USMLM Potsdam House to accept seasonal gifts to GSFG and SERB officers on behalf of CINCUSAREUR. Accredited USMLM officers and their wives were also present. Children of both US and Soviet participants enlivened this event with their presence.

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3. Soviet-Sponsored Social Events:

A. Soviet Army/Navy Day Celebration: On 21 February 1983, GSFG hosted a reception in Potsdam to commemorate Soviet Army/Navy Day. USMLM and BRIXMIS were each represented by their respective Chiefs and one additional officer. Senior Soviet officer present was GEN Sviridov, COS, GSFG. He was accompanied by a contingent of approximately 12 Soviet General Officers. Approximately 30 other Soviet officers were present, including officers from SERB and the local Potsdam Kommandatura. As in the previous year, USMLM attendance at this function was restricted, in consonance with US political directives. Atmosphere was somewhat strained due to reduced Allied participation at a function at which they are virtually the only foreign guests.

B. Soviet/Allied Military Mission Gift Exchange: Colonel Rubanov invited the three Allied Chiefs of Mission, each accompanied by four accredited Liaison Officers, to a Soviet Seasonal Gift Exchange at SERB, Potsdam, on 30 December. A traditional Russian buffet contributed to making this a most congenial event.

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PART IV LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (NOTE: All paragraphs and subparagraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise indicated)

A. GENERAL

1. During 1983 many small projects were completed throughout the West Berlin compound in conjunction with the 1982 renovation project. Significant construction in the compound included paving of the parking lot, installation of a substantial number of drainage cisterns to preclude the recurrence of the August 1982 flood, and augmentation of the air conditioning system for the new annex. Additionally, a new guard house was installed on the compound.

2. The Soviets have the responsibility to provide the majority of USMLM logistic support at the Potsdam facility and did so as follows:

a. Coal for heating the main building's 37 rooms amounted to seven tons per month during the heating season. Electricity is provided for lighting and appliances. Natural gas is provided for stoves and hot water heaters.

b. Gas coupons for US liaison personnel travelling in East Germany were issued in the amount of 2500 liters of VK 94 each month.

c. Rations were delivered twice each week and covered basic items; the quantity of rations is estimated to be 1100 meals per month.

d. There is weekly trash pick-up.

e. There is an East German and West German telephone installed, with extensions on all four floors of the house (The East Germans provide service to both lines.). New phones were installed, giving us an intercom ability.

f. There is one East German guard at the main entrance to the compound (24-hour post). There is a staff of ten East Germans who provide cooking, janitorial, and maid services.

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3. DEH, US Army Berlin, and volunteers also provided extensive support with equipment and services not available from the Soviets:

- a. Furniture was repaired and replaced.
- b. Paint, floor tiles, and electrical supplies were supplied as needed.
- c. A new microwave oven and a large industrial oven were installed in the kitchen.
- d. New carpeting was provided for high traffic areas.
- e. A complete rewiring program continued with supplies furnished by DEH and volunteer workers from FESA (Heidelberg). The project will ultimately include renovation of all wiring and lights of the residence itself and installation of an automatically controlled external lighting system throughout the compound.

B. (C) VEHICLES

1. Vehicle Status

a. As of 31 DEC 83:

1) Fleet Composition

Two 1978 Opel Senators
Two 1979 Mercedes 350 SE Sedans
Two 1980 Mercedes 350 SL Sedans
One 1982 Mercedes 280 SE Sedan
Three 1980 Mercedes 280 GE Station Wagons
(4-wheel drive)
Seven 1981 Mercedes 280 GE Station Wagons
(4-wheel drive)
Three 1983 Mercedes 280 GE Station Wagons
(4-wheel drive)
One 1980 Ford Transit Van
One 1983 Ford 2 Ton Panel Truck
One 1983 Volkswagen Kombi 1.9 Passenger Van

Total number of vehicles: 23

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b. Two new 1984 Mercedes 280 GE station wagons, three Mercedes 280 SE sedans, and one Volkswagen Kombi L were placed on order in late 1983 for delivery in mid-1984.

2. Accreditations: USMM currently is assigned ten vehicle accreditations, of which five are allocated to sedans and five to 280 GE vehicles.

