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UNIT HISTORY(U)

UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES IN GERMANY

1988

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INTRODUCTION

[All paragraphs UNCLASSIFIED unless otherwise marked]

1988 was one of those years where, if you listened closely, you could hear the great door of history creak upon its hinges.

We thought and hoped changes were coming, and tried to prepare for the time when liaison would again be a regular part of our function as well as our name. The signs gathered, in Moscow and in Washington, where the changes had to occur. From one capital, Soviet newspapers and periodicals kept bringing fresh evidence that George Kennan was right; contained at last, or spent in fruitless expansion, the Soviet Union was undergoing accelerated change. In Washington, personnel departures and attitude shifts brought the hope that, when the other side quit fighting the Cold War, we might, too.

In Potsdam, the door creaked twice. On 14 June, the apology for MAJ Nicholson's death was announced, to an unprepared USAREUR and GSFG. The pregnant pause that followed made us wonder if anyone knew what to do after so much blind, accusatory confrontation. Then in quick order came the Akhromeyev-Crowe visit and their calendar of contacts, with a CINC-CINC visit in Europe first on the list. The Mission was back into liaison, cooperating, for a change, with our Soviet counterparts to make something happen, rather than attack or defend what already had transpired. The second creak was on 7 December, when Gorbachev stunned the UN - and a good part of HQ GSFG, apparently - with his announced withdrawals and reorganization. We searched for our role here, too, and found it as dutch uncle, elicitor, friend of the court, honest broker, if not as invited witness to the event.

The door that slammed shut in December 1979 with the invasion of Afghanistan, and then was double bolted with Nick's death in March 1985, was suddenly open again. We renewed broader contacts with the Soviets. After how many years of riding by his garrisons, we had the Potsdam Artillery Division commander as a guest for Thanksgiving dinner, and for good measure had the priest from the Russian Orthodox Church of St. Alexander Nevsky in Potsdam say grace with the Berlin Catholic chaplain. The Torgau Room in the house that had, since its redecoration, done little more than let U.S. guests have their pictures taken in front of crossed American and Soviet flags, now had the Chiefs of Staff of USAREUR and GSFG sitting down at the round marble top table. And liaison officers who only talked to Soviets during detentions were interpreting between U.S. and Soviet guests. Potsdam House, after its extensive restoration looking like a sleeping princess, suddenly was kissed and awoke. Liaison was alive, and it was exciting.

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(C) All the while, the other mission of the Mission went on. Our four collectors tell their story in this history. They did their job and did it well. The Director of Central Intelligence visited us and presented an outstanding collector's award for 1987. Early in 1989 we were told that we had earned the DCI's award again for 1988. It was a team effort. No one person, or division, made a spectacular diving catch in center field. The 1988 award was for smart targeting, gutsy collection, painstaking processing, and timely reporting - all backed up by dedicated, if unsung, support. So, while we had some star performances, 1988 was the Team year.

(C) And through the door of history, now ajar and moving, we may have seen our future. In expanded liaison, of course, the beginnings at the CINC visit and thanksgiving are already flourishing by mid-1989. But also in collection we had the opportunity to see the Mission's role in the future. Ground Division tells of watching for the SS-12 to go away and working in conjunction with a CDE challenge inspection. In neither case were we an arms control verification instrumentality. In both cases we contributed to the effectiveness of inspection regimes and increased confidence in the results of formal verification. We were on the periphery - literally and figuratively - keeping the Soviets honest. In this, we are more like a "national technical means", which both sides accept as a way to achieve transparency without necessarily working out live-in details. When conventional arms control comes to Europe, the Mission experience will probably be used to touch up verification mechanisms. In any case, until all the forces have gone away, headquarters will remain and they must talk with one another. And they must see one another without misperceptions. Thus, there will be a role for the Missions right up to the last handshake of the last commanders.

1988 was not without its flaws, but no one was hurt. Two liaison officers, with lapses of good judgment uncharacteristic of USMLM, caused incidents that not so much hurt us with the Soviets as fed an inaccurate image of the Mission among our own higher headquarters. And, despite acknowledged strong efforts in troop education by HQ GSFG, dangerous acts against the Allied Missions were not eliminated. All of which merely emphasizes that the risk is down, but still there. Our consumers assure us the gain is higher than ever. And the burden of calculating risk versus gain lies, as it always has, on the shoulders of our soldiers, airmen, and marine.

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To have been Chief of Mission with these men and all the men and women of USMLM in a year of achievement and fundamental change was privilege, pleasure, and a most kind gift of Providence.

Gregory G. Govan

GREGORY G. GOVAN
COLONEL, GS
CHIEF OF MISSION

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UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION
UNIT HISTORY
1988

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PART I GENERAL

A. (C) MISSION.

1. (U) The primary mission of USMLM is to carry out responsibilities for liaison between CINCUSAREUR, on behalf of USCINCEUR, and CINCGSFG and to serve as a point of contact for other US departments and agencies with CINCGSFG, in accordance with provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

2. (C) The secondary and confidential mission of USMLM is to exploit its liaison status and attendant access for collection of intelligence information in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

B. (C) REFERENCES

1. TDA EIWLAUAA
2. USEUCOM DIRECTIVE 40-18, 30 Mar 78
3. USAREUR REGULATION 383-27
4. USAFE Regulation 23-11, 05 Feb 79
5. USMC Table of Organization 5503, 17 Dec 76

C. (U) AUTHORIZATION. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement (Annex A), signed in April 1947, authorized the exchange of Military Liaison Missions between the Soviet and US Military Headquarters in Germany and laid down general guidelines for their activities and for the support to be rendered by the headquarters to which they were accredited. The agreement provided for 14 accredited personnel, with complete freedom to travel, except in areas of military dispositions. The 14 accredited personnel "will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations."

D. (C) STATISTICS.

1. (C) Intelligence Information Collection. In carrying out its second and classified mission, USMLM dispatched 462 reconnaissance tours into the GDR for a total of approximately 440,000 kilometers. The Mission produced 727 Intelligence Information Reports based on information acquired during these tours.

2. (U) Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs). In 1988 HQ GSFG levied 55 TRAs.

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3. (U) Detentions and Incidents. USMLM tours were detained five times in 1988, the same number as in 1987. There were three incidents in 1988, as compared to two in 1987, but no injuries or significant damage.

4. (U) Liaison and Representation. CUSMLM or his representative met with HQ GSFG representatives a total of 54 times to discuss a variety of topics. Eighteen of these meetings were devoted in whole or in part to arrangements for the visit of CINC USAREUR to HQ GSFG. USMLM typically deals with the External Relations Branch of HQ GSFG. This is known as SERB or, more properly, by its Russian initials, OVS (Otdel Vneshnikh Snoshenij); the two terms are used interchangeably in this history.

E. (C) ORGANIZATION.

USMLM, with its support base in West Berlin, is able to employ all 14 accreditations (passes) for operational and liaison purposes in East Germany.

1. Pass Utilization. The 14 accreditations provided for by the Huebner-Malinin Agreement are normally held as follows:

CUSMLM	1
NCOIC, Potsdam House	1
Reconnaissance Teams (one officer, one NCO)	
Ground	4
Air	2

2. Army Element. The TDA in effect on 31 Dec 88 authorizes 11 officers, 29 enlisted personnel, and six Department of the Army civilians. There are four, locally-hired augmentees (all US citizens).

3. Air Element. The Air Element is composed of five officers and 14 enlisted personnel, organized as the 7452 Special Activities Squadron.

4. Naval Element. The USMLM naval element consists of one USMC officer.

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PART II. COLLECTION

A. (C) GROUND DIVISION COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.

1. (C) General: Ground Operations Division is a 25-person, overt HUMINT team engaged in sensitive collection, analysis and reporting of military intelligence on Soviet and East German ground forces in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Personnel include a Division Chief, six Reconnaissance (Liaison) Officers, Operations Officer, Production Officer, Operations NCO, Operations Clerk, six Reconnaissance (Liaison) NCOs, and eight Intelligence Analysts/Production Specialists. Ground Division fields six to eight two-man reconnaissance teams in the GDR per week, with each mission lasting normally 36-48 hours. Reconnaissance methodology is based on a serious and continual assessment of "Risk Versus Gain" and employs direct observation, video and still photography (both day and night), and Technical Operations.

2. (C) Reporting Highlights:

a. (C) Routine Products:

(1) (C) Situation Report: A Daily SITREP based on Tri-Mission (USMLM, FMLM, BRXMIS) sightings of military activity in the GDR.

(2) (C) Equipment Imports: A monthly Intelligence Information Report (IIR) summarizing Tri-Mission sightings of importation of new or refurbished military equipment into the GDR.

(3) (C) Side Number Study: A semi-annual IIR, based on Tri-Mission observations, compiling all known tactical vehicle side numbers in GSFG, including unit and installation associations, field post numbers, and vehicle types.

(4) (C) VRN Study: A semi-annual IIR, based on Tri-Mission sightings, detailing the vehicle registration numbers (VRN) of GSFG vehicles, including unit associations.

(5) (C) TAC Markings Guide: A semi-annual IIR providing a detailed listing of tactical markings used on GSFG and East German military vehicles, including unit associations and graphic portrayals of markings.

(6) (C) Soviet Troop Rotation: A semi-annual IIR, based on Tri-Mission observations, of spring and fall troop rotations.

(7) (C) Exercise Summaries, such as the combined Soviet-East German exercise on 23-30 July, which was announced under the provisions of the Stockholm Agreement (Conference on Disarmament in Europe, or CDE).

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(8) (C) Several hundred IIR annually concerning technical features of Soviet and East German military equipment, order-of-battle and TOE holdings (including restructuring units), unit movements to and from field training exercises and range areas, and other training activities, such as live fire, river crossings, para-drops and driver training.

(9) (C) Periodic military equipment nomenclature listings and equipment identification guides.


b. (C) Significant Observations Requiring Special Mention:

(1) (S) Arms Control Developments:

(a) (C) SS-12 Withdrawal: After the signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987, the Soviet Government announced that, as an act of good faith, all SS-12 missiles would be withdrawn from the GDR ahead of schedule. Capitalizing on Mission access to the GDR, USMIM organized a series of road and rail watches in an effort to provide coverage of the event independent of that provided by the Soviet and East German news media. Results included the 25 February confirmation of 27 departing SS-12 TEL and the first ground-level photography of SS-12 associated support vehicles, such as the C² vehicle, generator vehicle, and SS-12 associated crane.

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(U) Tarped SS-12 TEL




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(U) SS-12 Command & Control Vehicle


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(U) SS-12 Associated Crane



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(U) SS-12 Associated Generator Vehicle


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(b) (S) 1 GTA Withdrawal from CDE Challenge Area: From 30 March to 4 April, USMLM reconnaissance teams reported major elements of the 9 TD, 20 GMRD and 11 GTD moving into the Lieberose Training Area by road and rail. USMLM was notified of U.S. Government intent, Based on this information and other sources, to conduct a challenge inspection of the area to ensure that Soviet force levels were below the thresholds requiring prior notification under the provisions of the Stockholm Agreement. Continuing road and rail watches during the period between the issuance of the challenge and the arrival of the U.S. inspectors on the scene, USMLM reconnaissance teams observed at least 300 wheeled vehicles and 84 T-80 leaving the challenge area by road and rail in obvious haste.

(c) (C) Both of these examples highlight the valuable role that USMLM can play as an "Honest Broker" in the arms control and verification process by exercising its right of unescorted movement, while continuing to fulfill its routine mission of collecting and reporting order-of-battle and technical intelligence.

(2) (C) Armor Developments: The long process of upgrading tank holdings throughout GSFG also continued in 1988 with USMLM coverage of T-80 fieldings in 3 SA and 2 GTA, including the following:

(a) (C) On 4 April near Cottbus (VT5434), a USMLM reconnaissance team sighted 19 T-80 associated environmental containers moving into the GDR by rail.



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(C) T-80 Associated Environmental Containers

(b) (C) Subsequently, on 10 August in a training area near Granzin (UV6020) a USMLM reconnaissance team obtained the first photography of T-80(R) in the 16 GID, 2 GTA. In addition to reactive armor studs, the T-80(R) mounted skirting under the front glacis.




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(C) T-80(R) in 16 GID, 2 GTA

(3) (C) Artillery Developments:

(a) (C) 152mm, M1987: The 1988 upgrade of Soviet military equipment included Artillery, as evidenced by the importation into GSFG of the 152mm Gun-Howitzer M1987. Eighteen of these were photographed initially by a USMLM reconnaissance team on 20 May at the Falkenberg Rail Siding (UT7916). Subsequent Tri-Mission sightings confirmed its replacement of the aging D-20 system at Front level. Eventual deployment at Army level is expected.




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(U) 152mm Gun-Howitzer M1987

(b) (C) SS-21: Reorganization of Soviet ground forces in the GDR continues. Developments included a USMLM reconnaissance team observing indications of an SS-21 Brigade in 2 GTA. This conversion of division-level SS-21 battalions to an Army-level brigade was expected and brought the number of confirmed SS-21 brigades in GSFG to four.

(c) (C) SCUD-B: Probable improvements in SCUD-associated equipment were noted on 10 May by a USMLM reconnaissance team, when it encountered newly-imported MAZ-series generator vehicles vicinity Hakenburg (UU5450). The vehicles were similar to those reported during the SS-12 withdrawal; route of movement and escort vehicle identification suggested a ground support role in the 8 GCAA and the front level 164 Missile Brigade (SCUD).




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(C) New SCUD-Associated Generator Vehicle

(4) (C) Air Defense Developments:

(a) (C) 2S6: The 2S6 story, begun in 1987, continued on 4 March with a USMLM reconnaissance team obtaining near Letzlingen (PD6914) the first photograph of the 2S6 SAM canisters, indicating a dual SAM/AAA capability for this air defense system. This was followed on 3 October with video coverage of probable 2S6 night firing at Wustrow Air Defense Range (PE7299) and the 18 November observation of 9 TD ammunition containers having both the 2S6 and BMP-2 Gun Designators: 2A38 and 2A42. This most recent event revealed the interchangeability of 30mm HE-Incendiary and HE-Tracer Ammunition for both the 2S6 and the BMP-2 and offered yet another example of Soviet ammunition standardization.



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(C) 2S6 Air Defense System, Including Missile Canister



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(C) Closeup of 2S6 Missile Canister and Blast Deflectors

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(b) (C) SA-11: The first technical-quality ground photograph of the SA-11 SAM System was acquired in 1986. Since then, the system has deployed throughout GSFG, with SA-11 associated equipment appearing in all five armies. Examples of recent USMLM coverage of this transition has included photography of SA-11 TELAR in the 3 Shock Army at Bernberg (PC8742) on 18 March and frequent sightings of SA-4 associated equipment returning to the Soviet Union from 2 GTA and 20 GA.




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(C) SA-11 SAM TELAR (Without Missiles)

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(5) (C) C³I:

(a) (C) On 13 February, a USMLM reconnaissance team made detailed observations of the Governmental Signal Company (KGB/UPS) supporting the 3 Shock Army Headquarters, including vehicle markings and equipment types. The information collected expanded the data base on Army-level KGB/UPS communications support and provides a reliable signature for the deployment of an Army Main or Alternate Command Post.

(b) (C) Color photography of newly-imported COPPER LOG was obtained by a USMLM reconnaissance team on 21 December. This four-axle, MAZ-series, probable computer van provides yet another example that the Soviet military equipment modernization program includes the automation of C³I.



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(C) COPPER LOG

(6) (C) Radio-Electronic Combat (REC): The widespread reorganization of GSFG units extended into the REC arena in 1988 when a USMLM reconnaissance team made the first Tri-Mission sighting of GTS-M1986/SPR-2 at Divisional level (9 TD). The vehicle, a Proximity Fuze Jammer, had been previously noted only at Army level. Its presence on 30 March in the 9 TD indicated the existence of a Division-level REC unit which also includes the R-330P Operational-Tactical Ground Communications Jammer.