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C. (C) PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY PRODUCTION STATISTICS (NOTE: All elements of this section classified CONFIDENTIAL):

<u>ROLLS OF FILM PROCESSED (35mm)</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1982</u>
Black and White (Original)	2091	3357
Color (Original and Dupe)	1345	897
Duplicate Black and White	233	198
<u>PRINT PRODUCTION</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1982</u>
Proofs	51,740	100,087
Intelligence Report Prints	110,729	158,390
Total Prints	162,469	258,477

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ANNEX A

HUEBNER - MALININ AGREEMENT

A G R E E M E N T

MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadri-partite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."

5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

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7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of the Soviet or United States Mission wants to visit the United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24 - 72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and the headquarters of their respective Commander-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communications through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they will also be given facilities such as mail, telephone, and telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of breakdown in the radio installation the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communications.

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12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies, and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition, the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full rights of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the missions will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in the Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by the Deputy Commanders of the United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

/s/ C. R. Huebner
/t/ Lieutenant General HUEBNER

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
European Command

/s/ Malinin
/t/ Colonel-General MALININ

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
Chief of Staff of the Group
of Soviet Occupational
Forces in Germany

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ANNEX B

TOURING STATISTICS

A. (C) TOURS AND TOUR DAYS, 1983:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOURS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOUR DAYS</u>
January	46	89
February	43	82
March	43	93
April	36	78
May	43	90
June	42	90
July	48	102
August	42	90
September	44	90
October	48	92
November	37	82
December	41	82
TOTALS	513	1060

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B. DISTANCE TOTAL, 1983: 649,197 km

C. COMPARISON, 1982 AND 1983:

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>PERCENT CHANGE</u>
TOURS	586	513	-12
TOUR DAYS	1009	1060	+05
DISTANCE	640,952 KM	649,197 KM	+01

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ANNEX C. (U) USMLM Personnel Roster, 1983

PRESENT FOR DUTY 31 DEC 83

COL	LAJOIE, ROLAND	USA
LTC	GOVAN, GREGORY G.	USA
LtCol	WURZBURGER, NILS L.	USAF
MAJ	BOHN, CHARLES J. III	USAF
MAJ	BOLES, JOHN K. III.	USA
MAJ	CONNOLLY, MICHAEL P.	USA
MAJ	ESCHRICH, JOHN E.	USA
MAJ	EVANS, CLYDE L.	USA
MAJ(P)	KELLEY, LAWRENCE G.	USMC
MAJ	MILTON, THEODORE R. JR.	USA
MAJ	NELSON, PAUL H.	USA
MAJ	NICHOLSON, ARTHUR D. JR.	USA
MAJ(P)	PETERS, MICHAEL P.	USA
MAJ	WISE, ROBERT W.	USA
MAJ	WYCKOFF, THOMAS G.	USA
CAPT	CROXALL, GARY L.	USA
CAPT	GALLAGHER, EDWARD A.	USAF
SMSGT	FISHER, DAVID M.	USAF

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SFC	MINTZ, ROBERT J.	USA
MSGT	PATTERSON, RONALD P	USAF
SFC	SATORO, GREGEORY	USA
SFC	TIFFANY, HANS-JOACHIM H.	USA
SFC	YELL, CHARLES E. JR.	USA
TSGT	BENICKEN, JOHN A.	USAF
SSG	BENTON, JAMES F.	USA
SSG	BLAKE, RONALD H.	USA
TSGT	CHANDLEE, MICHAEL J.	USAF
TSGT	DEWEY, BRUCE L.	USAF
SSG	JOHNSTON, JON E. W.	USA
TSGT	MANNING, LANCE E.	USAF
SSG	MCDOWALL, JAMES H.	USA
SSG	McMULLEN, W. L.	USA
TSGT	MOSES, THELTON L.	USAF
SSG	OBERLE, LINDA M.	USA
SSG	POINDEXTER, MICHAEL D.	USA
SSG	TABARANI, LISA J	USA
SSGT	CUSHMAN, MARK T.	USAF
SGT(P)	DAVIS, EBYLEE	USA
SP5	DAVIS, STEVEN A.	USA
SGT(P)	DUPERROIR, RONALD A	USA