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(7) (C) Training Trends: The past two years have seen a phased shift in GSFG training of several weeks, aligning the training year with the calendar year. This shift may be related to resource allocation and accountability. No other significant changes have been detected as yet by USMLM that would indicate a more defensive-oriented training or greater emphasis on combined arms operations. Admittedly, these will be difficult for USMLM reconnaissance teams to document, given the "fender level" views our personnel acquire of GSFG and the fact that reconnaissance teams, by and large, observe movements to and from exercise areas but are often precluded from observing actual tactical play through the Soviet use of PRA and TRA.

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B. AIR COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

NOTE: All succeeding sub-paragraphs classified CONFIDENTIAL.

1. Squadron Changes:

a. This year was a year of change for the 7452d Special Activities Squadron, the Air Division for USMLM. A major shift in personnel occurred between June and September as three of the five officers and four new NCOs arrived on station. With this transition, the training program was full, training three tour officers and one new tour NCO. The remaining two NCOs are to be trained in 1989. In addition to new personalities, the squadron structure received a face lift.

b. The organization and chain of command of the 7452d SAS was streamlined to clarify responsibility of sections and simplify the reporting chain. Under the new organization, there are now three sub-sections under Operations (DO): Liaison Branch (DOO); Operations Support Branch (DOS); and DOR, the Research and Analysis Branch. DOO is headed by the Assistant Operations Officer and is responsible for the Liaison NCOs. DOS and DOR are new sections formerly combined under the one section of Production. DOS provides operational support with the photo and video labs and the photo repair technician. DOR supports the Operations Branch through its research and analysis and is responsible for producing Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs).




FIGURE 1. Organization Chart, 7452 SAS (U)

2. Collection Highlights:

a. Introduction: The Air Team collection effort in 1988 spanned a number of intelligence areas, including changes in the GSFG and East German Air Force organizations and new equipment receipt, technical advances on both fixed-wing and helicopter airframes; tactical gains observing new munitions and tactics in the air-to-air and air-to-ground realm and airfield operations at main operating bases and auxiliary airfields; and strategic gains by observing Soviet strategic assets deploying into the forward area from the Soviet Union.

b. Organization and New Equipment:

(1) Helicopter Reorganization: Several sightings of H1P H at Parchim Sov Aflc (2 GTA) and Stendal Sov Aflc (3 SA) indicated these regiments were integrating this latest HIP-series assault variant into their inventories. Through bort number tracking we were able to discern that some of the HIP H had transferred from Oranienburg Soviet Airfield, previously the only base to have the Mi-17. In addition, we identified ten HIND G-1 and three HIND G-2 at Stendal Soviet Aflc, and one HIND G-1 and two HIND G-2 at Parchim. This was a marked increase at the bases of these special purpose helicopters.

(2) Fixed-Wing: The most significant new arrival for 1988 was the MIG-29 FULCRUM in the East German Air Force, at Preschen Airfield. In September, the AMLNs put forth a concerted effort to track the new arrivals. The East German FULCRUMs are the MIG-29 FULCRUM A Variant 4 and FULCRUM B. These aircraft have a distinctive paint scheme of grey undersides and brown/green camouflage on the top surfaces, which differ from their Soviet counterparts. In addition to the new aircraft, the Air Team made a strong effort, photographing and analyzing the East German Air Force Wing and Naval Squadron FITTERS at Laage Airfield. Our analysis of the bort number placement, under or in front of the cockpit, helped the intelligence community to determine which aircraft belonged to the naval unit and which belonged to the air force. Finally, the Air Team has continued to monitor the changing structure of the Wittstock and Merseburg Soviet FULCRUM regiments. Over the past year, these regiments have slowly been upgrading with increasing numbers of FULCRUM C replacing the older FULCRUM A. As a result, roughly two out of three squadrons at each base now have the newer variants. Our assessment is that the increase in FULCRUM C at these bases has opened the door for exporting the FULCRUM A to the East German Air Force.

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


East German FULCRUM at Preschen (C)

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(3) Integrated Air Defense System (IADS):


(a) The IADS has seen a major change this year with the introduction of the new BILL BOARD and SNOW DRIFT Radars at Juebar, Quedlinburg, Stolzen, and Behnsdorf. These radars significantly improve Soviet detection capabilities and may eventually replace all TALL KING and LONG TRACK now in country. Furthermore, they are integral components in the new SA-11 and SA-12 SAM Systems.



BILL BOARD at Quedlinburg (C)

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Close-up coverage of the SNOW DRIFT radar chassis and folded sail was obtained on 9 and 11 July 1988.



SNOW DRIFT Chassis and Folded Sail (C)

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(b) In the East German early warning system, a possible new SA-5 site is under construction near Apolda. Photo coverage shows the earth mounds, camouflage netting and support buildings of this very large site.




Possible SA-5 Site, Apolda (C)

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In addition, the East Germans have begun modernizing their SA-2 sites for possible upgrade to SA-5 or SA-10. This construction at Neunkirchen SA-2 shows the large blockhouse-type building similar to one constructed at the Apolda SA-5 Site



Construction at Neuenkirchen SA-2 Site (C)

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Should these sites deploy SA-5, they will significantly improve East German air defense coverage in the southern and northern approaches.

c. Technical Gains: The Air Team had a number of collection opportunities which significantly improved the intelligence community's understanding of modern Soviet fighters and helicopters.

(1) The new year of 1988 was rung in with the crash of a Neuruppin F17ER. The Air Team forwarded some 50 pounds of parts from the aircraft.



F17ER G Wreckage (C)

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(2) Other Air Team coverage of East German and GSFG FITTER revealed several new modifications. The first was the addition of IR decoy flare packs on a FITTER H (1IR 1-215-0015-88).




FITTER H With IR Packs (C)

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Other FITTER coverage included the unidentified fuselage dome seen here carried with the ODD POD on a Laage FITTER K.




FITTER K With Unidentified Fuselage Dome and ODD POD (C)

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(3) The first indication of the Soviets firing the AA-11 ARCHER in live-firing training was observed in February as aircraft returned to base with missiles on board. These were the first non-alert aircraft of GSFG FULCRUM carrying the AA-11.




FULCRUM With AA-11 (C)

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(4) Helicopter developments included the increasing deployment of the new HIND G1 and G2. These helicopters were observed training on ranges for the first time. The HIND G1 was observed with the new flare ejectors. These ejectors carry 192 IR countermeasure flares.



HIND G1 With Second Generation Countermeasure Flare Ejectors (C)

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The HIND G2 pod door was observed in the open position for the first time. The purpose of this pod and the unique role of this helicopter are still unknown.



HIND G2 Pod Door in Open Position (C)

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d. Tactical Gains: Tactical gains are primarily achieved with the video camera at the air-to-ground ranges. However, occasionally air-to-air tactics are also observed near airfields. This year, helicopter low-level flight operations included contour and below tree-top flying.


(1) Helicopters this year were observed flying contour flying to low-level flying below tree tops. Although such flying was not the rule, in one case at the Belgern Range, the tour vehicle was buzzed by a HIND D at just 25 feet AGL. The newest additions to helicopter formations at the ranges were the HIND G1 and G2. They did not perform any new deliveries, but participated in rocket and gun attacks. Also, HIND E/F were observed firing AT-6 at the Gadow-Rossow Range. And finally, night paradrop training was recorded on video for the first time this year.

(2) Fixed-wing air-to-ground tactics observed this year remained consistent with previous years' observations in terms of dive angles, airspeed and general delivery profiles. However, during 1988, several new munitions were observed. The first new munition was a bomb dropped at night. As the bomb dropped, its fuze sputtered. Upon impact, a bright light filled the sky similar to that of a fuel/air explosive. The second ordnance was a bomb dropped off a Templin FITTER H at Retzow. As the bomb fell from the plane, a flare ignited on the rear of the bomb and fell away separately to the ground. The purpose of this unusual flare on the bomb is unknown. The third unusual weapon was again seen at night. This ordnance was delivered from a FENCER from about 2500 feet AGL on a level pass. As the munition fell to the ground, it opened up with a shower of sparkling lights at approximately 500 feet AGL. It is believed this may have been a cluster-bomb opening and dispensing its submunitions. In addition to these unusual munitions, other significant tactical observations included increased FULCRUM ground attack training and low-level flying. The FULCRUM was observed on several occasions by all of the AMLMs at both Retzow and Rossow Ranges. On each occasion, the FULCRUM appeared to be an extremely capable ground attack platform. Of particular note, however, was the integration of FULCRUM ground attack with FITTER and FLOGGER. In October 1988, FULCRUM were observed hitting Retzow Range at the same time FITTER were in the range pattern and a Wittstock FULCRUM was observed in the same formation with FLOGGER Js entering the Rossow Range circuit. This increased integration indicates the ground attack role of the FULCRUM is perhaps more than just a nominal secondary role. Finally, at the air-to-ground ranges, noteworthy were the low-altitude flying observations. On 20 November 1988, three four-ships of FITTER H from Templin Soviet Airfield were observed operating at between 300-500 feet AGL over the Rossow Range area. These aircraft ingressed to the range at between 500-750 feet, but were seen turning after weapons delivery at 300-500 feet and staying low until out of sight. In a second

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observation at Retzow Range, a single FLOGGER J flew the circuit repeatedly at between 300-500 feet AGL, popping up only for weapons delivery. While these observations are the exception and not the rule, they do indicate the Soviets have some pilots trained to operate at altitudes approaching the low-level regime of NATO pilots. The Air Team continues to watch for low-level training to determine its frequency and if lower altitudes is a trend in Soviet training.

(3) Air-to-air training is difficult to observe since it usually takes place out of sight. However, on three occasions, fixed-wing air-to-air training was observed. In the first case, on 14 April 1988, contrails above Cochstedt Airfield area clearly outlined the tactics the FLOGGERS G/K were flying. And, in one instance, the aircraft performed a high-angle gun pass and missile shot at about 5000 feet which was low enough for the Air Team to catch the action on video. This is the first instance of air-to-air training reported by the USMLM. A second observation of air-to-air training involved MIG-29 FULCRUM practicing air intercepts against a HIND helicopter. This action took place near Merseburg Airfield in April 1988. The FULCRUM made attack passes from 5000-6000 feet in a 15-20 degree dive probably simulating IR missile or gun shots against the HIND orbiting at approximately 300 feet. This type of training had never been observed before.



Helicopter Air-to-Air Combat Training (C)

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The third instance was a Dissimilar Maneuvering Air Combat Training (DMACT) mission observed on 10 May 1988. In this case, FLOGGER G/K were paired off against FULCRUM. DMACT is more advanced training than fighting the same aircraft and is a significant step in the training program for the FULCRUM pilots. This was the first sighting of its kind. Finally, in the realm of air-to-air training is helicopter training. On 19 July 1988, HIND G1 and HIND E from Stendal were observed performing rudimentary gun passes. The HIND G1 acted as the instructor and target with the HIND E setting-up above and to the rear of the target. The shooter dove toward the target for the attack and climbed to the opposite side for a reattack. This is the most comprehensive video of helicopter air-to-air training to date.

(4) The final area of tactical gains deals with airfield operations. The Air Team was able to make some long-term observations of main operating bases and also has made a renewed effort at covering auxiliary airfields and highway strips to check for any upgrades. Two significant observations were made at Merseburg Airfield. First, the alert aircraft, uploaded with missiles, were observed with generator vehicles standing by. While the FULCRUM may have a self-start capability, this observation indicates the Soviets prefer or require to have generator trucks available for alert status aircraft. The second observation at Merseburg was an Integrated Combat Turn or ICT of a FULCRUM. This video coverage saw the downloading of missiles from one FULCRUM and the uploading of missiles on another FULCRUM. This data will be used better to determine times involved in turning aircraft between combat sorties. At Weimar-Nohra Soviet Airfield, on 6 September 1988, two hours of airfield operations, including loading, refueling aircraft and take-offs and landings of HIND and HIP were observed on an exceptionally clear day. Of particular significance were the vertical take-offs and landings of HIND G1. Previously, it was believed HIND always used a rolling take-off. Finally, for airfield operations, the Air Team noted a number of upgrades and improvements at auxiliary airfields and highway strips. For example, at Calbe Auxiliary Airfield, a number of defensive trenches were noted around the airfield perimeter.

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


Weimar Nohra, Airfield Operations (C)

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At the Gnoien Auxiliary Airfield, arresting gear are in place, and at Gross Mohrdorf, new concrete landing pads and a taxiway are being poured. In this case, a sample of the concrete was obtained. At the Ruhland Highway Strip, the parking areas and taxiways are being widened and improved. These observations suggest the Soviets and East Germans have not abandoned the use of auxiliary airfields, but in fact are making improvements at these strips for safer operations.



Ruhland Highway Landing Strip (C)

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e. Strategic Gains: The final area of Air Team collection highlights deals with tracking Soviet aircraft such as the MAINSTAY and BACKFIRE that deploy into the forward area. This year, the BACKFIRE deployed into Falkenberg Soviet Airfield twice, in March and August 1988. Both times, close-up still photography and video coverage of its landings and take-offs were acquired. This coverage offers a rare glimpse of the non-naval bombers. However, the Air Team has yet to catch these aircraft operating at Rossow Range. This will be a continued effort during the next year. In terms of the MAINSTAY, BRIXMIS obtained the best coverage of this aircraft flying into Falkenberg on 10 March 1988. The USMLM Air Team has caught the MAINSTAY orbiting over Retzow and Rossow Ranges. We expect better coverage of this aircraft, perhaps even with the PLANKER, as it deploys into the forward area for exercises next year.



BACKFIRE B at Falkenberg (C)

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C. (C) NAVAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES


1. (C) General:

a. (C) 1988 has been a very successful year in terms of naval collection. Since June 1986, when 75% of East Germany's Baltic coastline became accessible to USMLM, the NavRep routinely exploited a wide variety of naval targets without any particular emphasis given to any one category of targets (i.e. communications sites, storage facilities, headquarters units and shipbuilding activities). Since early 1988, however, the naval community began focusing its interest on a few specific naval targets - primarily shipbuilding facilities.

b. (C) Thus, for most of 1988 the NavRep concentrated his collection effort at the two major East German shipyards in Wolgast and Rostock, and at the naval scrap pier, also in Rostock. The Peene Shipyard is important because it is the major producer of naval combatants and the Neptune Shipyard is important because it builds both commercial ships and naval auxiliaries. The scrap pier is significant because by knowing what naval ships are being scrapped, analysts can reasonably predict the type of ship which will either be built or imported to replace it.


2. (C) Activity:

a. (C) Routine coverage of the scrap pier (breakers yard) in Rostock showed that the East Germans were dismantling two classes of Patrol Boats (Shershin and Libelle). Although analysts suspected a replacement, no evidence of that appeared until December 1987 when USMLM was tipped off to the presence of an unidentified new ship in the Peene Shipyard in Wolgast. Coverage of this shipyard was increased and in February the first photographs of the new ship were obtained. Subsequent coverage revealed the weapons systems, the electronics and finally, in December 1988, the 8 cruise missiles, which are suspected to be the new Soviet SS-NX-25.



(C) BAL-COM 10 w/SS-NX-25


b. (C) Coverage of the Peene shipyard included the continuing Parchim II FPL construction project. Since this project began sometime in 1985, 9 Parchim II have been delivered to the Soviet Union and 3 more are still under construction. As of December 1988, there was no evidence of a 13th hull at the shipyard.



(C) Parchim II

c. (C) In early 1988, USMLM was told that a heavy auxiliary ship may be under construction at the Neptune shipyard in Rostock. Initial coverage of the shipyard revealed that such a ship (called the Kashtan AGL) was, in fact, being built. Subsequent coverage provided much greater detail of the first prototype and confirmed that the ship was destined for the Soviet Union. By the end of 1988, 2 Kashtan AGLs had been delivered to the USSR and another 4 were still under construction.

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(C) Kashtan AGL

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D. (C) TECHNICAL OPERATIONS REPORTING

1. (S/WN) USMLM ground, air, and naval personnel support Tech Ops reporting. Details of this support are sensitive.

2. (C) Tech Ops reporting in 1988 continued to answer many of the basic order of battle and technical intelligence requirements levied on USMLM by theater and national intelligence production agencies and centers.

3. (C) Quantity. (See IIG). Tech Ops is responsible for 40 % of total USMLM IIR production (FY88/CY88).

4. (C) Quality. Formal evaluation of IIR is a very imperfect measure of quality. Nonetheless, compared only with other USMLM reporting, Tech Ops IIR appear to be of especial value to analysts. (All figures, FY 88 IIR only, evals received through 2Q, FY89.)

a. (C) 36 % of all Tech Ops IIR are evaluated, a rough measure of general analyst interest (USMLM average, 27 %).

b. (C) 29 % of the Tech Ops total output was evaluated with the two highest ratings (CMS, CMV) (Mission average, 19 %).

c. (C) 62 % of all two highest ratings received by USMLM IIR were for Tech Ops reporting (with only 40 % of total production).

5. (S/WN) The following is a selection of Tech Ops reporting highlights (beginning FY 89, all Tech Ops reports are arbitrarily prefixed with "1"; prior to this, they were "1", "2", or "5", depending on collector):

	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>REPORT NUMBER(S)</u>
a. (C)	Training, safety measures and flight profiles of a REC (ECM) Brewer crew.	(1) 3001 88
b. (C/WN)	Training scheduled by an Army-level Spetsnaz company during a field encampment.	(5) 3004 88
c. (C/WN)	Detailed reporting on disease incidence, field sanitation and the general health of the troops in a GSFG ground army. Data were statistically analyzed for ease of consumer reference.	(2) 3035 88 (2) 3055 88 (2) 3066 88 (2) 3068 88 (2) 3071 88 (2) 3510 88

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- d. (C) Technical characteristics, basic ammo loads and order of battle details for most artillery systems fielded in GSFG. (2) 3044 88
- e. (S/WN) Examination of the exercise scenario developed by a GSFG ground army for a NATO attack. (2) 3045 88
- f. (S/WN) Analysis of the vehicle assignment in a ground army headquarters. Sensitive command and control vehicle groupings were isolated and all vehicles assigned to senior army command personnel were identified. (2) 3070 88
3023 89
- g. (C) Schedule of events in the Warsaw Pact special propaganda encampment "pravda-87". (2) 3072 88
- h. (S/WN) Report on the joint training scheduled between MD III and the 8 GCAA during the 1985-86 and 1986-87 training years. (2) 3076 88
- i. (S) Identification of the probable nuclear release staff element in a ground army — the special service (special group). (2) 3077 88
- j. (S) Data providing an opportunity to examine the course of the fielding of T-80 tanks by a GSFG ground army between 1984 and 1986 and detailed information on the maintenance problems associated with these tanks. This reporting included hundreds of T-80 serial numbers. (2) 3079 88
- k. (C) Analysis of the TX/KX series of designators used for nuclear warheads with associated kiloton yields (for FROG, SCARAB, and 2S7). (2) 3081 88
- l. (C) Assessment that if assigned to GSFG, the number of independent missile transport battalions (ORPDN) probably does not exceed two. (2) 3082 88

- m. (S/WN) Summary report on the structure, (2) 3088 88
manning, training, morale and related
details of an army-level Spetsnaz
company.
- n. (C) Identification of the missile fired (2) 3103 88
from the SA-18 launch mechanism
(9P516-1) as the 9M39.
- o. (S/WN) Near verbatim coverage of a meeting of (2) 3111 88
a military council of a GSFG ground
army.
- p. (C) Operating instructions for the TPD-K1 (2) 3116 88
laser range finder.
- q. (C) Identification of the IFF device in (2) 3122 88
the BMP-2K: 1L26.
- r. (C) Confirmation that the independent (2) 3128 88
signal battalion in Luebben supports
the Front Rear Control Post.
- s. (C/WN) Manuals and handbooks covering the (2) 3306 88
BRM-1, T-80 turret, the RPG-22, the (2) 3321 88
BMP-1K and component costs for the (2) 3304 88
T-64A. (2) 3334 88
(5) 3303 88
- t. (S/WN) Comparison of the 1988 training 3002 89
ammunition allocations to two different
ground formations of GSFG. This
provided hard data on the minimum
number of rounds allocated annually
for major weapons systems (e.g., 15-24
rounds per T-80, 8-12 rounds per 2S3).
- u. (S/WN) TOE data showing the distribution of 3007 89
anti-tank weapons in "type" ground
formations, including "Division-87",
the apparent name for the division
reorganization underway in GSFG since
late 1986.
- v. (S/WN) Comprehensive critique of the Fall 3018 89
1987 call-up/troop rotation into a
GSFG ground division. The critique
highlighted problems with USSR-based
training, physical condition of
conscripts and language problems.

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w. (C)	Spring 1988 troop rotation schedule from the Turkestan MD to GSFG.	3019 89
x. (C)	Comprehensive look at the end-of-cycle training conducted by the 35 MRD during November 1988.	3034 89
y. (C/WN)	Details on positive launch control for the SCARAB (SS-21), the structure of an army-level missile brigade (two battalions), and the number of assigned launchers.	3029 89

E. (C) RESTRICTED AREAS

1. (C) PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREAS (PRA).

a. (U) On 31 August 1986, USMLM received a new Permanent Restricted Area (PRA) Map from the Chief, Soviet External Relations Branch (SERB), Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). This new map went into effect on 1 September 1988.

b. (U) The new PRA Map is an update/modification to the 10 June 1986 PRA Map. It releases one area from PRA, but adds four new areas. A description of each of these five areas and its effect on Allied Military Liaison Mission (AMLM) Operations, follows. Figure 1 is a map of the GDR showing approximate locations of the areas and their relationships to PRAs:

(1) (U) The area released from PRA consists of the northwestern part of the Wittstock PRA, generally following the western and extreme northern traces of the Mueritzsee, extending northward to Alt Schoenau (UV4939) and eastward to the eastern shore of the Torgelowsee (see PRA Map, Figure 1).

(a) (C) Effect on AMLM Ground Collection: This area of the Wittstock PRA formerly held the garrisons of the GSFG U/I Missile Brigade (SS-12), which was withdrawn under the provisions of the INF Treaty. Because of the brigade's withdrawal, the opening of this area provides no known significant gains for the Ground collection effort.

(b) (C) Effect on AMLM Air Collection: The opening of this area permits AMLM Air Teams to obtain closer coverage of the take-off end of Mirow Soviet Airfield; however, the new Observation Points (OPs) are still no closer than 3.5 kilometers.

(c) (C) Effect on AMLM Naval Collection: The removal of this area from PRA opened three naval targets which were previously inaccessible to AMLM. The Central Supply Depot for the East German Navy's High Command, located at Waren-Mueritz 501, and the Missile Depot of the East German Navy's High Command, located next to the Supply Depot, provide limited improvement to AMLM Naval Collection efforts. Although the Rechlin Shipyard, located on the Mueritz See, remains inside PRA, good OPs are now open to AMLM naval collection; this shipyard has built and tested hydrofoils and submersibles in the past and is rated as a high-priority target.

(2) (C) The first area added to PRA is a pocket, previously open but surrounded by the Wittstock PRA, with rough boundaries Autobahn B64, Darritz (UT4669), secondary roads between Darritz and Katerbow (UT4274), and Katerbow itself.

(a) (C) Effect on AMLM Ground Collection: No significant effect.

(b) (C) Effect on AMLM Air Collection: Completely denies AMLM Air Team coverage of the take-off end of Neuruppin Soviet Airfield; the OPs in this area were extremely lucrative in the past.

(c) (C) Effect on AMLM Naval Collection: No effect.

(3) (C) The second area added to PRA completely surrounds the town of Schlotheim (PBI579).

(a) (C) Effect on AMLM Ground Collection: Denies AMLM Ground coverage of Schlotheim 201 and its local training area and significantly hinders AMLM efforts to monitor restructuring within 27 GMRD.

(b) (C) Effect on AMLM Air Collection: Completely denies AMLM Air Team coverage of the Schlotheim Soviet Airfield.

(c) (C) Effect on AMLM Naval Collection: No effect.

(4) (C) The third area added to PRA is a small pocket on the southern border of the Jueterbog/Briesen Brand PRA near Baruth (UT9768).

(a) (C) Effect on AMLM Ground Collection: Denies AMLM Ground coverage of the Baruth Rail Siding, as well as the intersection of Routes 115 and 96. The rail siding has been used by the Soviets to load and unload units training in the Jueterbog PRA. It is also now difficult, if not impossible, to cover units moving by road from north to south through Baruth.

(b) (C) Effect on AMLM Air Collection: Denies AMLM Air Team access to the OPs for the take-off side of Brand Soviet Airfield. This is by far the greatest loss to AMLM Air Operations caused by the PRA changes. Significant degradation of collection against FENCER D has resulted, as FENCER D is based only at this airfield in East Germany.

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(c) (C) Effect on AMLM Naval Collection: No effect.

(4) (C) The fourth area added to PRA is in the vicinity of Wuensdorf. In early 1988, this area was frequently designated a Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) by the Soviets during exercises.


(a) (C) Effect on AMLM Ground Collection: Denies AMLM coverage of training areas, ranges, and temporary communications sites in the vicinity of GSFG Headquarters.

(b) (C) Effect on AMLM Air Collection: Denies AMLM Air Team access to the Zossen- Wuensdorf Soviet Auxiliary Airfield and adjacent radio-electronic sites.

(c) (C) Effect on AMLM Naval Collection: No effect.

b. (FOUO) Chief, OVS stated that the original intent of the PRA change was only to open the Waren area following withdrawal of one SS-12 unit. It was, thus, to have been a unilateral reduction of PRA. It was decided, however, to incorporate various little "trouble spots" into PRA: the "Neuruppin Pocket" where there was a shooting incident with USMLM in September 1987; the Zossen-Wuensdorf area that had been covered by TRA repeatedly in early 1988 and was the scene of unattributed "incidents"; the area around Baruth, where there was a "military loading ramp" and GSFG staff officers complained of seeing AMLM vehicles frequently on the highway; and Schlotheim, scene of "incidents" with all AMLM. OVS alleged the area removed from was slightly greater than the area added to PRA. While true, if one includes the Mueritz See, this fact is also irrelevant. The PRA shuffle does indicate, however, that GSFG considers PRA (and, hence, TRA) as a means of preventing problems by preventing incidents by keeping the AMLM away from military activity.

Figure 1



PRA BOUNDARIES, POST-SEPTEMBER 1988

2. (U) TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS (TRA).

a. (U) In 1988, HQ GSFC imposed a total of 55 Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs), up from the 32 imposed during 1987, but still well under the 72 imposed during 1986.

b. (U) Aside from the increase in TRAs, Temporary Restricted Areas imposed during 1988 followed pre-1986 general patterns. Only three TRAs had unusual start/stop times; TRAs were generally imposed in groups. They averaged slightly over eight days in duration.

c. (C) As in previous years, patterns and trends noted in the issue of multiple TRAs led to the belief that most were exercise/movement-related.

d. (U) There were 130 days in 1988 when at least one TRA was in effect. This was the highest number in the last three years: There were 91 TRA days in 1987 when 32 TRAs were imposed, and 119 days in 1986 when 72 TRAs were imposed. Over half of the TRAs in 1988 were imposed during the first four months of 1988. No TRAs were imposed during the months of May, June and December. The following shows the TRAs in effect during each month of 1987 (NOTE: Some TRAs overlapped from one month to another):

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>TRAs IN EFFECT</u>	<u>NR OF TRA DAYS</u>
JANUARY	001-005	15
FEBRUARY	005-013	18
MARCH	009-026	28
APRIL	025-030	13
MAY	NONE	0
JUNE	NONE	0
JULY	031-033	7
AUGUST	034-036	14
SEPTEMBER	037-044	18
OCTOBER	045-046	11
NOVEMBER	047-055	6
DECEMBER	NONE	0

e. (U) NOTE: Sketch maps (Figures 2 through 18) used to show approximate TRA boundaries and relationships to PRAs use the post-September 1988 PRA boundaries. Permanent Restricted Areas (PRAs) are shown in solid black silhouette, while Temporary Restricted Areas (TRAs) are cross hatched. Most of the area covered by TRAs 002, 005, 008, 012, 014, and 029, all located near Zossen at the northeastern edge of the Jueterbog PRA, was incorporated into the Jueterbog PRA by the 1 September change.

f. (C) TRAs imposed during 1988:

1) (C) TRAs 001-88, 002-88, 003-88, and 004-88 were all in effect during the period 16-21 January (see Figure 2). These TRAs were probably associated with a communications exercise involving GSFG, 2 GTA, and 8 GCAA assets.

a) (C) TRA 001-88 extended the Templin PRA westward toward the Wittstock PRA.

b) (C) TRA 002-88 extended the Jueterbog PRA to include the Zossen-Wuensdorf area; this area was incorporated into the Jueterbog PRA in September. TRA 003-88 connected the Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand and Cottbus PRAs.

c) (C) TRA 004-88 was bounded by, and connected, the Naumburg, Weimar, and Kranichfeld PRAs.

2) (C) TRA 005-88, with approximately the same boundaries as TRA 002-88, was in effect during the period 22 January - 07 February. It began at 1200 hours, rather than the usual 2400 (Figure 3). This TRA is believed to have covered a GSFG communications-related exercise.

3) (C) TRAs 006-88, 007-88 and 008-88 were all in effect during the period 07-12 February (Figure 4). These TRAs probably were related to a GSFG communications exercise observed outside TRAs. Additionally, TRA 007-88 may have been intended to cover what appeared to be a 3 SA Headquarters/communications alert exercise/deployment to the Jueterbog Training Area on 13-14 February.

a) (C) TRA 006-88 connected the Wittstock and Templin PRAs.

b) (C) TRA 007-88 connected the Lehnin, Ragosen, Altengrabow, Dessau, and Jueterbog PRAs.

c) (C) TRA 008-88 protected the Zossen/Wuensdorf area.

4) (C) TRAs 009-88, 010-88, 011-88, 012-88 and 013-88 were all in effect during the period 24 February - 01 March (Figure 5).

a) (C) TRAs 009-88 and 010-88 connected the Wittstock, Templin, and Prenzlau PRAs. This TRA covered a possible 20 GA exercise.

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b) (C) TRAs 011-88 and 013-88 connected the Ragosen, Lehnin, Beelitz and Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand PRAs, and extended the southern trace of the Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand PRA south and east to the Luckau PRA. TRA 012-88 extended the Jueterbog PRA to include the Zossen/Wuensdorf area, and probably covered a GSFG communications exercise.

5) (C) TRAs 014-88, 015-88, 016-88, 017-88, 018-88, 019-88, 020-88, 021-88, 022-88, 023-88, and 024-88 (Figure 6).

a) (C) TRA 014-88, in effect during the period 04-31 March, protected the Zossen/Wuensdorf area. This TRA probably covered a GSFG communications exercise.

b) (C) TRAs 015-88, 016-88, 017-88, 018-88, 019-88, 020-88, 021-88, 022-88, 023-88, and 024-88 were all in effect during the period 13-27 March.

1 (C) TRAs 015-88, 016-88, and 017-88 connected and extended the Wittstock and Templin PRAs. These TRAs probably covered a 2 GTA exercise

2 (C) TRA 018-88 connected and extended the Stendal and Letzlinger Heide PRAs, and probably covered a 207 MRD exercise.

3 (C) TRAs 019-88 through 023-88 connected an arc of PRAs from the Altenburg north and east to Cottbus.

4 (C) TRA 024-88, identical to TRA 004-88, connected the Weimar, Naumburg, and Kranichfeld PRAs. This TRA probably covered a 57 GMFD exercise.

7) (C) TRAs 025-88 and 026-88 were both in effect during the period 25 March - 01 April (Figure 7).

a) (C) TRA 025-88 connected the Finow and Puerstenwalde PRAs, and probably covered a Special Purpose Forces exercise.

b) (C) TRA 026-88 connected the Altengrabow, Lehnin, Ragosen, and Jueterbog PRAs.