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SGT(P)	EAIRHEART, STEVE J.	USA
SGT(P)	JACOBS, HENRY T	USA
SP5	JOHNSON, CHARLES D.	USA
SSGT	KAYE, RICHARD	USAF
SGT	KENNEDY, DAVID J.	USA
SGT	KNIGHT, WILLIAM J	USA
SP5	RHOADES TIMOTHY E	USA
SGT	SANDOMIR, ALAN M.	USA
SSGT	SCHAFFNER JAMES W	USAF
SGT	SMITH, CHARLES E.	USA
SP5(P)	THOMPSON, ROBERT A.	USA
SP5	TYSON, DAVID K.	USA
SP4	CASSIDY, PATRICK S.	USA
SP4(P)	DIAL, LARRY D.	USA
SP4	LEINENWEVER, CHRIS	USA
SP4	WHEELER, KEITH G.	USA
PFC	ALLEY, WADE P.	USA
PFC	NIXON, TRACY J.	USA
PFC	PECHULIS, MICHAEL I.	USA
PFC	WIERNAN, LEONARD P. JR	USA

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MRS	BANKS, BENNIE B.	CIV
MS	CHAFFIN, LISBETH	CIV
MR	CORBETT, WILLIAM R.	CIV
MR.	CREEKMORE, MICHAEL C.	CIV
MS.	FUCHS, LINDA	CIV
MS	HADDAD, MARY D.	CIV
MR.	HANDY, MARK A.	CIV
MR.	HOYT, STEPHEN V.	CIV
MS.	SEMMETT, EDA SUZANNE	CIV

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ANNEX C (CONTINUED)

DEPARTURES 1983

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTURE DATE</u>	<u>BRANCH</u>
BG	GREENWALT, RANDALL A.	20 May 83	USA
MAJ	BETO, MARK D.	3 Jun 83	USA
MAJ	GREATHOUSE, JOHN M.	5 Mar 83	USA
MAJ	GENAILLE, RICHARD A. JR.	21 Jul 83	USAF
MAJ	TIHOMIROV, MICHAEL L.	15 Sep 83	USAF
SMSGT	GOTZMANN, GUNTER R.	31 Oct 83	USAF
MSGT	MULLEN, TIMOTHY C.	31 Jul 83	USAF
SSG	CARREATHERS, GEORGIA E.	21 Feb 83	USA
SSG	COBB, DANIEL H.	14 Jan 83	USA
SSG	COLEMAN, JERRY R.	31 Oct 83	USA
SSG	FRAMCKE, HERBERT JR.	9 Jul 83	USA
SSG	REDD, JOHN F.	12 May 83	USA
SP5	CLAY, CARLOS	27 Nov 83	USA
SP5	CRUZ-LOPEZ, LUIS F.	19 Feb 83	USA
SGT	LAMBERT, GREGORY I.	2 May 83	USA
SGT	MCNEILL, JOHN L.	3 Sep 83	USA
SP5	SMITH, GERALD JR.	23 Dec 83	USA
SSGT	TIFFANY, THOMAS J.	5 Aug 83	USAF
SSGT	TIFFANY, VIKKI M.	5 Aug 83	USAF
SP4	BEASLEY, BRYAN D.	29 May 83	USA
SP4	MORENO, DENNIS J.	18 Jul 83	USA
SGT	MULLEN, JERI	31 Jul 83	USAF
SP4	PRENDERGAST, RICHARD M.	16 Dec 83	USA

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ANNEX D

DEALINGS WITH SERB, STATISTICS

(C) A Unit History is often of use to the originating unit as an internal record of background information and precedent affecting current operations. This Annex has as its purpose the provision of just such an internal record of USMLM-SERB transactions for the period 1979-1983. Included are: total annual guest pass requests and total annual requests for accreditation changes for personnel and for vehicles.

A. GUEST PASS REQUESTS:

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
JANUARY	83	3	23	48	24
FEBRUARY	25	41	42	39	30
MARCH	60	53	58	82	34
APRIL	157	118	85	104	93
MAY	98	33	42	43	17
JUNE	519	500	106	314	345
JULY	50	56	362	50	36
AUGUST	35	68	72	40	62
SEPTEMBER	44	60	22	25	38
OCTOBER	56	29	39	37	51
NOVEMBER	88	126	72	93	140
DECEMBER	47	69	16	61	119
TOTAL	1262	1056	900	926	949

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B. PASS EXCHANGES

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
JANUARY	14	14	14	12	15
FEBRUARY	11	20	15	19	13
MARCH	13	16	11	13	19
APRIL	13	16	11	10	12
MAY	16	20	14	10	17
JUNE	10	8	16	12	21
JULY	13	16	20	13	16
AUGUST	14	17	17	20	25
SEPTEMBER	12	8	13	13	21
OCTOBER	13	11	10	14	20
NOVEMBER	15	12	15	17	21
DECEMBER	14	12	13	18	25
TOTAL	158	165	179	171	225