8) (C) TRAs 027-88, 028-88, 029-88 and 030-88, all in effect during the period 16-28 April connected the Letzlinger Heide, Magdeburg, Altengrabow, Ragosen, Lehnin, Beelitz, Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand, and Luckau PRAs and extended the eastern and southern trace of the Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand PRA (Figure 8). These TRAs probably covered a 3 SA exercise.

a) (C) TRA 027-88 denied AMLM ground coverage of temporary communications sites, a training area, and tactical and road movement routes between the Letzlinger Heide and the Altengrabow PRAs.

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9) (C) TRAs 031-88, 032-88, and 033-88 were all in effect during the period 23-30 July (Figure 9). These TRAs were in effect during a CDE-announced exercise during the period 15-28 July.

a) (C) TRA 031-88 connected the Wittstock and Templin PRAs and probably covered a 2 GTA communications-related exercise.

b) (C) TRAs 032-88 and 033-88 connected and extended the Altengrabow, Ragosen, and Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand PRAs.

10) (C) TRA 034-88 and 035-88, in effect during the period 07-14 August, connected a belt of PRAs from the Letzlinger Heide in the northwest to the Grossenhain/Koenigsbrueck in the southeast (Figure 10). These TRAs probably covered 1 GTA element movement to the Jueterbog Training Area.

11) (C) TRA 036-88, in effect during the period 20-27 August, covered an area east of the Gotha PRA (Figure 11).

12) (C) TRAs 037-88 and 038-88, in effect during the period 04-10 September, connected the Ragosen, Altengrabow, Grimme, and Dessau PRAs (Figure 12). These TRAs probably covered a 3 SA exercise.

13) (C) TRAs 039-88 and 040-88 were both in effect during the period 11-16 September. Both of these TRAs had unusual beginning and ending times (2000 hours) (Figure 13).

a) (C) TRA 039-88 included Dallgow-Doberitz, Satzkorn, Priort, and Rohrbeck.

b) (C) TRA 040-88 extended the southern trace of the Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand PRAs south and east to the Luckau PRA. This TRA possibly covered a communications-related exercise.

14) (C) TRAs 041-88, 042-88, 043-88 and 044-88 were all in effect during the period 25-30 September (Figure 14).

a) (C) TRA 041-88 connected and extended the Finow, Fuerstenwalde, and Cottbus PRAs.

b) (C) TRA 042-88 connected the Fuerstenwalde and Cottbus PRAs, and probably covered an Air Assault Brigade exercise.

c) (C) TRA 043-88 connected the Altengrabow, Dessau, and Jueterbog PRAs. TRA 044-88 extended the southern trace of the Jueterbog/Briesen-Brand PRA to the south. These TRAs probably covered 3 SA exercise movement to the Jueterbog Training Area.

15) (C) TRA 045-88, in effect during the period 30 September - 06 October, extended from the triangle formed by the Hagenow, Luebtheen and Ludwigslust PRAs in the northwest to the Dessau and Lehnin PRAs in the southeast, connecting the Perleberg, Stendal, Rathenow, Letzlinger Heide, and western border PRAs as well (Figure 15). This TRA probably covered long (250 kilometer) road marches conducted by the 2 GTA.

16) (C) TRA 046-88, in effect during the period 13-18 October, connected the Ohrdruf and Naumburg PRAs (Figure 16). This TRA probably covered an 8 GCAA communications exercise.

17) (C) TRAs 047-88, 048-88, 049-88, 050-88, 051-88, 052-88, and 053-88 were all in effect during the period 31 October - 03 November (Figure 17).

a) (C) TRA 047-88 ran from the northeast side of the Rathenow PRA halfway to the southeast corner of the Wittstock PRA.

b) (C) TRA 048-88 was a small, lopsided triangle in an area just west of the West Berlin Border PRA.

c) (C) TRA 049-88 extended southward from the Fuerstenwalde PRA almost halfway to the Prieros PRA.

d) (C) TRA 050-88 connected the Lehnin, Beelitz, and Jueterbog PRAs.

e) (C) TRA 051-88 extended eastward from the southeast corner of the Jueterbog PRA.

f) (C) TRA 052-88 extended from the northwestern trace of the Zeitz PRA.


g) (C) TRA 053-88 connected the Koenigsbrueck and Dresden PRAs, and probably covered a 1 GTA communications exercise.

18) (C) TRAs 054-88 and 055-88 were both in effect during the period 12-15 November (Figure 18).

a) (C) TRA 054-88 extended the northwest corner of the Letzlinger Heide PRA.


b) (C) TRA 055-88 connected the Stendal and Rathenow PRAs.

Figure 2




TRA 001 - 004-88/16-21 JANUARY 1988

Figure 3




TRA 005-88/21 JANUARY - 07 FEBRUARY 1988

Figure 4



TRA 006 - 008-88 / 07-12 FEBRUARY 1988

Figure 5




TRA 009 - 013-88 / 24 FEBRUARY - 01 MARCH 1988

REF ID: A55740

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
Figure 6



TRA 014-88 / 04-31 MARCH 1988
TRA 015 - 24-88 / 13-27 MARCH 1988

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Figure 7



TRA 025 - 026-88 / 25 MARCH - 01 APRIL 1988

~~SECRET / WINTTEL~~

Figure 8



TRA 027 - 030-88 / 16-28 April 1988

~~SECRET / WINTTEL~~

Figure 9




TRA 031 - 033-88 / 23-30 JULY 1988

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
Figure 10



TRA 034 - 035-88 / 07-14 AUGUST 1988

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
Figure 11



TRA 035-88 / 20-27 AUGUST 1988

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
Figure 12



TRA 037 - 038-88 / 04-10 SEPTEMBER 1988

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Figure 13




TRA 039 - 040-88 / 11-16 SEPTEMBER 1988

Figure 14




TRA 041 - 044-88 / 25-30 SEPTEMBER 1988

Figure 15



TRA 045-88 / 30 SEPTEMBER - 06 OCTOBER 1988

Figure 16



TRA 046-88 / 13-18 OCTOBER 1988


Figure 17



TRA 047 - 053-88 / 31 OCTOBER - 03 NOVEMBER 1988

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Figure 18



TRA 054 - 055-88 / 12-15 NOVEMBER 1988

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F. (C) DETENTIONS AND INCIDENTS.

1. (C) DETENTIONS. A detention occurs when a tour is halted and prevented from continuing by Soviet or GDR authorities and the tour is required to surrender its documents to a Soviet Komendant. An Akt, accusing the tour of violations of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement, may or may not be prepared, but is never signed in any case. Tours are released by the Komendant and continue their mission, reporting the facts of the detention by telephone to USMLM Potsdam House. Five USMLM tours were detained in 1988:

a. (C) Vicinity of Bad Lausick (US3469), 281030Z Jan 88. A USMLM Ground tour was detained near the town of Bad Lausick (US3469) by one Soviet truck. The three-hour detention occurred during a lunch break, while the tour vehicle was parked at US341696. The Grimma Komendant arrived at 1230Z Hours. He prepared an Akt which accused the tour of photographing Soviet equipment at Pommers and of being behind Mission Restriction Signs (MRS) two hours prior to the detention (both true). The Tour Officer protested the detention and declined to sign the Akt. The Komendant released the tour at 1340Z hours and the tour returned to West Berlin. There were no injuries or damage to US or non-US personnel/property. No weapons were displayed. No attempt was made to gain entry to the tour vehicle. Duration of Detention: Three hours.

b. (C) Vicinity of Hausneindorf (PC5646), 050805Z Mar 88. A USMLM Ground tour was in position on a side street to observe an imminent Soviet wheeled vehicle column movement through the town of Hausneindorf. The tour was noticed by a Soviet Praporshchik, involved in regulating the column move. The tour departed its position in the town, followed by the Soviet in a GAZ-66. After several minutes of attempting to maneuver away from the Soviet truck, the tour found itself blocked in a cul-de-sac. The tour accepted the detention at 0805Z Hours. The Soviet Halberstadt Komendant arrived at 1020Z Hours and prepared an Akt which accused the tour of photographing military equipment (not true). The Tour Officer refused to sign the Akt. The Komendant departed at 1045Z Hours to place a phone call, and returned at 1110Z Hours. At 1144Z Hours, the tour was escorted from the area by the Komendant and released. The tour continued with its mission, arriving back in West Berlin at 061339Z Mar 88. Duration of Detention: three and one-half hours.

c. (C) Vicinity of Dueben (UT2056), 061615Z Mar 88. A USMLM Ground tour approaching Dueben from the East observed a Soviet wheeled vehicle column moving West from Dueben. The tour decided to avoid the oncoming column, having been seen by several Soviet traffic regulators and noting at least two Soviet vehicles in

position (independent of the column) to block the tour. The tour turned South and proceeded across a field, the only open escape away from the column. Approximately 500 meters into the field, the tour vehicle became mired. Two Soviet VAI trucks, approaching the tour's position 15 minutes later, also became mired. At 1715Z Hours, a Soviet Major from the Dessau Komendatura arrived on the scene. Passes/credentials were exchanged and the Komendant filled out a report, but did not prepare an Akt. He acknowledged that the tour was not in a restricted area and was not observing military equipment. While the Komendant departed the scene to make a phone call, Soviet VAI personnel rendered assistance by towing the tour vehicle from the mud. After approximately one hour, the Komendant returned and released the tour at 1820Z Hours. The tour continued its mission. Duration of Detention: two hours.

d. (C) Vicinity of Halle (QC0711), 241800Z Mar 88. A USMLM ground tour transited through Halle. As the tour exited a major traffic circle in Halle onto a highway access ramp, it was observed by two Soviet traffic regulators stationed at the circle. The traffic regulators ran through three lanes of traffic in an attempt to detain the tour. The tour decided to accept a detention, given the heavy volume of civilian traffic around the tour vehicle and the dangerous road conditions (wet pavement). The Soviet Halle Komendant arrived at 1915Z Hours. He apologized for the detention, did not write up an Akt against the tour, and released the tour at 2000Z Hours. The tour continued its mission, arriving back in West Berlin at 250800Z Mar 88. Duration of Detention: two hours.

e. (C) Vicinity of Wendisch Priborn (UV1814), 251110Z Oct 88. A USMLM air tour was targeted to observe air activity at Retzow Soviet Range (UV140150) in the vicinity of Wendisch Priborn. Shortly after the tour moved into an Observation Post (OP), a Soviet truck with Komendatura markings approached the tour vehicle at high speed and halted directly in front of the tour vehicle. A Soviet Major (who identified himself as Major Lomovtsev, Komendant from Perleberg) jumped out, ran over to the tour vehicle and pressed his credentials against the window. The tour concluded that any attempt at evasion might jeopardize the dismounted officer's safety and accepted the detention at 1110Z Hours. An Akt was drawn up, but the Tour Officer refused to sign it. The tour was released at 1349Z Hours. The tour continued its mission, and returned to West Berlin at 261100Z Oct 88. Duration of Detention: two and one-half hours.

2. (C) Incidents. An incident is any occurrence that threatens the safety, security, or accepted liaison function of USMLM. An incident may occur in connection with a detention. There were three USMLM incidents in 1988:

a. (C) Vicinity of Grambow (VV5618), 281125Z Feb 88. A USMLM Air tour removed a Polish emblem from a border marker. On 14 March, USMLM was informed that the Polish Ministry of Foreign affairs had protested in a demarche to the US Ambassador a border violation of Polish territory and removal of an emblem, which they demanded be returned, by USMLM members in Vehicle 28. Chief, USMLM directed formal investigation, which established the facts of the incident, including the belief of the tour crew that they had not been seen taking the emblem and had been well within the GDR border (which is not clearly delineated at that point). The crew was suspended from accredited status immediately, reprimanded, and the emblem given to US Mission Berlin for return to the government of Poland through Department of State channels (15 Mar 88). On 22 March, State thanked USMLM for prompt action and authorized US Embassy Warsaw to return the emblem to Polish authorities with regrets and with assurance that the action had been unauthorized, that appropriate disciplinary action had been taken, and that measures had been taken to preclude a recurrence of violation of Polish territory. The US Ambassador in Warsaw the same day returned the emblem and reported Polish appreciation for prompt resolution of the issue, and that the Poles considered the matter closed. Meanwhile, on 17 Mar, OVS called a meeting to deliver a non-paper protesting the incident. The paper was accompanied by photographs of tire tracks and footprints in the snow at a border marker. OVS evidently was unaware that a protest had already been made in diplomatic channels. USMLM stated there would be no recurrence; that USMLM knew of the incident and treated it as a serious matter, despite the fact that it was in many respects a silly childish prank; that those responsible had been punished; and that the sign was being returned through diplomatic channels. Chief, OVS said the USMLM response answered all his concerns and the matter was closed. The OVS protest indicated HQ GSPG was blindsided by the Polish diplomatic action, assessed the incident as of less significance than reflected in the Polish protest, and (believing the matter would be kept in military channels) elected to resolve the matter at almost the lowest level (Chief OVS written protest).

b. (C) Vicinity of Gross Godems (PE8616), 030911Z May 88. At 1150Z Hours, a USMLM air tour was denied passage across the Glienicke Bridge Check Point to Berlin and asked to report to the Soviet/External Relations Branch (SERB). The tour returned to the Potsdam House and requested the Chief, USMLM come to the Potsdam House. The Chief, USMLM was briefed on a possible incident, then, accompanied by the Tour Officer and another Liaison Officer, went to SERB. Chief, SERB stated he had been informed by East German Police that tour personnel had taken a camera from a civilian car in the vicinity of Gross Godems (true). Chief, SERB requested the camera be returned. Chief, USMLM stated that the tour had been in an open

area and was being harassed by persons whose intentions were unknown, but who were probably surveillants. The Tour Officer approached a car occupied by one of these persons and, to his surprise, found the rear door open. The Tour Officer then took a bag from the back seat, whereupon the car drove off. The Tour Officer determined the bag contained a camera and telephoto lens. He then drove around the area looking for probable surveillants so as to return the camera bag. Finding a second car with three occupants, one of whom had been seen earlier as a dismounted surveillant, the tour left the bag on the ground within ten meters and in plain sight of this second car. Chief, SERB strongly protested the actions of the Tour Officer, citing the "tradition" of surveillance of Allied and Soviet Missions and the bad precedent of taking equipment from vehicles. He agreed to check with East German authorities as to whether the camera had been recovered. Chief, USMLM and the tour crew returned to the Potsdam House. At 1545Z Hours, Chief, SERB informed Chief, USMLM that the camera was still missing and requested that the Tour Officer return to where he had left it. Chief, USMLM told Chief, SERB he would return with the Tour Officer to look for the camera and asked that the Tour NCO, vehicle, and another Liaison NCO be allowed to return to Berlin. This was agreed. Chief, USMLM and the Tour Officer searched the turnover spot at 1715Z Hours and found nothing. Chief, USMLM returned and informed SERB of this. Chief, SERB, on an open line and through the SERB interpreter, again demanded that the officer return the camera. Chief, USMLM repeated that the Tour Officer had placed it in plain sight of accomplices of the person from whom it had been taken. The camera was no longer at the location where it had been left. USMLM had no further knowledge of the camera's whereabouts, but suspected provocation by East German authorities and asked Chief, SERB to check with them, stating USMLM knew they had seen the camera turned over to them. Chief, USMLM asked for an immediate meeting; Chief, SERB agreed to meet on 4 May (time to be announced). The Tour Officer was cleared to return to Berlin with Chief, USMLM. They returned to West Berlin at 2115Z Hours. On 4 May, Chief, SERB repeated his demands for the camera and Chief, USMLM repeated that USMLM did not have it. The incident continued to be mentioned in subsequent meetings, but no action was ever taken beyond Chief, SERB's verbal protests.

c. (C) Vicinity of Letzlingen (PD6814), 141422Z May 88. A USMLM ground tour on a PRA border road stopped where a tactical trail crossed the road. A Soviet traffic regulator walked toward the tour, which began to back up to leave the area. The regulator appeared to load his weapon, at which point the tour halted. The Soviet then approached the car, kept his weapon pointed at the crew, and ordered them to dismount. A Praporshchik drove up, dismounted, knocked the regulator's weapon away from the crew, and told the tour

to depart. The tour's TV camera recorded the regulator's threatening actions. CUSMLM protested this to OVS, stating he would not involve higher headquarters in the hopes of resolving this incident in a manner most likely to prevent a recurrence. CUSMLM provided, as evidence, a still photograph (from the videotape) of the regulator with the pointed weapon. OVS investigated, stating the regulator was improperly briefed and corrective action was taken by CofS GSFG in this and all other GSFG units.

3. (C) Other Reportable Events. On three occasions in 1988, would-be defectors entered the official USMLM residence in Potsdam and requested asylum. USMLM is unable to honor requests for asylum/assistance in defecting. Instructions for duty personnel include: Explain USMLM's inability to assist, ask that the intruder leave the compound; assist the intruder to depart without attracting attention.

a. (C) At 0020 hours (Local) on 2 July, the USMLM Duty NCO received notification from OSV that the VOPO guard at the Potsdam compound had reported an intruder, who had effected entry by climbing over the fence. The intruder, an East German male, took refuge in the Nicholson Villa. He refused to leave the compound and brandished a knife with an 8-inch blade, telling the Duty NCO that he would defend himself against any attempt to remove him. It became necessary to ask that OVS personnel remove the East German from the compound. Prior to their arrival, the Duty NCO was able to convince the intruder to surrender his weapon. He refused, however, to leave the compound. At about 0111 hours, the Deputy Chief OVS arrived, accompanied by three other Soviets. He persuaded the intruder to leave quietly. The intruder was turned over to East German authorities outside the gate at approximately 0123 hours.

(C) On 15 Jul 88 at 2315 hours (Local) a Soviet private made his way unobserved by the VOPO guard onto the compound, forced the French doors on the balcony of the main building, and entered the duty suite, awakening the Duty NCO. The latter moved the intruder back onto the balcony, summoned a Russian-speaking officer who was present, and notified the Chief of Mission, who arrived about one hour later. In a conversation lasting about 30 minutes, CUSMLM learned that the young soldier was attempting to desert because of harassment and ill treatment by senior enlisted personnel. CUSMLM outlined to the soldier the consequences of desertion for himself and for his family and was able to persuade him to leave the compound and to return to his unit. CUSMLM promised not to mention the attempted desertion to the Soviet authorities; the private promised to say nothing about his stay at USMLM. Duty personnel turned out all lights, to include perimeter security lights while

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the Soviet private made his way back over the fence. They advised the VOPO on duty that the compound had sustained a temporary power interruption.

c. (C) On 16 Aug 88 at approximately 0100 hours (Local) the Potsdam Duty Officer discovered three East Germans, two males and one female, who indicated that they had come from Brandenburg, that they had arrived by water (with no details given; subsequently a small rowboat was found), and that they requested asylum. The Duty Officer advised them that USMLM could provide no assistance and that the longer they remained on the compound the greater the danger of discovery by the VOPOs. Ultimately, they agreed to leave the compound; deciding that departure by water was not feasible, they opted to climb the security wall. The Duty Officer turned off the perimeter lights, although the intruders seemed singularly unconcerned about the danger of discovery and had no objection to climbing the lighted wall. Once they climbed the wall, the three would-be defectors walked away talking and laughing loudly, with no attempt at concealment. The VOPO guard did not react to the extinguishing of the lights nor to the noise made by the threesome. Because of behavior by the "defectors", this was assessed as a particularly blatant entrapment directed against the officer on duty.

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G. (C) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT (IIR) PRODUCTION.

1. (C) Due to the 1987 change in National IIR Reporting Procedures, assignment of FY 1988 IIR numbers ended on 30 September 1988; FY 1989 IIR numbers were used effective 1 October.

2. (C) Beginning with 1989 IIR numbers, USMLM is no longer distinguishing between Air, Ground, and NAVREP-originated reports in the SANDDUNE Series.

3. (C) USMLM IIR production figures for 1988, to include both FY 1988 and FY 1989 numbers, are listed below; 1987 figures for the same category follow in parentheses behind the total figures:

AIR DIVISION (1 215)	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY89</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USMLM Originated:	54	24	78 (055)
Based on Allied Reports:	22	04	26 (083)
Total:	76	28	104 (140)
GROUND DIVISION (2 215)			
USMLM Tour Reports:	183	52	235 (337)
Based on Allied Reports:	46	07	53 (194)
Total:	229	59	288 (432)
NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS (5 215):			
Total Reports	41	05	46 (021)
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS REPORTS:			
3000/3300 Series	155	26	181
3500 Series	42	18	60
3700 Series	39	09	48
Total:	236	53	289 (246)
TOTAL ALL IIR:	582	145	727 (938)

PART III LIAISON

A. (U) GENERAL.

1) (U) The liaison problem in 1988 was how to reestablish liaison as an important part of USMLM's activities. In the first half of the year, USMLM lobbied for increased contact opportunities with OVS and GSFG, primarily for USMLM, but also for USAREUR. This was necessary:

a) (U) To enhance deterrence by showing the Soviets the quality of servicemen and women who would oppose them in the event of war.

b) (U) To underscore the quality of life differences between Soviet and Western societies.

c) (U) To have a forum for continuing to talk about aspects of Soviet policy we find unpleasant (the Nicholson shooting, the KAL shootdown, Afghanistan) outside the confines of official protest.

d) (U) To be open to what the Soviets might want to communicate "unofficially".

e) (U) To add to the training of a cadre of responsible, well-grounded, military specialists on the USSR.

f) (U) To put liaison officers in contact with Soviets in other than a confrontational situation, so that when confrontation should occur it is less likely to go to extremes.

g) (C) To provide plausible cover to USMLM intelligence collection operations and the maintenance of "excess" personnel sharing our 14 accreditations.

h) (C) To obtain information about GSFG intentions, personnel, training, and equipment by observation and elicitation at liaison functions.

2) (U) When it became evident that there would be a swing to normalization in U.S. - Soviet military relations, the liaison task became how to accomplish this gracefully. OVS was gradually knit into more frequent meetings, quasi-social occasions, and information exchange. When the time came to tender a representational invitation (Fourth of July), it was done with acceptable advance notice by anticipating national instructions.

3) (U) The second half of the year saw quick work to get to a CINC-CINC meeting, and the reestablishment of the pre-Afghanistan contact calendar. This was possible after the 15 June announcement by the ASD(PA) that SecDef Carlucci had accepted Min of Def Yazov's apology for MAJ Nicholson's death. The transition to full-up liaison was much assisted by the September departure of COL Pereverzev, the un-restructured, hide-bound Chief of OVS from the Nicholson era of confrontation.

4) (C) Liaison reached a high point with the visit of CINC USAREUR to HQ GSFG on 1 Nov. GEN Saint led a delegation of his CoIS, DCSOPS, two division commanders, and Command Sergeant Major in discussions at HQ; a visit to the 69 MRR, 32 GTD garrison and training areas; and evening entertainment. CUSMLM was part of the CINC delegation and three USMLM officers served as interpreters. The Mission did all the advance team work, contributed to the visit preparation process in Heidelberg, provided transportation, debriefed participants, and prepared intelligence information reports and an extensive after action report.



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(U) CINC GSFG, Gen-Army Snetkov, welcomes
CINCUSAREUR, GEN Saint, to Wuensdorf

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B. (C) SELECTED LIAISON TOPICS.

1) (FOUO) Agreed Summary (Apr 86) Rights.

a) (FOUO) The Soviets continued to demonstrate they were trying to get compliance from all personnel. Komendants were almost at pains to insure they were "doing the right thing" in their dealings with Mission crews. OVS alluded to changes in procedure that would keep MLM from running into sentries unexpectedly in the field, and noted PRA (and some TRA) were specifically designed to reduce the likelihood of incidents (i.e., Agreed Summary violations).

b) (FOUO) USMLM was concerned by careless use of weapons, documenting one occasion where a traffic regulator (TR) pointed his weapon at a crew. OVS, given a photo (from crew television coverage), investigated, determined that a unit had improperly briefed a TR, and promised corrective action throughout GSFG.

c) (FOUO) A detention of an allied crew, with entry into the vehicle, search, and confiscation of some equipment, raised concerns about Agreed Summary compliance. USMLM expressed strong concern over vehicle entry in any form as a safety problem, and maintained that Agreed Summary protections extended to the French and British missions. While there was some question whether HQ GSFG authorized such actions or merely defended the excesses of local commanders, we made it clear that any violation involving a USMLM crew would put improving relations between the U.S. and USSR at risk.

d) (FOUO) We repeated a theme with OVS that so long as Agreed Summary rights were respected, USMLM crews would willingly accept being stopped to sort out questionable actions; no one was going to flee and risk harm to anyone merely to avoid the technicality of a detention. Further, USMLM would strictly abide by its obligation not to take provocative or threatening action; GSFG guards and troops, therefore, need not resort to force to protect against some supposed danger to themselves.

2) (FOUO) Withdrawals. After the Gorbachev U.N. speech we began to press OVS for details of the withdrawals and reorganization to "unambiguously defensive" formations. Our objective was threefold: find out if USMLM was going to be officially involved in counting equipment out of the GDR, finding out as much as was possible about the withdrawal and residual force, and putting the Soviets on notice that the West would be watching carefully to see whether Gorbachev's statements became reality. Our approach was to show that it was in Soviet interests to be open about what they were doing. These were unilateral measures, but they were undertaken with the idea of producing a certain impression on the West. We were

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spokesmen of how these unilateral actions look to the West, providing a kind of feedback that would have been an integral part of bilateral negotiations. Citing the 1979 "Brezhnev withdrawals", we tried to show how imprecision, double dealing, and too much secrecy ruined an initiative and poisoned Western perceptions of similar arms reduction proposals. By the end of the year, OVS was taking copious notes of our questions, but it appeared the staff at GSFG was still trying to cope with what it had to do to more men and materiel around and out; it had not yet begun to wonder about the public affairs aspect. All this was within our charter - maintain communications between the two HQ - because we were trying to reduce ambiguities and misperceptions, ever the enemy of good communications.

3) (POUO) The Berlin Connection. USMLM continued to act as a channel of communication on Berlin matters between USCOB and Soviet authorities. Both OVS and we were careful to note that USMLM had no competence on incidents in Berlin or relations between the U.S. and Soviet Sector Berlin military authorities.

4) (POUO) Construction. Dealing with OVS, and through them with the East German contractor, VEB Spezialbau Potsdam, was an object lesson in applied socialism. The contractor complained of inadequate labor and material shortages. His personnel spent longer hours in the work wagon than on the job. Once the House NCOIC drove to another VEB Spezialbau site and obtained the materials holding up the job. By various horsetrading, the NCOIC was also able to get other work done, such as pouring a pad for flammable material storage sheds (obtained in West Berlin) next to the garage. OVS, meanwhile, brought out harried KECH officers who made long lists and talked through interpreters to the VEB, who mostly shrugged (site foreman) or promised (supervisor). Nothing much was done until the 18 Oct CofS meeting at the House. Then everyone stormed the plan, trying to get everything done before the Chiefs arrived. Mostly, they repainted the main building, using a whitewash-like paint and, having waited until the last minute, worked in the rain the day before the visit. In fact, as the CofS USAREUR drove in the gate, workers were touching up the front window grills in a slight drizzle. Chief, OVS and Deputy, OVS both changed hands, both promised quick action, and both soon sank into the swamp of socialist contracting. The coups of the year were: getting "the only specialists in the GDR" finally to waterproof the foundation walls, stopping the deterioration that produced unsightly flaking and threat of eventual structural failure; swapping our missing shutters for installing heat in the carriage house; and getting the mountains of construction trash hauled off before Thanksgiving. These liaison credits go to the House NCOIC.

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5) (FOUO) FRG Exits. Chief, USMLM exercised alternate crossing options into the FRG on two occasions. In June, he crossed at Eisenach-Merleshausen to visit SMLM-F and attend the CINC USAREUR change of command in Heidelberg. In October, the Chief and Chief of Ground crossed at Hof-Hirschberg to visit USARI in Garmisch-Partenkirchen for recruitment of new liaison officers.

6) (C) The change in OVS.

a) (C) COL Pereverzev, Chief OVS, appeared glad to go, although he had one more year left on his tour. He was too much associated with confrontation, the cold formality of meeting only when there was trouble, and zero-sum play in everything. He, like his former boss, Gen-Col Krivosheyev, was for doing it by the book, unbending, and, at heart, unfriendly. We non-plussed Pereverzev with flexibility, with unexpected (by him) cooperation and candor, and with a larger vision than scoring points off one another over trivial issues. Whether this would have changed him over the long haul is unlikely. He probably went back to Moscow, glad to retreat into narrow prejudices and easy we-they simplifications. We can hope, however, that he sometimes looks at the outrageous SSSR red suspenders Chief USMLM suddenly gave him at his farewell reception, and remembers when the Americans refused to play the stale, old game.

b) (C) COL Mededev, Deputy Chief, we were pleased to send off with a gift and words of thanks for his compassion and humanity during troubled times. Of the old crew at the time of Nicholson, Mededev acted more like a human being and less like a mean-spirited, defensive brute.

c) (C) We were glad to welcome an old acquaintance, COL Polozov, as new Deputy Chief. Robert rapidly began his old wheeling and dealing, everything from badge trading to getting medication for his old mentor, Gen-Col Grinkevich, CofS of Soviet Ground Forces. Polozov was genuinely helpful in cutting through red tape. His gossip was entertaining, and sometimes informative. If he were pursuing aggressive counter-intelligence programs against us, he was circumspect.

d) (C) COL Kuklin, new Chief of OVS, was everything Pereverzev was not. He spoke passable English, was not interested in Mickey Mouse interpretation of rules, and clearly had - and knew how to implement - a mandate for improving relations. Kuklin gave MAJ Savchenko, the U.N.-certified interpreter, more leash, and that very talented officer seemed very glad to be more than mouthpiece for old thinking. Kuklin, in short, with his experience in Washington as an attache, promised to be the man the times

demand. He was not cramped by the suspicious defensiveness of the narrow counterintelligence specialist. He could reach for common goals. He was more interested in evolving relationships than the dead formality of the status quo.

e) (C) CPTs Styopkin and Naumenko, the OVS interpreters, were, like Prufrock [THIS is the way the world ends: Not with a bang, with a titter!], "deferential, glad to be of use", young linguists who happened to wear a uniform. S/Lt Polnuzhdin, the supply officer, was quietly in the background, busy with rations and the septic tank cleaner. MAJ Ostroumov, a late arrival, emerged as the textbook spotter and vetter with his B-grade movie approaches ("Why don't we get together some time to practice my English and your Russian?"). The old professional in Wuensdorf, LTC Pliyev, apparently had duties different from his previous tour, and was not working the crowd as he used to. We had been concerned that with improved relations would come more aggressive CI activity. As long as things were bad, the Soviets did not want to risk making them worse by having an incident over some recruitment fiasco. Warmer relations meant more freedom for the case officers, and USMLM stressed security awareness accordingly. A clumsy possible entrapment attempt against an officer on duty at the House, involving "religious would-be defectors", and the smarmy MAJ Ostroumov may be chalked up to the dangers of doing business in times of better relations.