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C. VEHICLE EXCHANGES

	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>
JANUARY			1		
FEBRUARY	1		2	2	
MARCH					
APRIL	1				
MAY					
JUNE	1	1			1
JULY		2		1	
AUGUST	1				
SEPTEMBER		1			
OCTOBER	1	1	2		
NOVEMBER			2	1	
DECEMBER	2	1	1		
TOTAL	7	6	6	4	1

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ANNEX E. US WW II VETERAN BURIED AT TORGAU, EAST GERMANY

At State Department request, USMLM participated in the 26 November 1983 ceremonies associated with the burial of WWII veteran Joe Polowsky in Torgau, GDR. The burial itself, notwithstanding a large crowd and extensive media coverage, was simple and dignified. Subsequent activities at the monument featured a joint US-Soviet military wreath presentation followed by an informal and somewhat disjointed program of speeches and readings. The following message sent to USAREUR and other headquarters summarizes this curious event in the post-war relationship between the superpowers.

1. (C) BACKGROUND: On 23 November 1983, USMLM was requested by the State Department to contact the Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB) in Potsdam and attempt to arrange for US military participation and inquire about a possible joint US-Soviet gesture at the ceremonies related to the burial of WW II veteran Joe Polowsky. CUSMLM contacted SERB and requested an immediate meeting regarding this matter. Meanwhile, coordination with CG, Berlin Brigade, established that a full 15-man burial detail with firing detail and bugler from the Berlin Brigade Honor Guard could be made available for the occasion. Affected personnel were alerted and administrative measures for their documentation and travel were begun.

At the Potsdam meeting, COL Rubanov was informed that the US side desired to render appropriate honors to Polowsky in accordance with military custom and in keeping with the family's wishes. Rubanov was asked to arrange the necessary travel documentation for the Honor Guard. He was also asked what, if any, Soviet participation was anticipated and if there was interest in a joint ceremony. Rubanov had obviously discussed this matter with his HQ prior to the meeting for he immediately and without his usual equivocation stated firmly that this affair had absolutely nothing to do with GSFG and, therefore, had to be handled exclusively within diplomatic channels between the "sovereign" states of East Germany and the US. He further stated that it would be futile to request SERB travel passes for the Honor Guard since this entire matter was outside the competence of Soviet authorities. It would be an insult to the GDR, he insisted, if his CINC GEN Zaytsev were to, on his own initiative, permit non-Mission personnel to travel to Torgau. In closing, he added gratuitously that accredited USMLM members could, of course, on that day visit Torgau as they could any other open city in East Germany.

Upon return to West Berlin, it was decided in coordination with USCOB and USBER that US military representation would necessarily

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have to be scaled down to a small observer group composed exclusively of accredited USMLM personnel. On 25 November, USMLM was contacted by SERB and informed that an urgent meeting was requested. At the meeting, COL Rubanov, without reference to his pompous stonewalling two days prior, stated that the CINCSFG in response to USMLM's request and after "due deliberation and appropriate coordination with East German authorities" had decided to permit the transit of a US Honor Guard to Torgau. COL Rubanov also mentioned that Soviet military involvement would include participation by a retired General from the Soviet War Veterans Committee in Moscow, a wreath-laying by Soviet officers of the Torgau garrison, and attendance by the Soviet Consul General from Leipzig and two observers from SERB. CUSMLM replied that this Soviet reversal with only 17 hours before the first meeting at Torgau came too late to permit adequate planning for a full US Honor Guard and therefore only USMLM attendance would be possible. COL Rubanov seemed disappointed and encouraged CUSMLM to give additional consideration to GEN Zaytsev's generous decision.

Upon return to West Berlin and after coordination with USCOB and USBER, it was decided to proceed with plans for USMLM observers but also immediately to procure a suitable wreath for use the next morning and to identify two NCOs from the Brigade Honor Guard to serve as honorary pallbearers and wreath bearers.