C. (FOUO) SYNOPSIS OF LIAISON CONTACTS

(All meetings at OVS, Potsdam, unless noted;
CUSMLM and COVS principal participants, unless noted)

- 8 Feb Initial accreditation meeting for new CUSMLM
USMLM declines 23 Feb invitations (continued presence in Afghanistan)
- 14 Mar (at Wuensdorf) Office call with CINC GSFG
GEN Shetkov notes 17 Sep 87 shooting incident a failure of junior commander to impose will of command on his subordinates
COVS asks AMLM to make allowances for young drivers, dangerous even to themselves
- 17 Mar (at USMLM Potsdam House) Inspection tour of USMLM Potsdam House to note work outstanding; luncheon

- ~~SECRET - UNCLASSIFIED~~
- 17 Mar OVS protest of Polish Border incident (non-paper, with photos and investigation report)
OVS surprised that Polish government protested
USMLM details actions already taken; COVS considers matter closed
- 27 Apr COVS provides his version of Nicholson shooting and aftermath; hints at broadened contacts
CUSMLM provides biographic data on GEN Saint, new CINC
CUSMLM proposes monthly meetings
Discussion of OVS involvement with CDE/INF
- 3 May CUSMLM accompanies Capt McCutcheon to OVS after he was denied passage through Gliencke checkpoint; COVS verbally protests taking MFS camera
- 3 May CUSMLM informs OVS that a search of area where camera was left did not produce camera, which is presumed retrieved by watching surveillants
- 4 May CUSMLM verbal statement on facts of camera incident and USMLM actions taken; COVS says GSFG reaction still not decided
- 6 May COVS passes letter of introduction of GEN-LT Fursin, new CofS, GSFG
Camera incident still unresolved; COVS continues to ask for return of camera
- 12 May OVS issues emergency medical cards for use by AMLM
Exchange of Soviet Military Power and Whence the Threat to Peace
CUSMLM provides biographic data on MG Kem, new CofS
CUSMLM provides verbal information on U.S. report of CDE inspection in GDR (more, said COVS, than Moscow told him)
COVS announces visit to AMLM by CofS, GSFG
CUSMLM notes need for groundsman at Potsdam House
Discussion of shutters and lightning rods at Potsdam House
COVS says he is caught in the middle on the camera incident; he needs a camera returned to close the incident
- 17 May CUSMLM protests Soviet TR pointing his weapon at USMLM tour, 14 May
- 25 May (at UK reception) COVS informs of investigation of 14 May incident and corrective action taken by GSFG

- 26 May (at USMLM Potsdam House) Orientation visit by GEN-LT Fursin, new CofS GSFG
- 9 Jun CUSMLM expresses concern over 31 May FMIM detention with entry into vehicle
COVS tables Wuensdorf as venue for a possible CINC-CINC visit, based on seniority in command
- 10 Jun CUSMLM presents non-paper on Soviet violation of FRG airspace
CINC GSFG letter response to CINC USAREUR farewell letter (18 May)
COVS inquires about 3 May camera incident
Presentation of farewell gifts to COL Medved', DCOVS
- 15 Jun COVS non-paper responds to airspace violation protest
Discussion of sentries in the field
Discussion of AMLM incidents at Schlotheim
Initial OVS reaction to announcement of Soviet apology over Nicholson shooting
- 26 Jun CofS GSFG letter announcing assumption of duties
CUSMLM invites OVS families to USMLM picnic in West Berlin, 1 Jul
COVS introduces new DCOVS, COL Polozov
COVS requests historical data on CofS and CINC USAREUR assumption dates
- 1 Jul (at Rose Range, West Berlin) USMLM unit picnic; COVS, DCOVS and interpreter attend, with wives
- 11 Jul CINC USAREUR letter announcing assumption of command
Discussion of CINC-CINC possibilities
- 14 Jul (at Bastille Day Parade) CUSMLM conveys offer from CINC to exchange personal telephone numbers
- 16 Jul (with DCOVS) CINC GSFG reply to CINC USAREUR letter
CUSMLM passes Akhromeyev-Crowe materials (joint statement, calendar of contacts)
CUSMLM notes House staff shortage
- 30 Jul CINC USAREUR letter with telephone number
Discussion of CINC-CINC possibilities
COVS discusses his escort duty with CDE observers

- 18 Aug (with DCOVS at USMLM Potsdam House)
Discussion of possible volleyball match with SMLM-F
Discussion of House requirements
Designation of SRLT Polnuzhdin as point of contact for routine maintenance matters
Discussion of COVS departure in one month
- 20 Aug CINC GSFG letter with telephone number
COVS mentions concrete plans for CINC-CINC meeting, details to follow
Discussion of command diesel transit requests
CUSMLM inquires about increase in POL allocation (from 3,000 to 4,000 liters per month)
COVS announces departure and replacement; arrangements for farewells
- 23 Aug COVS makes preliminary proposals for CINC USAREUR visit to Wuensdorf
GSFG problems in calling FRG to CINC USAREUR
COVS floats proposal to open former PRA from which SS-12 unit withdrawn; query about reciprocal reductions of Pershing-2 PRA; discussion of PRA in FRG
- 25 Aug COVS regrets invitation to West Berlin farewell dinner
CINC GSFG formal invitation for visit by CINC USAREUR to Wuensdorf
COVS provides CofS and CINC birthdays
- 31 Aug COVS presents new PRA modification; COVS says new PRA designed to prevent incidents with AMLM
CUSMLM indicates some problems with timing of proposed CINC visit, letter to follow
CUSMLM recommends solutions to GSFG's inability to dial out to the FRG
- 2 Sep (at USMLM Potsdam House) Farewell luncheon for COVS
CUSMLM gives counterproposal for CINC visit date, other details
COVS comments on USMLM "reserves" (officers and NCO in excess of 14 accreditations)
- 9 Sep (final bilateral meeting with COL Pereverzev)
CINC USAREUR letter accepting invitation to visit CINC GSFG; new date proposed; CofS luncheon in Potsdam proposed
Discussion of sports and musical exchanges
Discussion of CINC visit details

- CUSMLM asks about turning in his accreditation while he is absent for use by another MLM member (COVS defers to successor)
- 12 Sep Farewell reception for COL Pereverzev, introduction of COL Kuklin
COVS passes on GSFG acceptance of new date for CINC visit
DCOVS assures completion of carriage house by winter
- 21 Sep (first business meeting with COL Kuklin)
CINC visit details
CofS GSFG agrees to meeting date with CofS USAREUR at USMLM
CUSMLM provides CDE report
Discussion of plates for new cargo trailer
- 30 Sep (at USMLM Potsdam House) Facility tour and luncheon
CINC visit and CofS meeting details
- 6 Oct CINC visit details
Discussion of GSFG problems with CINC private telephone link
CUSMLM invites OVS to Halloween Party in West Berlin
Discussion of TRA-45 map error
CUSMLM mentions Potsdam House staff shortages
- 13 Oct (with DCOVS) CINC visit details
- 15 Oct (with DCOVS) CINC visit details
- 18 Oct (at USMLM Potsdam House) CofS luncheon and meeting
CINC visit details
- 20 Oct CINC visit details, in lieu of walkthrough at Wuensdorf
Discussion of proposed joint press release
CUSMLM seeks point of contact on Berlin autobahn access check points (on behalf of USCOB)
- 21 Oct CINC visit details; joint press release revision
- 31 Oct (with CSMLM-F; LTC Tetyakov, an OVS (Wuensdorf) officer)
Last minute CINC visit details
- 31 Oct (at CUSMLM residence) Tri-Mission Halloween Party; four OVS officers attend, with wives

1 Nov CINC USAREUR visit to HQ GSFG

8 Nov Reception at OVS (Revolution Day)
Questions on Stars and Stripes deviation from agreed joint summary
LTC Pliyev states GSFG would honor a request for a USMLM visit to a GSFG air base
CUSMLM passes CDE report (Soviet inspection in FRG)
COVS proposes a children's New Year's party with AMLM participation (not held or subsequently mentioned)
COVS introduces MAJ Ostroumov, new officer

9 Nov (with DCOVS) Discussion of GSFG preparations for CINC visit
DCOVS floats idea of film nights for AMLM (Soviet films)

11 Nov (with CPT Naumenko) CUSMLM submits U.S. guest list for Thanksgiving

14 Nov (with CPT Naumenko) Coordination of Thanksgiving guest pass request

17 Nov (with CPT Naumenko) CINC USAREUR thank-you letter for 1 Nov visit

19 Nov Thanksgiving celebration at USMLM Potsdam House

22 Nov COVS notes 25 Oct detention
Followup discussion on CINC visit (photos, TV tape, and newspapers)
CUSMLM followup on request for autobahn checkpoint POC
CUSMLM relays suggestion of GO representation at SMLM commemorative functions
CUSMLM asks about visiting the Polowski grave site in Torgau
Discussion of Christmas gifts
Discussion of CINC USAREUR unofficial visit to Potsdam
CUSMLM proposes luncheon meeting of military physicians (Cdr, USAH Berlin and Soviet counterpart)
CUSMLM requests autobahn bridge classification data (access to Berlin)
COVS asks about USCOB invitation to Cdr, Soviet Berlin Bde (answered by letter, 23 Nov)
CUSMLM passes USCOB invitations to reception, CDE forecasts for USA and USSR
Discussion of POL increase (authorized by OVS letter, 18 Nov), Potsdam House staff problems, and lack of progress on carriage house

- 1 Dec (with DCOVS) CUSMLM invites COVS and DCOVS to Berlin
Winter Formal
CUSMLM passes CDE report (Soviets in UK)
- 3 Dec (with CPT Styopkin) DCOVS request for chemotherapy
medicine
- 9 Dec (LTC Beto's residence and ICC West Berlin) Berlin
Formal; COVS and officer attend, with wives
- 21 Dec CUSMLM expresses condolences on Armenian earthquake
Discussion of Gorbachev U.N. speech
Discussion of visit by DCSINT USAREUR
Discussion of trailer license plates
Followup discussion on physician luncheon, bridge classi-
fication, followon contacts, POL increase for SMLM-F,
Christmas gifts
- 27 Dec (at USMLM Potsdam House) Gift exchange with OVS officers
- 30 Dec OVS New Year's Party

PART IV LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

A. (C) GENERAL

1. (C) Physical security upgrades to the USMLM Berlin HQS included the installation of additional fencing on the perimeter fence.

2. (C) ADP upgrade: As a result of a study of the capabilities of the ADP system on hand compared to future needs of the organization, a decision was made to upgrade the current Wang Alliance system to a Wang VS mini-computer with a software upgrade to include a fully relational data base and complete networking. The approved plan, funded at DM223,000, calls for installation of a VS75E CPU, 288 MB of additional storage capacity, with four additional PCs, and one laser printer networked to the VS. In addition, as a result of the conversion within ODCSINT USAREUR from Wang hardware to another system, USMLM will receive 15 additional PCs and three PC laser printers.

3. (C) All construction was completed necessary for upgrade of the communications room to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), required for installation of the RAPIDE secure communications system. Delays in fielding of the RAPIDE equipment continued, with projected delivery date of May 1989. Certification request documents were submitted for review by the Berlin Special Security Detachment (SSD) in December 1988.

4. (U) Work was begun on a DM515,000 project to tear down the old maintenance garage and replace it with one which is one meter wider. This project was required due to water penetration of the old garage's concrete roof, causing the concrete to deteriorate and become structurally unsound. The new garage will also have one large door instead of two small doors and improved lighting.

5. (C) With the addition of world-wide access keying material for the STU-II secure phone system, the existing KY-3 was removed. This proved to hinder secure phone communication with some offices where no STU-II was available and routing through KY-3 interface was required.

B. (U) SUPPORT TO POTSDAM HOUSE

1. (U) The Soviets continued to provide logistical support to the USMLM Potsdam facility in accordance with the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Routine support included:

a. Natural gas for heating and stoves/ovens and electricity for lighting and appliances.

b. Gas coupons for travel in East Germany were delivered at the following times:

<u>AMOUNT</u>	<u>ISSUE DATE</u>	<u>FOR THE PERIOD</u>
6000 liters	20 Jan 88	Jan - Feb
6000 liters	05 Mar 88	Mar - Apr
6000 liters	04 May 88	May - Jun
6000 liters	01 Jul 88	Jul - Aug
6000 liters	UNK	Sep - Oct
6000 liters	03 Nov 87	Nov - Dec

c. During the first half of 1988, use of Soviet-provided fuel coupons increased significantly. The cause was determined to be two-fold: The four new G-wagons introduced into the fleet get slightly lower fuel mileage and installation of fire extinguisher systems forced a slight reduction in the size of the auxiliary tank. Consequently, these cars begin tours with less fuel than in the past and use it slightly faster. This required tours to add more fuel while in the GDR and increased coupon usage.

In July, USMLM began to coordinate with HQ USAREUR on the prospects of increasing fuel allocations by 2000 liters each two-month period. A formal request for the increased allocation was transmitted to OVS by letter on 15 Sep 88. OVS responded by letter dated 18 Nov 88 approving the full increase. The first issue of 8000 liters was received on 20 December 1988 for the period January-February 1989.

d. Ration deliveries continued as in past years, generally on Tuesday and Wednesday each week. Amount and quality of rations provided were consistent with previous years. Soviet rations continued to be supplemented by U.S. funded commissary purchases of condiments, baking supplies, and beverages.

e. Trash removal was performed twice weekly by the Soviets. Draining of septic tanks was done on request, but sometimes required several requests.

f. Telephone service remained unchanged, with both East and West lines in operation. Very few service outages occurred on either line. West German HF radios were located in the Main Villa and the Nicholson Villa. This back-up system, however, was determined to be unsuitable, especially in the event of some emergency. Consequently, a purchase request was submitted in December to procure a 3-unit, hand-held Motorola radio set to replace the existing HF system. Expected delivery date is June 1989.

g. Minor security enhancements were made at the Potsdam compound. Work which had been approved by Chief, USMLM in 1987 was completed in 1988. This included replacement of the fence, slight modifications to the main gate, repair of the east wall, and improved lighting.

The East German Volkspolizist remains as in past years at his station outside the main entrance to the compound.

h. The household staff has been one person short for most of the year, consisting of nine persons: six women and three men. This situation has continued since the departure of Marion Mueller a housekeeper/server with eight years service at the Potsdam House.

2. (U) Modest improvements and redecorating were made to the Nicholson Villa in 1988. The interior was completely repainted by SpezialBau Potsdam, the East German contractor under OVS direction. Carpet tile was installed upstairs and new furniture and drapes were obtained through exchange at DEH. In December, the upstairs bathroom was renovated through self-help labor. As of July, the Potsdam Duty Officer/NCO now resides in the Nicholson Villa.

3. (U) The only significant construction involving the Main Villa was the insulation of the foundation, a project which had been held over from 1987.

4. (U) The main construction efforts in the compound involved the Carriage House. Roof tiles were replaced, exterior walls were repaired and painted, some interior walls were repaired and repainted, and windows were repaired/replaced. In a meeting with the Deputy Chief of OVS in August, it was agreed that heat would be operational by the end of October and that SpezialBau would install water lines to each floor, leaving feeder lines and actual hook-up to be completed as self-help projects. By the end of December, heating fixtures (radiators) had been installed and gas-fired furnaces had been delivered, but all work ceased at that point.

Major items remaining include installation of the gas line, final work on boiler overflow systems, and installation of water supply pipes. Also, final repairs to interior walls and doors are yet to be completed.

C. (C) VEHICLES.

1. (U) Vehicle Status

a. As of 31 Dec 88:

One 1989 Ford 9-Passenger Van

One 1989 Volkswagen Cargo Van

One 1983 Volkswagen Kombi 9-Passenger Van

One 1984 Volkswagen Kombi 9-Passenger Van

Three 1984 Mercedes 280E Sedans

Four 1987 Mercedes 300E Sedans

Three 1984 Mercedes 280GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Gelaendewagen

Two 1985 Mercedes 280GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Gelaendewagen

Two 1985 Mercedes 280GE 4-Wheel Drive 4-Door Gelaendewagen

Six 1987 Mercedes 280GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Gelaendewagen

Two 1987 Mercedes 280GE 4-Wheel Drive 4-Door Gelaendewagen

Three 1988 Mercedes 280GE 4-Wheel Drive 2-Door Gelaendewagen

One 1988 Mercedes 280GE 4-Wheel Drive 4-Door Gelaendewagen

Total number of vehicles: 30

b. Four tour vehicles, the three 1988 2-doors and the one 1988 4-door, were added to the tour fleet in 1988, following completion of their modification. Turn-in requirements were met by retiring one 1983 2-door G-Wagen and two 1980 Mercedes 350SE sedans. By agreement with USCOB G-4, one 1984 G-Wagen, which normally would have been retired, was retained as an unfinanced requirement.

c. By agreement with USCOB G-4, one 1982 Mercedes 280SE sedan was turned in and replaced by one 1989 Ford 9-passenger van. This action together with the preceding one had the net effect of reducing the sedan fleet by three (to seven) and increasing the 4-wheel drive G-Wagen fleet by three (to 19).

d. To replace the two sedans as administrative vehicles, two 1985 4-door G-Wagen were retired from touring and were stripped of their touring modifications. This allows all-weather capability, particularly important during winter driving conditions.

e. One 1989 Volkswagen Cargo Van was delivered in 1988, replacing the 1983 Ford panel truck, which was turned in.

f. Plans for 1989 call for delivery of two additional Ford 9-passenger vans to replace the Volkswagen 9-passenger Kombi vans. Three 1989 2-door G-Wagen were to be delivered in January 1989. Following modification work, they should enter the touring fleet in May-June 1989. At that time, the three 1984 2-door G-Wagens will be turned in.

g. During 1988, CUSMLM agreed to accept sedans from manufacturers other than Mercedes as replacements to the current sedan fleet, provided two identical models are procured each time. Indications are that two Audi 100 sedans may be delivered in 1989, depending on the availability of funding for purchase.

2. Accreditations: USMLM converted one vehicle accreditation in 1988. This plate - number 25 - was changed from a Mercedes sedan, which was turned in, to a 4-door G-Wagen. The plate was placed on one of the two "stripped" 4-door's and was assigned to the routine use of the NOOIC of the Potsdam House. Additionally, a covered utility trailer was procured as lateral transfer from another unit and was plated as 25T. It may be towed by vehicle 25 only. Allocation of plates follows on the next page.

<u>VEHICLE TYPE</u>	<u>PLATE NUMBER</u>
Mercedes 300 E (Chief)	19
Mercedes 280 GE	20
Mercedes 280 GE	21
Volkswagen Van	22
Mercedes 280 GE (4 door)	23
Mercedes 300 E	24
Mercedes 280 GE (4 door)	25
Mercedes 300 E	26
Mercedes 280 GE	27
Mercedes 280 GE	28
Mercedes 280 GE	29

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D. (C) PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY PRODUCTION STATISTICS (NOTE: All elements of this section classified CONFIDENTIAL):

<u>ROLLS OF FILM PROCESSED (35mm)</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1987</u>
Total	2739	2684
Black and White (Original)	1859	2120
Color (Original and Dupe)	880	564
<u>PRINT PRODUCTION</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1987</u>
Proofs	35,439	50,544
Intelligence Report Prints	63,952	99,965
Miscellaneous Prints (ID photos, official functions, etc.)	11,408	Not differentiated
Total Prints	110,799	150,509

ANNEX A - HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT

A G R E E M E N T

MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

In conformity with the provisions of Article 2 of the Agreement on "Control Mechanism in Germany", November 14, 1944, the US and the Soviet Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany have agreed to exchange Military Liaison Missions accredited to their staffs in the zones and approve the following regulations concerning these missions:

1. These missions are military missions and have no authority over quadri-partite military government missions or purely military government missions of each respective country, either temporarily or permanently, on duty in either zone. However, they will render whatever aid or assistance to said military government missions as is practicable.

2. Missions will be composed of air, navy, and army representatives. There will be no political representative.

3. The missions will consist of not to exceed fourteen (14) officers and enlisted personnel. This number will include all necessary technical personnel, office clerks, personnel with special qualifications, and personnel required to operate radio stations.

4. Each mission will be under the orders of the senior member of the mission who will be appointed and known as "Chief of the United States (or Soviet) Military Mission."

5. The Chief of the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces.

In the United States Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command.

In the Soviet Zone the Mission will be accredited to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany.

6. In the United States Zone the Soviet Mission will be offered quarters in the region of Frankfurt.

~~SECRET~~

7. In the Soviet Zone the United States Mission will be offered quarters at or near Potsdam.

8. In the United States Zone the Chief of the Soviet Mission will communicate with A/C of Staff, G-3, United States European Command.

9. In the Soviet Zone the Chief of the United States Mission will communicate with the Senior Officer of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

10. Each member of the missions will be given identical travel facilities to include identical permanent passes in the Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision.

Each time any member of the Soviet or United States Mission wants to visit the United States or Soviet headquarters, military government offices, forces, units, military schools, factories, and enterprises which are under United States or Soviet control, a corresponding request must be made to Director, Operations, Plans, Organization and Training, European Command, or Senior Officer, Headquarters, Group of Soviet Occupational Forces in Germany. Such requests must be acted upon within 24 - 72 hours.

Members of the missions are permitted allied guests at the headquarters of the respective missions.

11. a. Each mission will have its own radio station for communication with its own headquarters.

b. In each case couriers and messengers will be given facilities for free travel between the headquarters of the mission and the headquarters of their respective Commander-in-Chief. These couriers will enjoy the same immunity which is extended to diplomatic couriers.

c. Each mission will be given facilities for telephone communications through the local telephone exchange at the headquarters, and they will also be given facilities such as mail, telephone, and telegraph through the existing means of communication when the members of the mission will be traveling within the zone. In case of breakdown in the radio installation the zone commanders will render all possible aid and will permit temporary use of their own systems of communications.

12. The necessary rations, P.O.L. supplies, and household services for the military missions will be provided for by the headquarters to which accredited, by method of mutual compensation in kind, supplemented by such items as desired to be furnished by their own headquarters.

In addition, the respective missions or individual members of the missions may purchase items of Soviet or United States origin which must be paid for in currency specified by the headquarters controlling zone where purchase is made.

13. The buildings of each mission will enjoy full rights of extra-territoriality.

14. a. The task of the mission will be to maintain liaison between both Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs.

b. In each zone the missions will have the right to engage in matters of protecting the interests of their nationals and to make representations accordingly as well as in matters of protecting their property interests in the zone where they are located. They have a right to render aid to people of their own country who are visiting the zone where they are accredited.

15. This agreement may be changed or amplified by mutual consent to cover new subjects when the need arises.

16. This agreement is written in the Russian and English languages and both texts are authentic.

17. This agreement becomes valid when signed by the Deputy Commanders of the United States and Soviet Zones of Occupation.

/s/ C. R. Huebner
/t/ Lieutenant General HUEBNER

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
European Command

/s/ Malinin
/t/ Colonel-General MALININ

Deputy Commander-in-Chief
Chief of Staff of the Group
of Soviet Occupational
Forces in Germany

ANNEX B TOURING STATISTICS

A. (C) TOURS AND TOUR DAYS, 1988:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOURS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF TOUR DAYS</u>
January	39	86
February	41	106
March	50	119
April	45	104
May	33	81
June	32	74
July	31	73
August	37	82
September	35	81
October	36	83
November	28	53
December	33	59
TOTALS	462	1079

B. TOTAL DISTANCE, 1988: 440,000 KM

C. COMPARISON, 1987 AND 1988:

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>PERCENT CHANGE</u>
TOURS	462	440	-09.5
TOUR DAYS	1,079	1,001	-09.3
DISTANCE	404,838 KM	440,000 KM	+09.0

ANNEX C. (U) USMLM PERSONNEL ROSTER, 1988

PRESENT FOR DUTY, 31 DECEMBER 1988

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH OF SERVICE</u>
GOVAN, GREGORY G.	COL	USA
BETO, MARK D.	LTC	USA
BUSCH, ROBERT E. II	LT COL	USAF
COX, JAMES H. JR.	LTC	USA
ENNIS, MICHAEL E.	LT COL	USMC
CULPEPPER, MICHAEL H.	MAJ	USA
DE LEON, DIONISIO A. III	MAJ	USA
DELONG, YALE J. II	MAJ	USAF
GROB, DAVID C.	MAJ	USA
MAGGARD, MICHAEL	MAJ	USA
MURRAY, KIRK E.	MAJ	USA
SALYERS, SCOTT W.	MAJ	USA
ANDERSON, JOEL M.	CPT	USA
DUDA, JOSEPH J.	CPT	USA
HUMPERT, DAVID M.	CAPT	USAF
JOHNSON, JEFFREY S.	CAPT	USAF
CASHWELL, JOSEPH E.	SGM	USA
BRAKEY, GEORGE G.	SMSGT	USAF
CHANDLEE, MICHAEL J.	MSGT	USAF
BARNEY, DANFORD N. V.	SFC	USA

REF ID: A66563

~~SECRET / UNCLASSIFIED~~

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH OF SERVICE</u>
BOLDEN-INGRAM, LIBBIA	SFC	USA
DUNCAN, MICHAEL L.	SFC	USA
MERRIAM, PAUL W.	SFC	USA
MORALES RIVERA, J. L.	MSGT	USAF
TERENS, DENNIS P.	SFC	USA
ALLINSON, ANDREW P. JR.	SSG	USA
BENTON, JAMES F.	SSG	USA
BINDY, STEVEN J.	TSGT	USAF
CLAYTON, KIMBERLY P.	SSG	USA
COHENS-DAIES, LOLA M.	SSG	USA
DAVIS, EBYLEE	SSG	USA
DYCK, BRYAN J.	TSGT	USAF
GILL, GLEN R.	SSG	USA
GILPIN, SCOTT H.	TSGT	USAF
LAWRENCE, GARY W.	SSG	USA
ORTIZ, RICHARD	SSG	USA
RAMSEY, ROBERT J.	TSGT	USAF
SCHATZ, JESSIE G.	SSG	USA
ARENIBAR, MARTIN F.	SGT	USA
CAIN, VINCENT K.	SSGT	USAF
EASTERLY, SILVIA M.	SSGT	USAF
GAITHER, GARY D.	SGT	USA

~~SECRET / UNCLASSIFIED~~

UNCLASSIFIED

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH OF SERVICE</u>
GONZALEZ, ANGEL L.	SSGT	USAF
GRAY, WILLIAM I.	SGT	USA
JONES, ROBERT L.	SGT	USA
KURTZ, DARRELL L.	SSGT	USAF
MCELHERAN, MICHAEL K.	SGT	USA
PETIT, RICKIE L.	SGT	USA
STEWART, DOYLE K.	SSGT	USAF
SULLIVAN, ROBERT A.	SGT	USA
ALENMAN, LUIS	SPC	USA
ALLEY, WADE P.	SPC	USA
CAUDILL, CLINTON M.	SPC	USA
HERTL, ROBERT F.	SPC	USA
JOHNSON, MICHELE	SGT	USAF
KOCH, RHONDA L. S.	SPC	USA
MCCORKLE, MICHAEL W.	SPC	USA
MUNDY, GERALD	SPC	USA
RADFORD, CORA L.	SPC	USA
SHELTON, MARVIN E.	SPC	USA
BATES, JAMES	MR	CIV
CARTIER, CRAIG	MR	CIV
CORBETT, WILLIAM R.	MR	CIV
HANDY, MARK A.	MR	CIV

~~SECRET~~ / ~~WHITTEL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>BRANCH OF SERVICE</u>
KALIHER, KRISTELL A.	MS	CIV
LUTHER, VICTORIA A.	MS	CIV
RATZ, MELVIN E.	MR	CIV
SEMMETT, EDA-SUZANNE	MS	CIV
SEXTON, JEFFREY R.	MR	CIV
STINSON, DAVID	MR	CIV

1331

DEPARTURES 1988

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DEPARTURE DATE</u>
EVANS, CLYDE L.	LTC	02 MAY 88
SHOFFNER, LARRY L.	LTCOL	20 JUL 88
BERRY, JOHN H.	MAJ	10 JUN 88
BORT, ROGER E.	MAJ	03 JAN 88
CLOVIS, ALLEN M.	MAJ	01 AUG 88
JONES, RANDAL R.	MAJ	29 MAY 88
LEAHY, JAMES V.	MAJ	01 AIG 88
WILSON, THEODORE C.	MAJ	10 JUN 88
MCCUTCHEON, BENNETT B.	CAPT	08 JUL 88
BERRETT, ALLEN L.	CMSGT	01 AUG 88
BARRY, CHARLES L.	MSGT	10 APR 88
BLAKE, RONALD H.	SFC	14 AUG 88
SCHWAB, LAWRENCE R.	SFC	25 AUG 88
MCCRIMMON, JAMES E.	SSG	15 JUL 88
THOMPSON, ROBERT A.	SSG	20 DEC 88
WIEMAN, LEONARD P. JR.	SSG	04 AUG 88
BRYSON, KATHLEEN	SSGT	03 JAN 88
DUKE, CYNTHIA G.	SSGT	30 APR 88
WESSELING, PAULA M.	SGT	22 APR 88
DAVIES, ELIZABETH A.	SFC	03 JUN 88
SUMMERS, THOMAS H. JR.	SIC	01 APR 88
AGUIGOI, ROSITA N.	CIV	09 OCT 88

ANNEX D DEALINGS WITH SERB, STATISTICS

(C) A Unit History is often of use to the originating unit as an internal record of background information and precedent affecting current operations. This Annex has as its purpose the provision of just such an internal record of USMLM-SERB transactions for the period 1985-1988. Included are: total annual guest pass requests and total annual requests for accreditation changes for personnel and for vehicles.

A. GUEST PASS REQUESTS:

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
JANUARY	77 (26)	65 (26)	125 (30)	53 (12)
FEBRUARY	65 (17)	60 (21)	43 (17)	69 (20)
MARCH	76 (24)	186 (51)	125 (32)	78 (23)
APRIL	216 (43)	66 (27)	48 (18)	46 (14)
MAY	126 (29)	79 (30)	110 (25)	85 (23)
JUNE	72 (20)	127 (39)	94 (27)	172 (37)
JULY	113 (27)	91 (27)	105 (30)	78 (19)
AUGUST	124 (32)	144 (38)	178 (28)	79 (23)
SEPTEMBER	85 (33)	118 (33)	82 (19)	107 (29)
OCTOBER	107 (33)	80 (21)	175 (42)	40 (17)
NOVEMBER	97 (34)	115 (23)	200 (45)	103 (25)
DECEMBER	115 (32)	68 (23)	117 (28)	92 (26)
TOTALS	1283 (350)	1199 (359)	1402 (341)	1002 (268)

NOTE: Statistics in parentheses () indicate the number of guest pass requests.

B. PASS EXCHANGES

	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
JANUARY	23	11	9	12	13
FEBRUARY	26	10	12	12	14
MARCH	18	9	13	14	19
APRIL	18	13	13	14	12
MAY	22	10	11	13	13
JUNE	16	10	10	14	14
JULY	12	8	14	14	15
AUGUST	12	11	12	14	13
SEPTEMBER	10	10	14	15	13
OCTOBER	10	11	14	14	17
NOVEMBER	11	12	14	12	19
DECEMBER	13	16	15	20	17
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	191	131	151	168	179

ANNEX E VISITORS TO USMLM

(C) OFFICIAL VISITORS: Visits by members of the intelligence community and others with a professional interest in USMLM's collection activity promote an informative dialogue which assists USMLM in its efforts to maintain an effective and active collection program.