2. (U) TORGAU CEREMONY:

A. (C) PREPARATIONS: The US delegation of five USMLM officers and two NCOs arrived in Torgau just in time for CUSMLM to attend an ad hoc planning conference being held at the Central Hotel. A crowd of East Germans was gathered outside the hotel out of curiosity at the number and mix of foreigners. Among those inside were Ted Polowsky, son of the deceased; a delegation from the US Veterans for Peace; a delegation from the Soviet War Veterans Committee; representatives from the American Embassy in East Berlin; Torgau municipal officials; and numerous TV and print correspondents. This meeting was used as much for propaganda as planning, with both veterans groups ballyhooing the US-Soviet wartime cooperation as a model for a future relationship between the super powers. Additional future cooperative ventures were proposed by both sides in the spirit of Torgau. CUSMLM was able to approach Ted Polowsky and arrange for the two members of the Honor Guard to participate in the graveside ceremony. It was also agreed, at US suggestion, that wreaths be laid simultaneously and not with the Soviets leading as initially proposed by GEN Gorlinsky of the Soviet War Veterans Committee.

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B. (U) CEMETERY: Approximately 150 people, mostly East German civilians, had assembled at the cemetery. Media presence was ubiquitous and occasionally obtrusive. The honorary pallbearers consisted of two Soviet and two American war veterans and the two Honor Guard NCOs. Rev William Sloane Coffin delivered a short and surprisingly apolitical eulogy stressing the long-term peace efforts of Joe Polowsky - "A simple soldier far ahead of his government in his quest for a peaceful relationship between the super powers." Sloane predicted that Polowsky's symbolic gesture of being buried near the site of the US-Soviet linkup in 1945 would have a positive effect on the bilateral climate. The US flag draping the coffin was then ceremoniously folded by the two Army NCOs and handed to CUSMLM who presented it to Ted Polowsky. CUSMLM expressed condolences on behalf of the officers and men of the US armed forces, along with assurances that his father's service in WW II and participation in an historic event would be long remembered and respected. A flower arrangement was then placed on the casket by the POL Counselor US Embassy Berlin and it was lowered into the ground. The brief service was dignified and in general dominated by positive American symbolism.

C. (C) AT THE MONUMENT: Most of the crowd then moved to the monument on the Elbe where a PA system and rudimentary crowd control measures had been set up. Here Rev Coffin, apparently by prior arrangement, again assumed the role of master of ceremonies, giving a brief speech and adding several comments in surprisingly good German and Russian. The pouring rain complicated an already loose organization. USMLM was able by some on the spot jockeying to arrange for the joint US-Soviet military wreath-laying to be followed by and separate from the civilian wreaths which included at least two of East German sponsorship. The Soviet wreath was accompanied by the Torgau Commandant and two lieutenants - the only active Army Soviet participation in the day's events. This was followed by numerous prepared and impromptu speeches as well as readings of literary passages and short remarks by the civilian and veterans representatives. American veterans gave most of the speeches but Gorlinsky's was by far the longest and most carefully prepared. None of the speeches made much impact since driving rain and poor amplification made comprehension extremely difficult. Gorlinsky's prepared remarks, in addition to the mandatory nostalgia about April 1945 and wartime comradery, contained standard Soviet boilerplate regarding US attempts at military superiority and responsibility for a destabilizing arms race - charges repeated by the Torgau buergermeister during his brief talk.

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3. (C) COMMENTS: Obviously this occasion was being used by various people for various reasons, not all of which had to do with honoring Joe Polowsky. The apparent early approval by East German (read Soviet) authorities given to the request for a Torgau burial was perhaps an appreciation of Polowsky's role as a persistent if minor figure in the peace movement (Polowsky visited Moscow in 1959 to present Khrushchev with a framed map that had been used by his patrol to reach the Elbe in April 1945). Although the Soviet veterans group played a prominent role in the events, other Soviet participation was low key and mostly limited to the wreath laying ceremonies. East German officials also kept a generally low profile. In fact, although the longest and most carefully crafted speech was Gorlinsky's, by far the largest number of speakers were Americans. The concern that this occasion would turn into a propaganda show was certainly justified, but this situation did not materialize. There were no banners, no posters, no demonstrators, and no unusually harsh or strident anti-American statements.

The proceedings were quite solemn considering the lack of planning and rehearsals. In retrospect, the level of American participation was probably just right: Not so extensive as to attach undue importance to an event of uncertain sponsorship, but clearly at a level to achieve appropriate decorum and convey necessary respect for the combat service of a WW II veteran.



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1-AIR UNIVERSITY, MAXWELL AFB AL 36112
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1-G-2 VII CORPS, APO 09757
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