The following is a selected list of key personnel briefed by USMLM in Berlin during 1988:

JANUARY

MS. BRITT L. SNIDER	GENERAL COUNSEL, SSCI
MR. JAMES H. DYKSTRA	MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR, SSCI
MS. CHARLENE PACKARD	PROFESSIONAL STAFF MBR, SSCI
LTC ROBERT P. WILLIAMS	OCLL ESCORT OFFICER
COL DONALD F. ULLMANN	CH, HUMINT DIV, ODCSINT, DA
MR. CHARLES J. PETERSON	SPEC ASST TO DCSINT, USAEUR
BG PAUL J. VANDERPLOOG	CG, 2D SPT CMD
COL THOMAS PRATHER	DEPUTY CDR, 2D SPT CMD
SENATOR TIMOTHY E. WIRTH	MBR, SEN ARMED SVCS COMM
	(SASC) (D-COLORADO)
MR. WILLIAM E. HOEHN	PROF STAFF, SASC
MR. JOHN HAMPE	PROF STAFF, SASC
MR. WILLIAM G. MILLER	AMBASSADOR'S AIDE, POLIT,
	USBER
MS. DEBRA L. CAGAN	INR, STATE DEPARTMENT

FEBRUARY

MG JAMES C. CERCY	CG, 32D AADCOM
MR. GEORGE S. KOLT	IC Staff
COL PATRICK K. BRANCH	DEP DIR, POL, PLANS & PROG,
	HQ USAF/INX
COL THOMAS E. PENICK, JR.	MOB ASST TO DEP ASST COPS,
	INTEL, HQ USAF/INX
COL EDWARD A. REILLY	MOB ASST TO DEPUTY ASST
	COPS, INTEL, HQ USAF/INX
MG RICHARD S. KEM	DCSENGR, USAREUR
COL ROBERT G. FERRARI	CH, FAC ENGR DIV, ODCSENGR,
BG WILLIAM STUDER	CDR, 316 AIR DIV
BG GEORGE B. HARRISON	COPS USAFE
GEN GLENN K. OTIS	CINC USAREUR
MG JOHN H. MITCHELL	USCOB
BG LOUIS J. DELROSSO	CG, VII CORPS ARTILLERY
BG FRANK CUNNINGHAM	CDR, 59 ORD BDE
COL JAMES H. AMATO	DEP CDR, 59 ORD BDE

MARCH

COL BEN C. HARDAWAY, JR.	CDR, 6912 ESG
MG MONIE B. MILLER	CMD SURGEON, USEUCOM
BG PAUL D. GLEASON	CMD SURGEON, USAFE
MR. ROBERT SINGLETON	INTEL OVERSIGHT OFFICER,
	ODCSINT DA
COL MIKE SCHNEIDER	DCSINT, AMC
COL LON RATLEY	USAFE/INO TO BERLIN, BONN
	EUCOM STAFF, PLUS 22 PAO'S
	CAPSTONE SENIOR FELLOW
GEN(R) ROBERT W. SENNEWALD	CAPSTONE DIR
RADM JAMES E. ECKELBERGER	CAPSTONE
BG RICHARD S. SIEGFRIED	CAPSTONE
COL(P) WILLIAM C. CARLSON	CAPSTONE
COL(P) BERNARD W. GANN	CAPSTONE
COL(P) NICHOLAS R. HURST	CAPSTONE
COL(P) JAMES MCINTYRE	CAPSTONE
COL(P) ROBERT L. STEPHENS, JR.	CAPSTONE
COL(P) LESTER J. WEBER	CAPSTONE
COL(P) WILLIAM H. CAMBELL	CAPSTONE
COL(P) RICHARD C. HEARNEY	CAPSTONE
COL LIONEL R. INGRAM	CAPSTONE ESCORT
MR. DAN THAL	U.S. EMBASSY, BONN
MG JACKSON R. ROZIER, JR.	DCSLOG, USAREUR
DR. LAURENCE LEGERE	SECDEF'S PERSONAL REP TO
	EUROPE & DEFENSE ADVISOR
CAPT THOMAS B. ELLSWORTH	ADCSINT, USEUCOM

APRIL

COL DANTE CAMIA	CHIEF PAO, USAREUR
DR. JUDITH A. DALY	PROGRAM MGR, DARPA/TAC TECH
	OFF
MR. BERNARD RAIMO	COUNSEL, HPCSI
MR. BERNARD R. TOON, II	PROF STAFF MBR, HPSCI
MR. ROBERT J. WINCHESTER	SPEC. ASST TO SEC ARMY
GEN JOHN R. GALVIN	SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
	EUROPE
MR. GEORGE FINDLEY	GDIP STAFF
MS. JOAN SARDO	GDIP STAFF
MR. DOUGLAS M. HORNER	EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
	PRESIDENT/OMB
COL MICHAEL D. KRAUSE	FACULTY TRIP LEADER,
	NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CAPT RONNIE J. ACKERMAN	STUDENT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CDR PETER K. BOLTON	STUDENT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CDR ROBERT F. POWERS	STUDENT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CDR PETER W. SCHEMPE	STUDENT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CDR ROBERT A. TAYLOR	STUDENT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
LTCOL EDWARD L. LAFONTAINE	STUDENT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
LTCOL LEONARD C. LYLE	STUDENT, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

COL ROGER E. CARLETON	XO, CINCUSAFE
COL BARRY L. THOMPSON	DCSPLANS, CINCAAC
COL OTTO B. HABEDANK	CH, PLANS & OPS, ANG
COL DAVID SIBLEY	AFRES
LTCOL DAVID L. SCOBAY	XO, ANG
LTCOL DOUGLAS M. OLSEN	CH, PLANS BR, ANG
MR. JOHN VOGEL	DDI, BONN
MR. HUGH BALAM	DDI, BONN
MR. PAUL KUEGER	DDI, STUTTGART
MR. DENNIS STADTHER	DDI, STUTTGART
MR. ROBERT RESSMAN	DDI, MONS
GEN GLENN K. OTIS	CINC USAREUR (OUTGOING)
LTG WILLIAM E. ODOM	DIRNSA
MR. ROBERT K. PRICE	CH, NSA EUROPE
MR. FRANKLIN J. BUCK, JR.	DOD SPECIAL REP TO BERLIN
LTC GARY L. SORNESS	AIDE TO DIRNSA
HON JUDGE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER	DCI
LTC GEORGE D. NORTON	PAO, USCOB
GEN CROSBIE E. SAINT	CINCUSAREUR (INCOMING)

JULY

MG THOMAS R. OLSON	COFS, ALLIED TACAF, HEIDELBERG
COL CORTES PROCTOR	ACOFPS, ALLIED TACAF, HEIDELBERG
BG MELVIN L. BYRD	COMMANDER, AMC, EUROPE
BG RICHARD J. O'LEAR	DCSI, USAFE
MG THOMAS C. FOLEY	DCSOPS, USAREUR
MR. ROBERT J. WINCHESTER	SPEC ASST TO SEC ARMY FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
MS. JEANNE MCNAUGHTON	SSCI STAFF DEL FOR SENATOR DENNIS DECONCINI (D-AZ)
MR. MARVIN OTT	SSCI STAFF DEL FOR SENATOR FRANK H. MURKOWSKI (R-AK)
LTC(P) CHARLES W. WOOD	CHIEF, PLANS BR, PLANS & OPS DIV, OFC OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON, DA
MR. CHARLES J. PETERSON	SPEC. ASST TO DCSI, USAREUR
MG(P) HARRY F. SOYSTER	CDR, INSCOM
COL WILLARD T. CARTER	CDR, FIELD STATION BERLIN
MG CHARLES B. EICHELBERGER	DCSI, USAREUR

AUGUST

COL ALEXANDER MURCHISON	DEP BASE CDR, 7350TH ABG
DR. MICHAEL A. WARTILL	DIA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM
MR. PETER A. MARINO	DIA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM
MR. JOHN J. TODD	DIA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM
LTCOL JOHN E. HATLELID	DIA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM
MS. CONNIE L. MCMAUGH	DIA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMM

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~

COL WILSON B. BRILEY	VICE CDR, 65TH AIR DIV
ADM(R) HARRY D. TRAIN, 11	CAPSTONE SENIOR FELLOW
RADM JAMES E. KOEHR	CAPSTONE
RADM RALPH L. TINDAL	CAPSTONE
BG STANCIL L. DILDA, JR.	CAPSTONE
BG ROBERT C. LEE	CAPSTONE
BG DENNIS P. MALCOR	CAPSTONE
BG MARTIN L. BRANDTNER	CAPSTONE
BG JOSEPH J. REDDEN	CAPSTONE
COL(P) JOHN D. HOWARD	CAPSTONE
CAPT(P) THOMAS F. HALL	CAPSTONE
COL(P) JAMES M. HURLEY	CAPSTONE
COL FRITZ OELRICH	CAPSTONE ESCORT
COL OSCAR L. FERRELL	HUMINT PANEL, DIA
	SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ADM JAMES B. BUSEY	CINCUSNAVEUR
MAJ JOHN E. KING	TECH MGMT OFC, COFS ARMY
MAJ DOUG MACINNES	TECH MGMT OFC, COFS ARMY
LTC JOSEPH INGE	TECH MGMT OFC, COFS ARMY
COL CHARLES F. SMITH	CDR, CRYPTOLOGIC SPT GP
	HEIDELBERG
MR. DEL DAVIS	STAFF DEL, HOUSE APP COMM
LTC PAUL PAYETTE	CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET LSNO
MR. BURTON S. WEISMAN	DEF INTEL COLLEGE
MS. JOANN DOLAN	AMEMB BONN
MR. GARY ROBBINS	AMEMB BONN
MR. WALTER ANDRUYSUN	AMEMB BONN
MG RICHARD S. KEM	COFS, USAREUR & 7A
CAPT RICHARD A. LITE	168.4 TASK GROUP, MUNICH, GE

SEPTEMBER

MR. CHRISTOPHER M. CENTNER	USAF INTELL AGENCY
MR. JOHN DESPRES	STAFF DESIGNEE FOR SENATOR
	BRADLEY (D-NJ), SSCI
MR. MICHAEL P. W. STONE	UNDERSEC ARMY
MS. ANNE N. FOREMAN	AF GEN COUNSEL
LTGEN BUFORD D. LARY	AF IG
MS. FLORENCE W. MADDEN	ASST GEN COUNSEL FOR
	MIL AFFAIRS
COL KEITH L. CRAMER	CH, INTEL INSPECTION
	BRANCH, AFISC
LTCOL ALLEN B. BROWSER	XO, SAF/IG
MG NORMAN C. WOOD	ACSINTEL
MS. BECKY SCHMIDT	DEP DIR FOR DEF
	BUDGET, HOUSE OF REPS
GEN JAMES J. LINDSAY	CINC, US SPECIAL OPERATIONS
	COMMAND (SOC)
RADM CATHAL L. FLYNN	J5 DIRECTOR, SOC
COL JOHN D. BLAIR	J3 DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SOC
LTC(P) RICHARD H. WHITE	XO TO CINC SOC

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~

LCDR DOUGLAS S. LOWE
 BMCN RUDOLPH E. BOESCH
 MG FRED R. NELSON

LTC JERRY T. STANSFIELD
 HONORABLE JOHN O. MARSH, JR.
 COL JOHN A. MCCLOUD
 MR. RICHARD A. BARNETT
 MR. THOMAS DILLON

ADC TO CINC SOC
 SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR
 DOFS, AIR, HQ ALLIED FORCES,
 NORTHERN EUROPE
 CHIEF, CL/HUMINT BRANCH
 SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
 OFFICE OF ASST SECDEF (C3I)
 OASD
 OASD

OCTOBER

MR. MICHAEL ROSENE
 MG NORRIS EINERTON
 HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TAFT
 MR. FRED S. HOFFMAN
 MR. JOHN A. WOODWORTH

MR. CHARLES H. THOMAS

DR. LAURENCE LEGERE

BG ROBERT A. GOODBARRY
 MR. CLARENCE JOHL
 CAPT JAMES G. PROUT, III
 LTC JOHN P. LILLEY
 MG JAMES W. CRYSEL
 LTCOL PATRICK BRANCH
 COL EDGAR PAUL
 COL RICHARD POWERS
 MG BILLY M. THOMAS
 MR. JAMES SKURKA

MR. MONTE SAYNE
 MAJ MCPHERSON
 MG RICHARD S. KEM
 MS. LORIE WAKTMAN
 COL JAMES ROOT
 MG JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.
 COL CHARLES E. KENT
 BG GARY W. O'SHAUGHNESSY
 COL JOHN W. MCGUINNESS
 BG CHARLES L. BISHOP
 BG OWEN W. LENTZ
 BG JOHN F. STEWART
 CAPT CHARLES W. KIRCHHOFF
 RADM ISIAH C. COLE
 COL MICHAEL E. PHENEGER
 COL JAMES A. CORSI
 COL JOHN H. GARRISON
 COL THOMAS W. O'CONNELL

FSTC
 CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS
 DEP SECDEF
 DEP ASST SECDEF (PUB AFFAIRS)
 DEP ASST SECDEF (EUR & NATO
 POLICY)
 PRINCIPAL DEP ASST SECSTATE,
 BUREAU OF EUR & CANADIAN
 AFFAIRS
 DEFENSE ADVISOR, US MSN TO
 NATO
 SEN MIL ASST TO DEP SECDEF
 ASST FOR BURDEN SHARING
 MIL ASSY TO DEP SECDEF
 TRIP COORDINATOR
 CDR, TAPA
 TAPA
 ESCIG, KELLY AFB, TX
 DIR INTEL SYSTEMS, ODCSINT DA
 COMMANDER, CECOM
 DIRECTOR, C3I LOG &
 READINESS CTR
 FORCE MOD DIR, CECOM
 USAREUR CECOM REP
 CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR
 NSA
 SAC
 PACOM
 FORSCOM
 EUCOM
 CENTCOM
 USFK
 SPACECOM
 SOUTHCOM
 JSTPS
 CINCLANT
 USSOCOM
 MAC
 SHAPE
 JSOC

MG CHARLES B. EICHELBERGER	DCSINT, USAREUR
MG NORMAN C. WOOD	USAF INTEL
RADM JAMES S. MCFARLAND	USN INTEL
BG JAMES O. BEANS	USMC INTE
LTC EDWARD J. HEINZ	IC STAFF
MG IRA C. OWENS	NSA
RADM H. B. THORSON	USCG
MG ROBERT F. DURKIN	DMA
BG ROLAND LAJOIE	OSIA
COL RICHARD E. DAVIS	NORAD
LTC LEONARD H. PERROOTS	DIR, DIA
MR. GORDON F. NEGUS	DIA ED
MR. MARTIN F. HERWITZ	DIA D/GDIP
MG FRANK B. HORTON, III	DIA VP
MR. CHARLES W. ROADES	DIA DA
MR. A. DENIS CLIFT	DIA DI
COL WARREN A. UTHE	DIA JS
BG WALTER C. HERSMAN	DIA VO
MR. HOWARD ROOP	DIA DIC
LTC RALPH E. WEMPE	DIA DI-ESA
LTC LLOYD J. TUCKER	DIA DR-XA
CPT CAROLYN S. METCALF	DIA DR-XA
MR. FRANCIS B. NORTHRUP	IC STAFF
MS. SUZANNE WILLIAMS	PRO
MS. ELIZABETH E. KERPER	PRO
MR. RICHARD P. ISPER	CMD, CTL & COMM, DIR FID
GEN CROSBIE E. SAINT	CINCUSAREUR

NOVEMBER

GEN CROSBIE E. SAINT	CINCUSAREUR
MG CAL WALLER	CG, 8TH MECH DIV
MG RICHARD S. KEM	CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR
MG NICK KRAWCIW	CG, 3 ID(M)
MG THOMAS C. FOLEY	DCSOPS, USAREUR
MG RAYMOND E. HADDOCK	USCOB
CSM DANNEY C. CLINE	CSM, USAREUR & 7A
MR. DONALD E. RICHBOURG	STAFF DEL, DEF SUBCOMMITTEE
MR. DENNIS M. KEDZIOR	STAFF DEL, HOUSE APPR COMM
MS. ELIZABETH J. PESKIN	JIC, USEUCOM
MR. MICHAEL R. NOONGAY	JIC, USEUCOM
MR. STEVEN CERTO	JIC USEUCOM
LT RICHARD OSMUN	JIC USEUCOM
MR. CHARLES E. CRENSHAW	JIC USEUCOM
CAPT KAREN S. WYNS	JIC USEUCOM
RADM J. W. BITOFF	USEUCOM
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CAPT B. VANHEERTUM	USEUCOM
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